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This study investigates the outcome of the process 
of secularization in three modernized urban Chinese 
societies in East Asia and seeks to describe the resultant 
patterns of change and continuity. Some missiological 
implications are drawn from the findings of the 
investigations.
Chapter 1 is an account of the historical 
development of secularization in Western societies and the 
effects of secularization on religion, society, and the 
individual. The focus in chapter 2 is on worldview and 
worldview change and the functions of these in the process 
of secularization. A five-part theoretical paradigm of the 
traditional Chinese worldview analyzed vis-a-vis the themes,
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
hierarchy, antiquity, particularity, harmony, and 
practicality is presented in chapter 3. In chapter 4 the 
impact of modernization and secularization on these Chinese 
societies end the emergence of a new hybrid worldview in 
which elements of both the traditional and modern are 
synthesized, are examined. Some aspects of the traditional 
Chinese worldview, such as affinity for hierarchy and 
antiquity, have gone through radical and perhaps 
irreversible change, whereas the Chinese esteem for 
particularity, harmony, and practicality has largely 
remained intact. Chapter 5 focuses on the implications of 
continuity and change, and seeks to show how these dynamic 
patterns of change have created new conditions conducive to 
mission.
The missiological conclusions of the study are 
spelled out in categories: mission, conversion, and church.
1. The process of secularization has opened up a 
degree of freedom from family and historical tutelage. This 
signals new opportunities for mission.
2. The Chinese group consciousness calls for a
rethinking of the evangelistic process to include a more 
family and group oriented approach.
3. The sense of unease induced by change has
created an atmosphere in which the church as the Body of
Christ needs to function as a socially supportive and 
meaning reifying community.
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INTRODUCTION
Background to the Problem 
The Chinese are perhaps one of the world's most 
widely scattered ethnic groups. Chinese who reside outside 
mainland China are found in over eighty countries. They 
live under various political., ethnic, and economic 
conditions. The Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Singapore, however, share a commonality in that their 
countries are highly urbanized and industrialized 
cosmopolitan societies with Chinese descendants as most of 
their citizens. Chinese in these countries share a great 
cultural and commercial heritage. Most of them were born 
and have spent most or all of their lives outside China. 
Their pro-Western governmental, judicial, educational and 
medical systems are similar. Being Chinese, though, does 
not necessarily mean they are Chinese-speaking Chinese. 
Millions do not know or care much about the Chinese language 
and live, dress, eat, and think in a manner that bears 
little resemblance to their Chinese counterparts in mainland 
China.
The contemporary Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Singapore have grown up during decades of rapid 
industrialization and economic growth. During the years of
1
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national development, Western ideas and technology have been 
imported and vigorously adopted. The espousal of Western 
ideals and models has brought the pervasive influence of 
Western civilization in general and secularization in 
particular.
Many social scientists argue that industrialization 
invariably produces secularization, and that as technology, 
industry, and bureaucracy spread throughout the world, the 
importance and influence of religion decrease. To some 
degree this appears to be true in these Chinese societies. 
Powerful social and economic forces have triggered a crisis 
in values. Traditions that have been entrenched for 
millennia are being challenged and reshaped by a new 
worlcview. Young Chinese are leaving traditional Buddhist 
and Confucian religions in search of a "good life." In 
general terms one might argue that preoccupation with the 
pursuit of material prosperity is put in the place of the 
traditional priority of worship. In certain areas temples 
are being replaced by technology, and jos3 sticks by 
microchips. Long-cherished traditional rituals and symbols 
are being replaced or forsaken. Cohesive family ties are 
breaking down. On the other hand, Taiwan is currently in a 
temple-building boom. Hence, the overall picture is quite 
complex. Fundamental social changes in the contemporary 
societies present the Christian church with unprecedented 
problems and opportunities, but the resurgence of
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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traditional religious belief and reaffirmation of some 
social mores in certain areas is a reminder of the 
durability of the traditional ethical code of the Chinese.
Purpose of the Study 
The ultimate purpose of this study is missiological. 
We are concerned with the exploration of possibilities and 
opportunities for the communication of the gospel and the 
enlargement of Christian communities in the three 
contemporary, modernized, urbanized, Chinese societies of 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Before this can be done, 
it is necessary to seek to understand as thoroughly as 
possible who the Chinese in these societies are. To what 
extent have they remained traditional Chinese, and to what 
extent and in what ways have their thinking and the patterns 
of their lives been influenced by the symbiotic processes of 
modernization and secularization. At the outset, therefore, 
there is a sustained attempt to investigate and analyze the 
processes of modernization and secularization in these 
societies. This investigation is conducted in stages, as 
follows: (1) studying secularization in its Western
historical context; (2) examining the concept of worldview 
and worldview change and the way these relate to the process 
of secularization; (3) identifying the traditional Chinese 
worldview in terms of its cultural continuity; and (4) 
describing the worldview in these three societies as shaped 
and fashioned by the forces of modernization and
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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secularization. What is learned from these investigations 
is then used to inform a missiological investigation of the 
new possibilities, challenges, and difficulties in the 
communication of the gospel and the establishment and 
expansion of Christian communities in these societies.
Delimitations
This dissertation is subject to several limitations. 
First, the study is conducted in the setting of three 
predominantly overseas Chinese communities in East Asia, 
namely, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Although not 
exactly parallel in every respect, they have enough 
commonality in their cultural heritage and economic prowess 
to make them objects of our study. In the survey of the 
traditional Chinese worldview, mainland China is 
understandably the main focus.
Second, this dissertation is concerned with the 
traditional and the contemporary Chinese mind. It is not 
intended to be a study of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, or 
Chinese folk religion, although these are often alluded to 
and referred to. These religions are only referred to 
within the context of their respective influence on the 
traditional Chinese worldview.
Third, this dissertation is not intended or designed 
to be a comparative study of the processes of secularization 
in the West and the East. It is accepted that 
secularization is a universal phenomenon. Some of the
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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characteristics it assumes in the West and the East are 
similar, although many dimensions of the process are very 
different. The study of secularization in the West is 
employed as a background against which to evaluate a similar 
process in the selected Chinese societies.
Methodology and Sources
This dissertation is in the main a descriptive study 
of the process of secularization. To achieve its objectives 
an interdisciplinary approach is followed. Chapter 1 is an 
historical study in broad sweep of the process of 
secularization in Western societies. Inasmuch as 
secularization is a social phenomenon, sociological 
interpretations of the processes and results of 
modernization and secularization are employed in chapters 1 
and 4. Insights from anthropology are used in the study of 
worldview and worldview change in chapter 2 and of the 
traditional Chinese culture in chapter 3. In chapter 5 the 
findings of the sociological and anthropological analyses of 
the worldview and the varied social and political situations 
of the selected Chinese societies are utilized in 
missiological deliberations on strategies to reach the 
contemporary Chinese.
Both published and unpublished sources are used in 
the study of secularization and the traditional Chinese 
worldview. The sociological and anthropological data on the 
contemporary Chinese worldview are based principally on
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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published sources in both English and Chinese.
The following is an overview of the dissertation. 
Chapter 1 is a survey of the historical development of the 
complex process of secularization in Western societies and 
of the impact of secularization on religion, society, and 
the individual. Chapter 2 is a study of worldview and 
woridview change and the relationship of these to the 
process of secularization. In chapter 3 a theoretical 
framework of the traditional Chinese worldview is outlined 
and discussed in five broad categories. The influence of 
Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and folk religion on the 
Chinese worldview is also considered. In chapter 4 the 
focus is on the emergence of the contemporary Chinese 
worldview after decades of modernization in Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Singapore. In chapter 5 the attention is 
shifted from the descriptive to the prescriptive.
Suggestions regarding the task of mission among the Chinese 
are made primarily from the standpoint of the new Chinese 
worldview. Special emphasis is given to the presentation of 
the gospel to the Chinese mind. The different political and 
religious contexts of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan will 
also 3hape suggested mission strategies.
Sicrnificance of the Study
This dissertation seeks to break new ground in three 
ways: (1) in the understanding of the contemporary Chinese
worldview in three industrialized societies, (2) in the
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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comprehension of the process of secularization within a 
cultural matrix stabilized by the Chinese worldview, and (3) 
in suggestions regarding the communication of the gospel to 
the contemporary Chinese in the light of their worldview 
assumptions and social situation.
Literature on Western secularization abounds; but 
relatively few books, journals, and dissertations deal with 
the process of secularization and its effects on the Chinese 
urban communities studied in this dissertation. On the 
other hand, literature on Chinese philosophy and tradition 
can be readily found, but little of this explores the 
relationship between secularization and the Chinese mind. 
Besides, thought pertaining to ways of reaching the Chinese 
with the gospel tend to focus primarily on the historical 
and philosophical perspectives instead of on deep-seated 
Chinese worldview assumptions. Admittedly, the intellectual 
approach to mission has its place, but the scope of its 
application is somewhat limited to the intelligentsia, not 
the commoners, who are the majority of the populace.
The varied patterns of relatively slow growth of 
Christianity in East Asia has been a matter of missiological 
concern. Despite the rapid socioeconomic growth in East 
Asia, two things remain unchanged.1 For one thing, Asia is 
still one of the most "religious" of the continents. Asia
‘Walbert Buhlmann, The Coming of the Third Church 
(Maryknoli: Orbis Books, 1978), 160-62.
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has been known as the birthplace of the great religions, 
inasmuch as the major religious faiths originated there.
The three monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam, arose in Western Asia; the four other world 
religions, Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism and Shintoism, 
had their cradle in East and South Asia. Each of these 
world religions is still practiced in parts of the continent 
where it began.
On the other hand, Asia is one of the least 
Christian of the continents. According to David Barrett, 
the most comprehensive chronicler of world Christianity to 
date, the 89 million Christians in East Asia represent only 
about 4.9 percent of all Christians (almost 1.8 billion) in 
1991, while the 147 million Christians in South Asia 
represent about 8.2 percent of all Christians. By 
comparison, Christians in Africa represent 13.4 percent; 
Latin America, 25 percent; and Europe, 22.8 percent of all 
Christians.1
Historically, the Christian church has always had a 
keen interest in East Asia, especially in China, which for 
many years was the world's largest single foreign mission 
field. The history of Christianity in China spans thirteen 
hundred years, from the arrival of the Nestorians in 635
‘David B. Barrett, "Annual Statistical Table on 
Global Mission: 1991," International Bulletin of Missionary
Research 15 (January 1991) : 25.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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A.D.,1 to the Franciscan missionaries in the thirteenth 
century,2 to the Protestant missionary movement in the 
nineteenth century. In spite of their attempts to penetrate 
Chinese life and culture with the gospel, they had little 
success. In fact, missionaries were banished from the 
country time and again, the last occasion being in 1949 
after the Communist takeover.3
Even after 1949, progress of the gospel work among 
the overseas Chinese in East Asia has been somewhat 
sluggish. Recent statistics reveal that the Average Annual 
Growth Rates (AAGR) of the Christian churches from 1970 to 
198 0 were about 1.3 percent for both Hong Kong and 
Singapore, and about 3.1 percent for Taiwan.4 The trend in 
decades of meager success in mission among the Chinese 
suggests potentially serious problems that need to be
‘Kenneth S. Latourette, A History of Christianity 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1975), vol. 1, 324.
:Leonard M. Outerbridge, The Lost Churches of China. 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1952), 59.
3For a review of the thirteen hundred years of 
history of the Christian faith in China, see Ralph R.
Covell, Confucius. The Buddha, and Christ: A History of the 
Gospel in Chinese. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986.
‘The method of calculating Average Annual Growth 
Rates and Decadal Growth Rates is taken from Bob Waymire's 
and C. Peter Wagner's book, The Church Growth Survey 
Handbook (Milpitas, CA: Global Church Growth, 1984), 15-17, 
38-39. The AAGR of the Seventh-day Adventist Church during 
the same period were -7.3 for Hong Kong, 1.2 percent for 
Taiwan, and 1.5 percent for Singapore. See 126th Annual 
Statistical Report 1988. Compiled by the Office of Archives 
and Statistics (Washington, DC: General Conference of 
Seventh-day Adventists, 1988), 12-13.
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attended to. Finding ways to reach this large people group 
constitutes one of the most pressing needs of the church in 
the 1990s and beyond.
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CHAPTER I
SECULARIZATION IN ITS WESTERN CONTEXT 
Introduction
Secularization is primarily a process of change in 
religion and society. More specifically, it is an 
interpretive paradigm used to explain the emergence of the 
m o d e m  world that is radically different from what came 
before it.1 In sociology of religion, secularization is a 
process said to have led to religion's becoming more 
marginal in contemporary societies. Secularization is often 
associated with such concepts as social change, decline of 
organized religion, desacralization of society, conformity 
with "this world," etc. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, secularization is defined as a process of 
fundamental social change in which traditional meaning 
systems or worldview are modified, lost, or replaced.
The word "secular" has its root in the Latin 
saeculum that means "period of time," "generation," or 
"age." It was a neutral term with no negative or positive
‘Thomas Luckmann. "Theories of Religion and Social 
Change," in The Annual Review of the Social Sciences, ed. 
Joachim Matthews, Bryan R. Wilson, Leo Laeyendecker, and 
Jean Seguy (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1977), 17.
11
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connotation. In the Vulgate translation of the New 
Testament, the meaning of the word was ambiguous. It could 
assume a neutral meaning, i.e., to signify "a great length 
of time" (as in 1 Timothy 1:17, saecula saeculorum-- nforever 
and ever" or an "endless span of time"). Or, it could be 
used as a religiously negative term signifying "this world" 
under Satan's domination (as in Romans 12:2, at nolite 
confirmari hui saeculo), "vet not conform to this age," or 
"worldly desires" (as in Titus 2:12, saecularia desideria).1 
To be secular in this sense is to be bound to the present 
age and to be given to the concerns of the world.
In the Middle Ages the antithesis of the secular and 
the holy became more apparent. Being secular meant 
"belonging to the world and its affairs as distinguished 
from the church and religion."2 It signified the 
nonecclesiastical, nonreligious, and nonsacred. Later, 
however, as the church became more at home in "this world," 
the term was accorded a more neutral meaning. Thus there 
was "the secular clergy," or "the secular arm," as 
contrasted with the "religious" or "regular" clergy, who
’Shiner provides an excellent account of the 
evolution of the word "secular." See Larry Shiner "The 
Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research," Journal 
for the Scientific Study of Religion 6 (Fall 1967): 207-209. 
See also Charles H. Malik, A Christian Critique of the 
University (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1982),
83 .
:James A. H. Murray, ed., A New English Dictionary 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), s.v. "Secular."
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lived according to the regula or rule of their monastic 
orders.1 Secular priests lived in the "world" and were not 
bound by vows and might possess property.
Tn the past twenty years, the concept of 
secularization has been used with a great divergence of 
meaning. It has been identified with slogans ranging from 
the "death of God" and "the decline of religion" to "man 
come of age."2 The lack of consensus among sociologists 
has prompted much debate. In response to this, David Martin 
suggested that the word be erased from the sociological 
dictionary because its meaning had become subject to 
ideological distortion.3 Significantly, however, he later 
helped to rehabilitate the concept.
British sociologist David Lyon gives a valuable 
account of the historical development of the concept of
'Michael Hill, A Sociology of Religion (London: 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1973), 229.
:David Lyon, "Rethinking Secularization: Retrospect 
and Prospect," Review of Religious Research 26 (March 1985): 
229. See also Karl Dobbelaere, "Secularization: A Multi­
dimensional Concept," Current Sociology (Monograph) 29 
(1981): 5-7; and David Lyon, "Secularization and Sociology: 
The History of An Idea," Fides et Historia 13 (1981): 38-52.
3David Martin, "Towards Eliminating che Concept of 
Secularization, " in Pencruin Survey of the Social Sciences 
1965. ed. Julius Gould (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965),
182. See also Peter Glasner, The Sociology of 
Secularization: A Critique of A Concept (London and Boston: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977); Harry Ausmus, The Polite 
Escape: On the Mvth of Secularization [Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1982); and Luckmann, 17.
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secularization since the eighteenth century.1 He outlines 
four phases of development it underwent as follows: 
enlightenment, change and loss, modernization's partner, and 
change and relocation.2
The Enlightenment, beginning in the eighteenth 
century, might be characterized as the triumph of reason 
over ignorance, prejudice, and superstition. Previously 
reality was understood and defined by theology. God was 
believed to be the Creator of all things. All mores and 
folkways, all social institutions, and all academic 
disciplines were of divine origin and subject to divine
‘Lyon, "Secularization and Sociology", 38-52.
different authors approach the historical 
development of Western civilization and secularization 
differently. Christian philosopher Cornelius van Peursen, 
for example, subscribes to the philosophical categories: the 
myth, the ontology, and the function. See "Man and Reality: 
The History of Human Thought, " The Student World 5 6 (First 
Quarter 1963): 13ff. French thinker, Auguste Comte (1798- 
1857), one of the fathers of modern sociology, believed in 
the theory of unilinear evolutionary development of human 
society. He taught that Western society evolved from a 
theological stage, through a metaphysical stage, to the 
present positivistic form. See Auguste Comte, The Positive 
Philosophy of Aucruste Comte, trans. Harriet Martineau, vol.
3 (London: Bell, 1896), 305-8. Although Comte'3 theory of 
unilinear evolution provides a useful framework for the 
interpretation of European history, there is danger of 
applying the theory too far. The logical conclusion to his 
theory would lead to the inevitable disappearance of 
religion, a position with which many sociologists disagree. 
They believe religion does not so much vanish as take new 
forms. Further, Comte's theory lacks empirical support. 
Without verification, the theory appears incongruous. 
Although Comte failed to prove the theory of unilinear 
evolution, he did give a fairly good description of European 
intellectual history under the metaphor of a three-stage 
development.
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direction. Religious assumptions were a priori to human 
thought and action. Kings ruled by divine right. Rebellion 
against rulers was tantamount to rebellion against God.
Rain was thought to be the direct activity of God. Famine 
and drought were regarded as divine judgments. Alchemy, 
numerology, and astrology were considered to be valid 
sciences. But with the establishment of m o d e m  science, 
supernatural phenomena were discounted; enlightened reason 
and scientific explanation replaced religious myths.
During the development of sociology as an academic 
discipline from 1860 to 1920, sociologists came to conceive 
of secularization as a social process of change and loss. 
This new perspective was developed in response to the social 
conditions in western Europe where urbanization, 
industrialization, and capitalism took on increasing social 
importance causing religion to decline or to take on new 
social forms.
During the later economic and technological 
development of the 1950s and 1960s, "secular1’ sociologists 
came to regard secularization as an inevitable partner of 
modernization. As society was modernized, they argued that 
it tended to become secularized. Religion was accorded a 
steadily reduced role in society. But as we shall see 
later, this proved to be more of an ideological than an 
actual perspective.
In the seventies, many less biased sociologists saw
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secularization as involving change and relocation and not as 
an inevitable evolutionary process that would bring about 
the eventual demise of religion. They maintained that 
religion did not so much disappear as relocate, taking on 
different forms and assuming different meanings.
Defining Secularization 
A Definition of Religion
The outcome of any discussion of secularization 
largely depends on two basic premises: how secularization
is defined and, as importantly, how religion is defined.
David Lyon affirms that a working definition of 
religion is essential to a working definition of 
secularization. He explicates his view this way:
The study of secularization must begin with the 
question: secularization of what? Sociologists are far 
from united on this question. The main dividing line 
falls between those who prefer to see religious behavior 
in organizational (and thus more empirically testable) 
terms of church membership and religious practice, and 
others who maintain that because religion for most 
believers is obviously more than mere observable 
practice, religion should be more broadly defined to 
include certain phenomena not normally thought of as 
"religious."1
Lyon obviously maintains that the meaning of 
secularization depends on how religion is defined, whether 
functionally or substantively. The functional approach to 
religion seeks to understand religion in terms of the social
'David Lyon, "Rethinking Secularization," 234. See 
also W. Warren Wagar, ed. , The Secular Mind (New York: 
Holmes & Meier, 1982), 2, 3.
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functions it fulfills, whereas the substantive looks at 
religion in terms of its content and belief system. 
Functional definitions emphasize what religion does, whereas 
substantive definitions seek to define what religion is.
Functional definitions of religion are usually 
broader than are substantive ones. This inclusive approach 
may comprise such phenomena as ideologies, ethos, value 
systems, and worldview, which substantivists may identify as 
non-religious.1 A functional approach may encompasses 
cross-cultural, trans- historical, and changing aspects cf 
religion and encourages the observer to be sensitive to the 
religious undertone of many social settings.2
‘Meredith B. McGuire, Religion: The Social Context 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1987), 9-10. See 
also Ronald J. Johnstone, Religion in Society: A Sociology 
of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983),
270ff.
:The definitions of religion used by Robert Bellah, 
Clifford Geertz, and Thomas Luckmann reflect the functional 
approach. Bellah, for example, defines religion as "a set 
of symbolic forms and acts that relate man to the ultimate 
conditions of his existence." To Geertz, religion is "a
system of symbols that acts to establish powerful,
pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by 
formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and 
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality 
that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic." 
Luckmann describes religion as "the transcendence of 
biological nature by the human organism." See Robert 
Bellah, "Religious Evolution," American Sociological Review 
29 (June 1964): 358; Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a
Cultural System," in Anthropological Approaches to the Study
of Religion, ed. Michael Banton (New York: Praeger, 1966),
4; and Luckmann, The Invisible Religion. 49. See also Peter 
3erger, "Second Thoughts on Substantive Versus Functional 
Definitions of Religion," Journal for the Scientific Study 
of Religion 13 (June 1974): 125-33. In this article Berger 
defends a substantive definition of religion that does not
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The need for functional definitions of religion 
steins from the fact that not all aspects of religion are, in 
Lyon's words, "empirically testable." Chinese "religious" 
systems, for instance, are much more implicit than explicit, 
and often "beliefs" are unconsciously held and rarely 
systematically expressed. Besides, these systems involve 
elaborate rounds of symbols and rituals, which transmit 
ideas, feelings, and values. All these make quantifying the 
religiosity of the Chinese in the exclusive sense of the 
word impossible.
Many who are schooled in the Christian tradition 
are accustomed to thinking of religion in narrow, 
institutionally specialized forms. This is true especially 
in societies with fairly complex and differentiated social 
institutions and structures, as in Europe and America. But 
institutional forms of religion constitute only a narrow 
category of the religious experience of humankind. There 
are also noninstitutional religions and nonchurch forms of 
religiosity whose presence and influence have been somewhat 
overlooked.
lose sight of the phenomena of religion itself. See also 
Richard Machalek, "Definitional Strategies in the Study of 
Religion," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 16 
(December 1977): 395-401; Roland Robertson, "Basic Problems 
of Definition," in Sociological Perspectives, ed. Kenneth 
Thompson and Jeremy Tunstall (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 
1971), 365-78; Andrew J. Weigert, "Functional, Substantive, 
or Political? A Comment on Berger's 'Second Thoughts on 
Defining Religion,'" Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion 13 (December 1974): 483-86.
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Both the functional and substantive approaches to 
religion are recognized as valid methodologies for the study 
of religion, however. In this dissertation both approaches 
are utilized because the inquiry relates to secularization 
in the Chinese cultural milieu where religion is not 
narrowly institutionalized. Religion in this context may be 
defined as the ground of the meaning system that defines 
reality and legitimizes the patterns of social life.
In the West, religious and secular worldview are 
often held in diametrical opposition. This sacred/secular 
polarity, common in the West, is by no means consubstantial 
in every culture. As Niyazi Berkes points out, this 
polarity is largely based on the Western model of "church" 
and "state," and presupposes an institutionalized form of 
religion which functions independently of, and on a 
different level than, the political order.1 This principle 
of differentiation, characteristic of some Western Christian 
societies, is not found in many non-Westem societies or 
religions. Berkes alludes to cypicai Islamic societies as 
illustrative of states in which political authority is 
permeated with religious values. In such societies, 
religion for the most part is a way of life and a 
determining factor in every sphere of daily living. Every 
act or symbol has religious significance. There is no
‘Niyazi Berkes, "Religious and Secular Institutions 
in Comparative Perspective," Archives de Socioloaie des 
Religions 16 (July-December 1963): 65.
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dichotomy between the sacred and the secular. Life is one 
complete whole.1
An absence of duality also may be seen in Chinese 
"religious" systems. An often-asked question is whether the 
entire panorama of traditional Chinese practices, such as 
filial piety, ancestral cult, divination, etc., are 
religious practices. Most Chinese do not think so. The 
Chinese wholistic approach to life does not leave room for 
dualism. Worshipping one's ancestor is considered no more 
"religious" than eating rice at three meals daily. One is 
as much a cultural thing to do as the other. It is true 
that the former may have more "religious" attributes, as 
religion is understood in the West, nevertheless, it is 
considered neither "religious" nor "nonreligious" in Chinese 
thought. It is simply part and parcel of the Chinese 
cultural heritage. Therefore, to impose a non-Chinese 
sacred/secular dichotomy on certain aspects of Chinese 
culture is to make Chinese culture something it is not.
'Those who have dichotomized traditional and m o d e m  
societies and placed the sacred in one and the secular in 
the other have been taken to task by Bendix, Gusfield, and 
the Rudolphs, and others. See Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition 
and Modernity Reconsidered," Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 9 (April 1967): 292-346; Joseph R. Gusfield, 
"Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study 
of Social Change," in Social Change: Sources. Patterns and 
Consequences. ed. Eva Etzioni-Halevy and Amitai Etzioni (New 
York: Basic Books, 1973), 333-41; and Lloyd I. Rudolph and 
Susanne H. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political
Development in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1967).
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A Definition of Secularization
The essential notion of the concept of 
secularization is that the religious doctrines, 
institutions, and values that once dominated society appear 
to have lost much of their status and influence. The former 
authority of the church over the political, economic, 
scientific, and moral spheres of human life has waned. As a 
consequence, religion is increasingly confined to private 
life. Many choose to look upon the world and their lives 
without the benefit of religious interpretation.1
The definition of secularization used in this 
dissertation is based on a broad concept of religion in 
order to accommodate non-Westem, non-institutionalized 
forms of religious expressions. Secularization in this 
context may be defined as a process of fundamental social 
change in which traditional meaning systems and the 
worldview that underlies them undergo loss, replacement, or 
modification. It should be noted that secularization is a 
process that not merely involves religious phenomena, but to 
a large extent also influences cultural and traditional 
norms and perceptions. The result is a change in basic, 
deep-seated, long-held belief systems. A person caught up 
in the process of secularization is less likely to feel 
bound by the absolutes of tradition, and more likely to be
'Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (New York:
Doubleday, 19F7), 108.
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open to change in response to the emerging realities of 
history.1
Secularization in Historical Perspective 
The process of secularization has been influenced 
through the years by a series of historical developments.
We shall briefly consider the rise of Protestantism, the 
Enlightenment, the development of science and technology, 
and the development of the modern state.
The Rise of Protestantism 
Most sociologists agree that Protestantism 
contributed to the process of secularization. Peter Berger 
contends that Protestantism served as an historically 
decisive prelude to secularization,2 in that it promoted the 
spirit of rationalism. The mystery and magic of the 
sacraments were demythologized in an effort to uplift the 
transcendent God and His grace. Relics, shrines, and 
special places of holiness that had survived in the Catholic 
Church were done away with. The reformers rejected the 
sacerdotalism of the Catholic clergy and demystified the
'Bernard E. Meland, The Secularization of Modern 
Cultures (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 3-9; 
Howard Becker, "Current Secular-Sacred Theory and Its 
Development," in Modern Sociological Theory in Continuity 
and Change. ed. Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1957), 133-86.
2Berger, The Sacred Canopy. 113. See also Ernst 
Troeltsch, Protestantism and Progress: The Significance of 
Protestantism for the Rise of the Modern World 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986).
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priesthood and its functions. They abrogated private 
confession as well. Man became the keeper of his soul, a 
phenomenon which Wilson described as the "privatization of 
responsibility.1,1
Ironically, Protestants encouraged the rise of 
modern science by their support and promotion of scientific 
research. Moore has provided evidence of the influence of 
specific Protestant contributions to the advancement of 
science in the seventeenth century. For example, a Lutheran 
prince, Duke Albrecht of Prussia, subsidized the publication 
of the astronomer Copernicus' De Revolutionibus (1543); 
Andreas Osiander, a Lutheran theologian, arranged for its 
printing and wrote the preface; Joachim Rhaeticus, a 
Lutheran mathematician and professor at the Wittenberg 
University, supervised the printing; and Erasmus Reinhold, 
another Wittenberg professor, supported Copernicus' teaching 
in his astronomic tables.
Evidence that Protestants helped stimulate the 
scientific revolution derives from data concerning the 
religious preferences of scientists. Percentagewise, there 
seems to have been a relatively larger number of Protestants 
who were scientists than there were scientists in the 
population at large. For example, 90 percent of the foreign 
members of the Academie des Sciences in Paris between 1666
‘Bryan Wilson, Religion in Sociological Perspective. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 86.
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and 1883 were Protestants, and this was in a period when 
Protestants constituted only 40 percent of the population of 
Western Europe outside France. Evidence from other sources 
points in the same direction.1
The Enlightenment
The Enlightenment in the eighteenth century played a 
major role in unseating the church from its position of 
influence and dominance. The humanistic spirit espoused 
during the Renaissance, together with other elements such as 
religious wars and dogmatism, contributed to the rise of the 
Enlightenment. The Enlightenment in turn contributed to the 
development of a new epistemology.2 In medieval
epistemology the church was regarded as the ultimate
authority. In Protestantism from the sixteenth century, the 
authority of Scripture was elevated above the authority of 
the church. During the Enlightenment, however, authority 
underwent a shift from the church and Scripture to 
experience and reason.
Undeniably the change of authority posed a serious 
challenge to theology and the church. It caused a spirit of 
self-sufficiency, a naturalistic way of viewing things, and 
a breakdown of the supernatural understanding of reality,
'James R. Moore, "The Rise of M o d e m  Science, " in
The History of Christianity, ed. Tim uowley (Oxford: Lion
Book, 1990), 48-50.
:Robert E. Webber, The Church in the World (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 19 88), 147-49.
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for reason promised to solve all problems without resort to 
supernaturalism.1
The Development of Science and Technology 
The development of science and technology also 
contributed to the process of secularization. Science and 
technology demand rationality and functional utility, which 
in turn predispose to rational thinking and to a questioning 
of religious interpretations of the cosmos and life.
Besides, people who adopt science and technology are more 
inclined to look for technical solutions to human problems 
than for religious or moral ones. The development of 
science and technology has contributed to the alienation of 
Western culture from its religious roots.2
The Development of the M o d e m  State 
The development of the m o d e m  state was yet another 
factor in the process of secularization. The idea of the 
m o d e m  state as a social system is closely linked with the 
concept of legitimation Le gitimation may be defined as
"the process by which one aspect of a social system confers 
sanctions on the society as a whole and on particular
'Vernon Pratt, Religion and Secularization (London: 
Macmillan, 1970), 11-20.
:Wilson, 43, 55. See also Bryan Wilson, ed. 
Rationality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970); and S. S. Acquaviva, 
The Decline of the Sacred in Industrial Society, trans. 
Patricia Lipscomb (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 140.
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institutions within it."1 Historically, religion has been 
the most widespread and effective instrumentality of 
legitimation. Legitimation may also come in such forms as 
myths, legends, proverbs, folklores.
With the arrival of the modern state, the role of 
religion as a source of legitimation has been reduced. 
Increasingly the m o d e m  state has become self-justifying. 
Some claim legitimation on the basis of the will of the 
people. Others regard political and economic goals and 
functions as the ultimate source of legitimation.2 Social 
institutions have replaced religious institutions in 
exercising the function of legitimation.
To sum up, we may say that the process of 
secularization is a multifaceted and bewilderingly complex 
phenomenon that took shape in response to a variety of 
developments. We have seen how Protestantism, the 
Enlightenment, science and technology, and the modern state 
have contributed to the process. Not all sociologists may 
agree about the extent to which each of these developments
‘Richard K. Fenn, "Religion and the Legitimation of 
Social Systems," in Chancing Perspectives in the Scientific 
Study of Religion, ed. Allen W. Eister (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1974), 144. See also Berger, The Sacred Canopy.
32ff; McGuire, 224; and Wilson, Perspective. 54.
Walcott Parsons, "Belief, Unbelief and Disbelief," 
in The Culture of Unbelief, ed. R. Caporale and A. Grumelli 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 99; Guy E. 
Swanson, " M odem Secularity: Its Meaning, Sources and 
Interpretation," in The Religious Situation, ed. Donald 
Cutler (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 801-34.
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developments has considerably influenced the Western world 
at almost every point of human existence.
Impact of Secularization
The impact of the process of secularization on 
society has been profound and complex. In this study we are 
interested primarily in its effects on religion, which may 
be explored in at least four interrelated spheres, namely, 
liberation, differentiation, privatization, and 
individualism.
Liberation
Many religious thinkers decry secularization as a 
negative force which has replaced religious faith with 
scientific rationality. This common perception can be seen 
in Jacques Ellul's view of the city. Ellul regards the city 
as irredeemable and secularization as pernicious.1 Harvey 
Cox, on the other hand, appears to be more optimistic. Cox 
admits that secularization is a force relativizing religious 
worldviews and rendering them innocuous.2 But he welcomes 
secularization and sees it as a fulfillment of biblical 
themes. Cox identifies secularization with liberation, "the 
liberation of man from religious and metaphysical tutelage,
’Jacques Ellul, The Meaning of the City (Grand 
Rapid3: Eerdmans, 1970).
:Harvey G. Cox, The Secular Citv (New York:
Macmillan, 1966), 2.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
28
the turning of his attention av/ay from other worlds and 
toward this one."1 Seen in this way, secularization is not 
necessarily the implacable enemy of Christian faith.
Bishop Lesslie Newbigin, in his attempt to 
understand the process of secularization in the light of 
biblical faith, views the triumph of secularization as 
neither the triumph of the Kingdom of God nor the work of 
the devil.2 To him, secularization means new possibilities 
of freedom for all.
In a biblical perspective this can be seen as man's 
entering into the freedom given to him in Christ, 
freedom from the control of all other powers, freedom 
for the mastery of the created world which was promised 
to man according to the Bible. At its best the secular 
spirit claims the freedom to deal with every man simply 
as man and not as the adherent of one religion or 
another, and to use all man's mastery over nature to 
serve the real needs of man.3
Both Cox and Newbigin in the sixties perceived the 
positive impact of secularization as delivering people from 
mysticism and tradition-bound orthodoxy. They saw this 
freeing effect as having significant missiological
‘ibid., 15. Cox's book, The Secular Citv. was much 
criticized in the sixties and seventies. A discussion of 
the so-called Secular City Debate is beyond the scope of our 
study. Suffice it to say that Cox gives an over-glorified 
picture of the city without taking into account the social 
problems associated with ic. But his point on 
secularization as liberation, while much too optimistic, 
does contain some elements of validity. Cox confesses that 
his later books are much less optimistic.
:Leslie Newbigin, Honest Religion for Secular Man 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), 29.
3Ibid. , 8-9.
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implications not only in Western society, but also in the 
three Chinese societies focused upon in this study. In this 
they were quite perceptive and studies during this period 
began to indicate a gradual increase in the receptivity of 
people in East Asia to the gospel.
Differentiation 
The secularization of society is reflected in a 
phenomenon sociologists call institutional differentiation. 
The term "differentiation" is utilized to describe the 
process by which the various institutional spheres in 
society become separated from each other, with each 
institution performing specialized functions.1 During the 
Middle Ages, the church more or less dominated every aspect 
of life, religious and otherwise. All aspects of life were 
influenced by religious beliefs, values, and practices. The 
church, believed to be endowed with divine authority, 
defined and punished deviant behavior. Secularization has 
changed the central role the church played in society. In 
the process of differentiation each institutional sphere 
became separated from the other. In due course, political, 
economic, and educational institutions broke away from the 
control of religion and developed their own specialized 
forms. Institutionalized religion thus lost much of its 
overarching influence. Shiner describes this phenomenon as
'McGuire, 221ff.
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che "disengagement of society from religion. 1,1
Because the role of religion in contemporary society 
is much reduced, certain social relationships, business 
transactions, and moral choices appear to operate on values 
other than those of the Judeo-Christian heritage. For 
instance, marriage is no longer considered by many as being 
made in heaven, but is regarded an earthly arrangement in 
response to biological and social needs. An answered prayer 
may not be thought of as divine providence, but as a matter 
of luck. Instead of attributing phenomena such as 
earthquakes, death, floods, etc., to God's will, 
explanations are sought in scientific and rational terms.
The process of differentiation also contributes to 
the difficulty of motivating behavior and commitment. In 
societies in which institutional differentiation has not yet 
taken place, family, community, religion, and tradition are 
the prime motivating factors. In contemporary society, 
however, it has become increasingly difficult to inspire 
commitment on those grounds.2
’Shiner, 212. Differentiation is part of the 
process of the so-called "desacralization of the world," 
which Weber refers to as the Entzauberung (disenchantment) 
of the world (Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essavs in 
Sociology. trans. and ed. H. K. Gerth and C. W. Mills [New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1958], 139). See also 
Talcott Parsons, "Christianity and M o d e m  Industrial 
Society," in Sociological Theory. Values and Socio-Cultural 
Change. ed. Edward A. Tiryakian (New York: Free Press,
1963), 33-70.
:McGuire, 223.
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Privatization
Another consequence of secularization is the so- 
called "privatization" of faith--a process in which the 
private sphere of life is compartmentalized and removed from 
effective roles in the public sphere. The public sphere 
represents the world of facts, whereas the private sphere 
includes the world of beliefs, opinions, and values. The 
public sphere is the macro world of giant institutions, 
government, business, politics, economics, and national 
life. It is large, impersonal, and anonymous. The private 
sphere is the micro world of the family and social 
relationships, the world of personal tastes, sports, 
hobbies, and other leisure pursuits.1
As the institutions of the public sphere become less 
and less concerned with providing meaning for people, the 
private sphere is expected to take over. The family and 
other institutions in the private sphere are counted upon to 
provide a haven from the public sphere.2 Yet ironically, 
the influence of the family on the public sphere is 
shrinking. This is mainly because the extended family has 
been reduced to the nuclear family. The traditional
‘McGuire, 52; and George Gerharz, "Secularization as 
Loss of Social Control: Toward a New Theology," Sociological 
Analysis 31 (Spring 1970): 8. Newbigin describes 
privatization as one of the hallmarks of the contemporary 
society. Lesslie Newbigin, Foolishness to the Greeks: The 
Gospel and Western Culture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 
18-19, 35-39.
:Luckmann, Invisible Religion. 107-14.
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supporting web of the extended family, friends, and 
neighbors is difficult to count on for support and meaning.
Increasingly religion is practiced in the private 
domain. Religion retreats into the inner person and finds 
definition and meaning in personal religious acts. Berger 
explains the outcome of this private religiosity and its 
irrelevance to the public sphere as follows:
This religiosity is limited to specific enclaves of 
social life that may be effectively segregated from the 
secularized sectors of modern society. The values 
pertaining to private religiosity are, typically, 
irrelevant to institutional contexts other than the 
private sphere. For example, a businessman or 
politician may faithfully adhere to the religiously 
legitimated norms of family life, while at the same time 
conducting his activities in the public sphere without 
any reference to religious values of any kind. It is 
not difficult to see that such segregation of religion 
within the private sphere is quite "functional" for the 
maintenance of the highly rationalized order of m o d e m  
economic and political institutions.1
As religion is privatized, the traditional potency 
of religion is weakened, in that it is effective largely in 
the private domain. Further, religion has tended tc become 
more tenuous, because the m o d e m  family as representing the 
private domain is also of tenuous construction.
Individualism 
Secularization has also contributed to the 
development of individualism. The new emphasis on self 
appears to be rooted in the Enlightenment. Kant defined the 
Enlightenment as "man's emergence from his self-imposed
‘Berger, The Sacred Canoov. 133.
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tutelage, " and he saw it as man's claim to be recognized as 
an adult, responsible being.1 Man has come of age, so to 
speak. Individuals can now pursue freedom in every 
conceivable form-- freedom from arbitrary power, freedom from 
ecclesiastical authority, freedom of speech, freedom of 
trade, freedom to realize one's talents, and freedom of 
aesthetic response. In short, one can discover one's 
potential in the fullest sense of the word.
This discovery of the individual self has turned 
into individualism. Bockmuehi observes that individualism 
has had a noble birth. Respect for the individual started 
out as a prominent and precious heritage of Christianity.
But the Enlightenment severed it from its organic link and 
turned it into individualism.2 In essence, extreme forms of 
individualism teach that before any person can discover his 
destiny, he must first declare himself free from 
institutional control. External authorities are to be 
rejected, be they political, parental, or ecclesiastical. 
This is an emphasis upon values of self-determination, 
personal gratification, and individual rights.3
'Peter Gay, The Rise of Modern Paganism, vol. 1, The 
Enlightenment: An Interpretation (New York: W. W. Norton,
1977),3, 8.
:Klaus Bockmuehi, "Secularization and Secularism: 
Some Christian Considerations," Evangelical Review of 
Theology 10 (January 1986): 61.
3Edgar Mills, "The Sacred in Ministry Studies," in 
The Sacred in a Secular A ge. ed. Philip E. Hammond 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 170.
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One of the outcomes of individualism is the 
segregation of individual roles in society. In societies in 
which communalism is regarded as important, group interests 
matter more than individual rights. But in a highly 
differentiated society, the reverse seems to be true. 
Individual roles are well defined and designated. The 
person is regarded as a role-performer rather than a member 
of the community. The segregation of roles may have 
contributed to increasing personal isolation, loneliness, 
anonymity, and a host of social problems, such as suicide, 
disruption of marriage, and substance abuse.
Secular Spirit
The process of secularization has also facilitated 
the emergence of a m o d e m  worldview Gilkey calls "the 
secular spirit" which is characterized by contingency, 
autonomy, relativity, and temporality.1 The secular spirit 
or mood sums up in a general way the contemporary person's 
understanding of self and reality.
Contingency is an accidental occurrence, something 
whose happening depends on chance. A person who accepts the 
premise of contingency believes the basic elements of the 
universe simply exist, and that everything that exists has a 
natural cause that can be scientifically explained.
’Langdon Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind (New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), 39-71. See also Anthcny Cainpolo, A 
Reasonable Faith: Responding to Secularism (Waco, TX: Word 
Books, 1983) .
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Creation of the universe by a supernatural God is ruled out. 
One implication of contingency is the concept that planet 
earth and its inhabitants came about through a series of 
accidents.
Autonomy means that human beings are creators of 
their own environment. Since God is not a factor in the 
creation of the universe, human beings are free to choose 
their destiny as they see fit. Autonomy is seen as 
essential for the development of a new and enlightened 
humanity. Human beings are no longer willing to let the 
transcendent dictate their lives and the meaning of their 
existence. Even social authority is not welcome, for it is 
believed that all external social authority--whether of 
church, of state, of local community, or of family--will in 
the end undercut personal authority. Most scholars 
recognize that the spirit of autonomy is due in part to 
Protestantism. In their zeal to deliver Christianity from 
the ecclesiastical tutelage of the Roman Church, the 
reformers championed the cause of individual autonomy, 
autonomy over against ecclesiastical authority, but not as 
over against divine authority. The prevailing concept of 
autonomy, however, has taken a new twist. Autonomy in 
contemporary society may simply mean freedom from any kind 
of authority, political, ecclesiastical, parental, or 
otherwise. In particular, it means being free from the need 
of God. It means human beings can control the present and
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the future. They can cope with change and eventuality.
There is no need for resignation to a divine will.
Relativity denotes the absence of absolutes in a 
world believed to be in a constant state of flux. If humans 
are creators of society, then the values and destiny created 
by one group of people may not be acceptable to another 
group in a different cultural and historical context. On 
this view there is no single system that can be adopted as 
binding all people at all times. To a secular person, the 
days of moral absolutes are over.
Temporality means that everything is bound by time 
and space, and is subject to change and decay. There is no 
after life, no future world, and no sense of accountability 
for deeds and misdeeds. Death ends all. God and eternity, 
therefore, have been consigned to the realm of fantasy. 
Gilkey concludes that the spirit of temporality has rendered 
eschatology equivocal and meaningless. An historical 
interpretation of eschatology has become more meaningful to 
a contemporary person than an eschatological interpretation 
of history.1
Gilkey's description of the secular spirit of 
contingency, autonomy, relativity, and temporality is by no 
means confined to contemporary Western society. 
Secularization being an universal phenomenon affects other 
cultures as well. As we shall see in chapter 4, some
‘Gilkey, 57.
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present-dav Chinese come rather close to sharing the same 
spirit.
Secularization in Western and Eastern Milieus
Secularization appears to manifest itself 
differently in Western and Eastern societies. In the West, 
secularization is a process of religious change, a process 
in which religious thinking, practice, and institutions lose 
social significance. It is a moving away from the influence 
of religion in all spheres of life toward a separation 
between religious faith and the structures of society.
In East Asia, as is shown later in this study, the 
process of secularization has taken on different 
characteristics. The contrast stems mainly from the way 
religion is perceived. In the West, religion tends to be 
expressed in terms of a belief system; in the East religion 
is experience. Western religion is more dualistic and 
organizational, while religion in the East is more wholistic 
and ritualistic. Secularization in the West is generally 
characterized by the decline of organized religion. In the 
East, where religion is not institutionalized and where 
religion and culture are enmeshed as one, secularization 
appears to be more broadly expressed in social and cultural 
change. It is a process in which there is a decline in the 
social influence of the traditional meaning system. It is a 
reorientation of values. It is a moving away from 
traditional guidelines and sensitivities.
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Social and cultural change in the Eastern milieu has 
been accelerated by rapid modernization. In fact, 
secularization has often been identified with modernization, 
and modernization is associated with market economies, 
bureaucracy, and industrialization. Modernization has 
fostered changes in structures, processes, and attitudes.
1. It has brought about the replacement of outmoded 
commercial and economic establishments with modern ones, 
usually adopted or emulated from the West.
2. It has also had consequences for social 
processes as well as social institutions.1 For example, 
mate selection as a social process has tended to go from 
marriage by arrangement to love marriage. The family as a 
social institution has also gone "modern" from a largely 
extended family structure to the conjugal type.
3. Modernization as a commercial-industrial process 
has precipitated changes in values, attitudes, and beliefs. 
Basic deep-seated traditional values have given way to those 
consonant with such m o d e m  ones as individualism, youth- 
orientation, and achievement-orientation.
'W. E. Moore, The Impact of Industry (Englewood 
Cliffs, N J : Prentice-Hall, 1965), 11-12. See also Alex 
Inkeles, "Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to 
Experience, Perception and Value," American Journal of 
Sociology 66 (July 1960) : 1-31; David J. Smith and Alex 
Inkeles, "The OM Scale: A Comparative Socio-Psychological 
Measure of Individual Modernity," Sociometry 29 (December 
1966) : 353-77; and Alex Inkeles, "Making Men Modem: On the 
Causes and Consequences of Individual Change in Six 
Developing Countries," American Journal of Sociology 75 
(July 1969-May 1970): 208-25.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3 9
The change in structures, processes, and attitudes 
are undoubtedly interdependent. But the change should by no 
means be equated with westernization. Values and attitudes 
may be modern (i.e. associated with the imperatives of the 
industrial way of life), they are not necessarily 
westernized. Considerable evidence from J a p m  and other 
East Asian countries has shown the emergence of social 
structural features that are modem, but are definitely not 
western.1
The social and culture change engendered by the 
process of modernization has been chosen as the focus of 
this dissertation. Of special interest is the change in 
values and attitudes, or more broadly speaking, a 
reorientation of worldview. The definition and functions of 
worldview and worldview change are the core of study in 
chapter 2.
Conclusion
The concept of secularization may be understood as a 
process that has contributed to the displacement of a
‘See, for example, T. 0. Wilkinson, "Family 
Structure and Industrialization in Japan," American 
Sociological Review 27 (1962): 678-82; E. F. Vogel, Japan's 
New Middle Class (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1965); K. Odaka, "Traditionalism, Democracy in Japanese 
Industry," Industrial Relations 10 (1963): 95-103; and B. 
Karsh and R. E. Cole, "Industrialization and the Convergence 
Hypothesis: Some Aspects of Contemporary Japan," Journal of 
Social Issues 24 (19 68) : 45-64. For similar evidence on the 
Chinese communities in East Asia, see chapters 4 and 5 of 
this dissertation.
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religious interpretation of reality and a religious 
orientation toward life by scientific and rational 
explanations. This process has precipitated the decline of 
the social influence and significance of religion in Western 
societies.
Secularization is a complex, multidimensional 
phenomenon. By and large, it is a result of a long process 
of social and religious change that most sociologists 
believe began at the Renaissance. The Protestant 
Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and 
the Industrial Revolution have all contributed to the trend 
toward empiricism and rationalism. Other aspects of 
modernity-related developments, such as the contemporary 
communications media, the education system, science and 
technology, and a market economic system have also 
contributed to the decline of religion from its formerly 
dominant role in society.
Secularization has had considerable effect on 
society, primarily through the process of institutional 
differentiation. It has resulted in the relativization and 
privatization of the spiritual sphere. It also has affected 
individual members of society largely through extreme 
individualism and the segregation of roles. In addition, 
the process of secularization has facilitated the emergence 
of a rational reductionism or secular spirit in which human
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life is seen in terms of contingency, autonomy, relativity, 
and temporality.
Although the process of secularization is a global 
phenomenon, it has taken different forms in different 
societies. Secularization in the West is marked by a 
decline of the social significance of religion. In the East 
where religion and culture are inextricably linked, it is 
characterized by social and cultural change in which the 
traditional meaning system that has held people together for 
millennia has been weakened.
The study of the process of secularization in its 
Western milieu is intrinsically related to one of the 
purposes of this dissertation, and that is to provide a foil 
against which to analyze the impact of the process of 
secularization in three contemporary urban Chinese 
societies.
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WORLDVIEW AND WORLDVIEW CHANGE 
Introduction
The slow growth of the Christian church in China has 
been a source of concern to missiologists for decades.
Scores of books have been written and many explanations 
suggested for the tenacious resistance encountered and 
sluggish development of the church. Two main underlying 
reasons may be identified: one pertaining to external
factors, and the other internal. External factors have to 
do with problems associated with presenting the gospel in 
Western dress and by Western missionaries protected by 
Western imperialist power. Christianity was frequently 
considered by the Chinese as a foreign religion with little 
relevance to Chinese culture.
The internal factors are more subtle, and less 
easily perceptible. They have to do with the intrinsic 
resistance of Chinese to the gospel. The Chinese mind does 
not appear to be receptive to the gospel message. Such 
apathy, and even antipathy as has been encountered, may have 
been culturally conditioned. An examination of the external 
factors pertaining to missionary endeavors in mainland China
42
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in the nineteenth century lies beyond the purposes of this 
dissertation, but the study of the internal factors, and 
particularly those relating to the Chinese worldview, 
constitutes the main thrust of chapters 2 to 4.
The study of the concept of "worldview" by 
anthropologists was given renewed impetus during World War 
II in efforts to analyze the national character of Germans, 
Japanese, and other peoples with whom the United States was 
engaged as enemies and allies. Refinement of the concept 
took place in a subsequent dialogue between anthropologists, 
notably Clyde Kluckhohn, and philosophers such as F. S. C. 
Northrop, Ethel Albert, and David Bidney. Together they 
studied the worldview of non-Westem peoples in contrast to 
those of the West.1
Defining Worldview
The word "worldview" derives from the German 
Weltanschauung or world-and-life view. Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary defines it as "a comprehensive 
conception or apprehension of the world, especially from a 
specific standpoint."
"Worldview" is commonly used to describe that which 
is mo3t general and characteristic about a people. It is 
the set of presuppositions or assumptions underlying each
'Roger M. Keesing, Cultural Anthropology: A
Contemporary Perspective (New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, 1981), 365.
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culture. Kraft suggests that worldview is the "central 
control box" of culture. It lies at the very core of 
culture.1 Worldview assumptions are the deepest assumptions 
about life and reality. The concept of worldview has been 
expressed in such terms as "unconscious system of 
meanings, "2 "unconscious canons of choice, "J 
"configurations,"4 "culture themes,"5 "value orientations,"6
‘Charles H. Kraft, Christianity in Culture 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988), 53. Lloyd Kwast and 
others with similar understanding regard culture as having 
several successive "layers," the outermost of which is 
behavior; the next, values and beliefs, and the innermost is 
worldview. See Lloyd E. Kwast, "Understanding Culture," in 
Perspectives on the World Christian Movement: A Reader, ed.
Ralph D. Winter and S. C. Hawthorne (Pasadena: William Carey 
Library, 1981), 361-64. See also David J. Hesselgrave, 
Communicating Christ Cross-Culturallv (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 1978), 125; idem, Planting Churches Cross- 
Culturallv (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987), 177; Michael
Kearney, World View (Novato, CA: Chandler & Sharp, 19 84),
41; Paul G. Hiebert, Cultural Anthropology (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Book House, 1986), 371. See also Robert Redfield,
"The Primitive World View," Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 96 (1952): 30-36; Anthony F. C. 
Wallace, Culture and Personality (New York: Random, 1961), 
100.
:Edward Sapir, "Conceptual Categories in Primitive 
Languages," in Language in Culture and Society: A Reader in 
Linguistics and Anthropology, ed. Dell Hymes (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1964), 128.
JRuth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1934), 48.
4Clyde Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man: The Relation of
Anthropology to M o d e m  Life (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949).
Morris E. Opler, "Themes as Dynamic Forces in 
Culture," American Journal of Sociology 51 (1945): 198-206, 
and "The Themal Approach to Cultural Anthropology and Its 
Application to North Indian Data," Southwestern Journal of 
Anthropology 24 (Autumn 1968): 215-27. See also Luzbetak's 
use of "societal personalities" in Louis J. Luzbetak, The
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"covert core,"1 or "philosophical presuppositions."2
Geisler describes worldview as an overall framework 
of meaning through which human beings view the totality of 
their environs.3 He likens worldview to a pair of glasses 
through which every face is seen. Worldview serves as a 
grid through which everything in life is screened in a 
particular fashion. He further elaborates:
A worldview is a conceptual framework or "system" of 
thought through which everything is given meaning and 
context. It is a structure by which all the "stuff" of 
experience is given meaning and coherence. Without an 
overall worldview the facts of life are like unconnected 
dots on a page.4
Geisler concludes that people do not usually see
Church and Cultures: An Applied Anthropology for the
Religious Worker (Techny, IL: Divine Word Publications,
1970), 161ff .
6See Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck, 
Variations in Value Orientations (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1975) , 4-10.
‘Laura Thompson, Culture in Crisis: A Study of the
Hopi Indians (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 183.
2Donald R. Jacobs, "Conversion and Culture: An
Anthropological Perspective with Reference to Hast Africa," 
in Gospel and Culture, ed. John Stott and Robert T. Coote 
(Pasadena: William Carey Library, 1979), 175-94.
‘Norman L. Geisler, "Some Philosophical Perspectives 
on Missionary Dialogue," in Theology and Mission, ed. David 
J. Hesselgrave, 241-57 (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House,
1978), 242. See also Robert Redfield, The Primitive World 
and Its Transformations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1953), 85-86; and Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value 
Orientations in the Theory of Action: An Exploration in 
Definition and Classification." in Toward a General Theory 
of Action, ed. Talcott Parsons, Edward A. Shils (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1959), 388-433.
4Ibid.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
46
things as they are, but as they appear through glasses 
tinted by their worldview. Conditioned by their cultural 
systems, people interpret reality according to what they are 
taught to perceive. If their culture informs that disease 
is caused by evil spirits, they perceive most diseases in 
their lives to be so caused.
Most worldview assumptions are implicit rather than 
explicit. They are assumed to be true without prior proof 
or reason. They are caught rather than taught. Some 
assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know what 
they are assuming because no other way of putting things has 
ever occurred to them.1
Worldview is taught to the next generation early in 
life so persuasively and imperceptibly that it seems 
absolute and is seldom questioned.2 The learning process is 
so thorough and subtle that some anthropologists, such as 
Luzbetak, are convinced that it actually conditions some of 
the glands, involuntary muscles, and nervous system.3 For 
this reason, worldview is seldom verbalized. If it is, it
‘A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New 
York: Mentor Books, 1948), 49.
^his attitude has been labeled by anthropologists 
as "ethnocentrism" which simply means that the culture of 
the group is of central importance irrespective of actual 
achievement. Arsensberg and Hiehoff note that ethnocentrism 
is not necessarily "bad," for it is vital to the 
preservation and continuity of a cultural system. See 
Conrad M. Arensberg and Arthur H. Hiehoff, Introducing 
Social Change (Chicago: Aldine & Atherton, 1971), 66ff.
3Luzbetak, 77.
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is not done in intellectually oriented propositions but in 
moral admonitions, statements of religious faith, and 
training formulas for child conduct.1
Since worldview is a matter of assumptions, it 
seldom occurs to people that there may be others who do not 
3hare the same assumptions. Most people do not carefully 
evaluate their own worldview; neither do they meticulously 
examine and interpret messages arising within the context of 
other worldview. Although worldview assumptions are largely 
implicit, they are reinforced by the deepest feelings, and 
anyone who challenges them may become the object of vehement 
attack. This is why most of the time worldview is sacredly 
guarded and is rarely changed. Since most people are used 
to one pair of glasses from the time of their earliest 
recollections, they are not predisposed to lay those glasses 
aside in order to look at the world through another pair of 
glasses.2
Dimensions of Worldview Assumptions 
The study of worldview may be enhanced by examining 
its various dimensions. In his worldview model, Hiebert
‘Felix M. Keesing, Cultural Anthropology: The
Science of Custom (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
1966), 323.
:Hesselgrave, Communicating. 98, 125; and Paul G. 
Hiebert, Anthropological Insights for Missionaries (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1988), 45.
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spells out three basic worldview assumptions: cognitive,
affective, and evaluative.1
Cognitive or existential assumptions provide a 
framework that people use to explain reality. These 
assumptions include concepts of atoms, viruses, and gravity 
in the West, and feng-shui (Chinese geomancy), spirits, and 
yin-yang forces in the East. Cognitive assumptions provide 
the grammar by which the concepts of time, space, and other 
worlds may be understood. They help to give shape to the 
mental categories and logic people use, and to the concepts 
of authority they accept.
Affective assumptions are related to a people's 
notions of life, in general, and their tastes in art, food, 
and music, in particular. For example, the principle of
‘Hiebert, Anthropological Insights. 45-48. The 
terms "cognitive," "affective," and "evaluative" have been 
used earlier by Parson and Shils in the development of a 
system classifying the mechanism of learning. They call the 
system the cognitive-catheetive- (or affective-) evaluative 
matrix. The classification is based upon the 
phenomenological place of problems, the type of problems, 
and the kind of learning processes chiefly responsible for 
solution of the problem. See Talcott Parsons and Edward 
Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1959), 125ff. Edward Hall's three 
levels of culture are adapted by Hiebert in his worldview 
model. Hall notes that there are at least three levels of 
culture: formal, informal, and technical. Formal culture
includes implicit assumptions and beliefs that are taken for 
granted but are generally emotion-laden. Violation of 
formal culture is considered as sin. Informal culture 
involves assumptions which have strong emotions attached, 
although they are less explicit. Violation is bad taste. 
Technical culture is explicit cognitive knowledge acquired 
largely in school. Its assumptions are rational, and 
violation is considered as error.
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health for the Chinese is harmony between the two forces in 
the body. Where the two are in equilibrium, health is 
maintained. This underlying assumption leads the Chinese to 
eat the kinds of food that will achieve that balance.
Evaluative assumptions have to do with the ‘.-chics 
and morality of a culture. They serve as criteria to 
determine truth and error, right and wrong. They are 
standards people use to make judgments. One aspect of the 
Chinese worldview, for instance, upholds li as the highest 
propriety and social sensitivity. It means telling people 
what they want to hear, not necessarily the truth, because 
it is deemed more important to encourage than to hurt.
Worldview and Its Functions
The importance of worldview to the present study of 
the Chinese becomes apparent when one considers its 
functions. Charles Kraft outlines five major functions of 
worldview: explanatory, validating, reinforcing,
integrating, and adaptational.!
First, worldview explains how and why things are as 
they are and how and why chey continue that way. Geertz 
maintains that worldview not only provides us with a model 
of reality but also structures our perceptions of reality.2
'Charles H. Kraft, "Ideological Factors in 
Intercultural Communication, " Missiolocry 2 (July 19 74) : 
295-312. See also Charles Kraft, Christianity in Culture. 
54-57.
:Geertz, 7.
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If one accepts the assumptions of one's worldview that the 
universe is mechanistic and impersonal, one's beliefs and 
values would lead one to explain all phenomena in terms of 
those assumptions. If one's assumptions say that the world 
is capricious and spirit-controlled, the way one interprets 
the cosmos would be very different. In other words, 
worldview provides a person with the foundations on which to 
build a system of explanation.
Second, a worldview sanctions or legitimizes the 
values and institutions of a society, giving people the 
impression that their cultural norms are right, and other 
approaches are inferior, perhaps even wrong. In most 
cultures, the ultimate ground of legitimation is 
"supernatural" (using the word in its Western sense).
Third, worldview provides psychological 
reinforcement at points of anxiety or during crises such as 
illness and death. It gives emotional support and security. 
That is the reason worldview assumptions are most evident at 
births, initiations, marriages, and funerals. They are also 
conspicuous during accidents or failure. Frequently thi3 
reinforcement takes the form of a ritual or ceremony. The 
ritual may involve the group or the individual.
Fourth, worldview integrates and systematizes 
perceptions of reality into a design which makes sense for 
the people involved. This integrated design helps people to 
understand and interpret events in a meaningful manner.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5 1
Finally, worldview has an adaptational function. 
Worldview assumptions do not always remain unchanged. They 
may be challenged by new ideas, behavior, and products.
Under such pressure, one can select those assumptions that 
fit one's culture and reject those that do not, or one may 
attempt to retain two contradictory sets of assumptions and 
try to minimize internal dissonance. Alternatively, the 
differences between the old and the new may be reconciled by 
devising a new understanding of the old assumptions. The 
result is likely to be a gradual transformation of the 
worldview.
A Thematic Approach to Worldview
The concept of worldview theme is important to our 
study of the Chinese worldview in that it provides a 
theoretical framework from which worldview assumptions may 
be analyzed and evaluated. Most worldview assumptions tend 
to be nebulous and imperceptible, but a thematic approach to 
the study of worldview has the advantage of systematizing 
assumptions into several organized categories. Opler 
suggests that in most cultures several closely related 
themes unite the various elements of culture into an 
integrated whole. He explains:
It is the thesis of this paper that a limited number 
of dynamic affirmations, which I shall call themes, can 
be identified in every culture and that the key to the 
character, structure, and direction of the specific 
culture is to be sought in the nature, expression, and 
interrelationship of these themes.
The term "theme" is used here in a technical sense
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to denote a postulate or position, declared or implied, 
and usually controlling behavior or stimulating 
activity, which is tacitly approved or openly promoted 
in a society.1
Worldview themes are sometimes called "societal 
personalities" or "national character." These themes make 
up the worldview of the people in a culture. The themes of 
an American worldview would include such core values as 
individualism, democracy, equality, competitiveness, youth 
orientation, frontier spirit, and the like.
Although Opler's theory is helpful in analyzing 
worldview, not all worldview themes are readily detectable. 
Even after considerable "digging," not every theme would 
emerge with lucidity or being rational. For this reason, 
the outcome of a study of a given worldview is not likely to 
be without a certain degree of vagueness and ambiguity.
Worldview Change and Cultural Chance
Most anthropologists agree that all cultures change 
in one way or another. Most of them, though, change slowly 
over an extended period of time.: Luzbetak explicates the
phenomenon this way:
Cultures are constantly changing because the 
individuals of a society, the "architects of culture, "
‘Opler, "Themes as Dynamic Forces in Culture," 198.
:For the Wape people in Papua, New Guinea, culture 
change took generations. See Donald E. McGregor, 
"Communicating the Christian Message to the Wape People of 
Papua New Guinea," International Review of Mission 63 
(July 1974): 530-38. See also Donald R. Jacobs, "Conversion 
and Culture," 181.
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are constantly modifying their cultural plans,
"improving" and adjusting their ways to the whims and 
demands of their physical, social, and ideational 
environment. One change in the blueprint may 
necessitate other changes so as to restore the balance 
and harmony that through change has been disrupted. 
Sometimes change gets out of control and disorganization 
sets in. Some cultures may change more rapidly and more 
thoroughly than others, but all cultures change, even 
the most primitive and isolated.1
Although all cultures change, they also tend to 
resist change. Luzbetak spells out the twin tendency of 
most cultures--to persist as well as to change.2 People in 
most societies tend to retain certain socially shared ideas 
in their original form and thus perpetuate orthodoxy. If 
most people are inclined to be conservative, why is change 
taking place? Arensberg and Niehoff believe that most 
cultures are not immune to change because they are not 
isolated from other cultures. If they were absolutely 
isolated from others, there would be relatively little force 
for change.3 Change would appear to be inevitable in a 
world that is rapidly becoming a global village. For the 
most part, though, persistence and change are held in 
constant tension. It is impossible to speak of the one 
without speaking of the other, for together they constitute 
the positive and negative aspects of cultural dynamics.'*
‘Luzbetak, 195.
:Ibid.
3Arensberg and Niehoff, 67.
*Luzebetak, 197.
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Cultural change may occur in different areas of 
culture. It may take place in the structure of a society; 
or it may affect the form, meaning, function of its culture 
and institutions. The fundamental meaning of an element of 
the culture may remain the same, even though the form may 
change.
Inasmuch as worldview is at the heart of culture, 
worldview change is indissolubly associated with cultural 
change. Just as everything that touches the roots of a tree 
affects the fruit, so anything that changes the worldview 
assumptions is likely to change the whole culture.1 The 
reverse appears to be true as well. Change in peripheral 
customs often leads to change in worldview relative to the 
specific area of life.: For example, the introduction of a
steel axe as a replacement for a stone axe tends to alter a 
people's perception of values. Having a stone axe may be 
perceived as a sign of poverty, whereas a steel axe 
represents a rise in status and financial standing. Hence, 
change in either worldview or culture is likely to have a 
corresponding effect on the other.
Anthropological studies of change are more likely to 
relate to culture than to worldview, and tend to focus on
'Charles H. Kraft, "Worldview, a Society's Map of 
Reality," in Worldview and Worldview Change: Source Book,
ed. Ian L. Grant (Pasadena: Fuller Theological Seminary, 
1985), 49.
:Ibid. , 50.
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observable phenomena such as behavior and practice.
Research that examines change in understandings of the self 
and reality moves toward the area of worldview.
Types of Cultural Change
Since cultural change is part and parcel of human 
societal existence, people of various cultures use different 
approaches to work out conflict stemming from two or more 
incompatible sets of assumptions, each claiming equal 
validity. Luzbetak spells out four methods of resolving the 
problem of cultural change: substitution, loss,
incrementation, and fusion.1 Substitution entails the 
dislodging of traditional elements by new ones.
Substitution may be complete, or it may be partial. Loss 
involves the elimination of traditional patterns without 
simultaneously providing substitutes. Incrementation cccurs 
when additional elements are introduced without 
corresponding displacement. Finally, fusion is the 
amalgamation of new and traditional patterns.
Luzbetak's description of incrementation as a means 
of coping with cultural change is akin to the so-called 
"pragmatic adaptation" discussed by Gusfield. Gusfield 
explains that in some Asian and African societies old and 
new cultures have the capacity to exist alongside one 
another without conflict. The acceptance of the new does
'Luzbetak, 19S-202.
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not necessarily do away with the traditional forms:
The syncretism of inconsistent elements has long 
been noted in the acceptance of religious usages and 
beliefs. Paganism and Catholicism have often achieved a 
mutual tolerance into a new form of ritualism drawn from 
each in Spanish-speaking countries. The "great 
tradition" of the urban world in India has by no means 
pushed aside the "little tradition" of the village as 
they make contact. Interaction has led to a fusion and 
mutual penetration. We have become increasingly aware 
that the outcome of modernizing processes and 
traditional forms is often an admixture in which each 
derives a degree of support from the other, rather than 
a clash of opposites.1
Pragmatic adaptation as a method of resolving 
conflicting worldview presuppositions is significant to this 
study in that it helps to explain why and how in some 
cultures people seem able to live with two sets of 
assumptions without overt dissonance.
Internal and External Factors 
Cultural change may be actributed to the outcome of 
interplay of external or internal developments. 
Anthropologists use the terms "origination" and "diffusion" 
to describe factors of cultural change. Origination is the 
process of change from within the society, while diffusion 
is change due to outside borrowing. Luzebetak maintains 
that diffusion is more common than origination.2 His view 
is supported by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck:
It is logical to assume that the better integrated a
‘Joseph R . Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity,"
335-36.
:Luzbetak, 213.
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value-orientation system is, the greater will be its 
power of resistance to the effects of impinging forces. 
This is most especially true in cases of culture contact 
(the outside culture being considered as the impinging 
external force) where the power factor of actual 
conquest is not a critical issue. . . . Anthropological 
studies have amply documented the fact that it is a 
common tendency of people to borrow actively, or accept 
passively, the ideas, the techniques, the art forms, and 
many other aspects of other cultures and then remold 
them in accordance with their basic value system. Our 
theory would argue that while this is generally true, it 
is the more likely, as a tendency, the greater is the 
degree of goodness of fit of the ordering of the several 
orientations in the total value-orientation system.1
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck further submit that the 
seeds of change almost always are located outside the 
system. "The external force which is potentially creative 
of providing the seeds of a basic change is the impact of 
another culture--another value system."2
The importation of another value system may be 
deliberate. Arensberg reaffirms the view expressed by 
Luzebetak and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck. He speaks of the 
phenomenon of intentional borrowing:
A cultural system can change in respect to borrowing 
when the members come to believe that the adoption of 
new ideas is more advantageous than maintaining old 
customs exclusively. Several Asian countries at first 
attempted to defend themselves against the industrial 
European powers by keeping the new ideas out; later they 
reversed their decision. Japan was one of the earliest 
to decide to close itself off from the encroaching West, 
but it changed policy in the nineteenth century and 
embarked on a deliberate program of getting Western 
ideas, particularly those of a technical nature.3
‘Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 45. 
:Ibid., 46.
3Arensberg and Niehoff, 75-76.
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Arensberg goes on to say that while it is common to 
borrow, people are much more apt to borrow ideas of a 
technological nature. In fact, the kinds of things that 
have been universally borrowed are usually of a technical 
nature Arensberg's point has particular relevance to Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Increasingly, much of the 
technical borrowing in these countries is initiated by state 
or state-sponsored corporations. The adoption of Western 
technical knowhow invariably encourages the adoption of 
Western culture and value systems.
Significance of Understanding Worldview
An understanding of worldview is critical to the 
study of the process of secularization and its impact on the 
Chinese mind. Several reasons are advanced in support of 
this thesis:
First, worldview provides a point of reference from 
which the essence of a culture is grasped. When the point 
of reference is incorrectly placed, the conclusion cannot be 
expected to be valid any more than one can type accurately 
when one's fingers are not properly stationed at the home 
keys of a typewriter or computer. For too long attempts 
have been made to try to analyze and understand the Chinese 
mind from the non-Chinese perspective, and the result in 
reaching the Chinese with the gospel has been disappointing. 
A case in point is the popular practice of the traditional 
Chinese bridal party taking seemingly aimless detours on
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their way to the marriage ceremony. Well-meaning Christian 
workers in China used to label such practices as "strange," 
"ridiculous," or even "superstitious." If the workers had 
understood Chinese worldview within a Chinese frame of 
reference, they would have known that the Chinese believed 
that evil spirits could not turn corners. Therefore, the 
bridal party taking a circuitous route could not be followed 
by evil spirits.
Second, worldview provides the key to comprehend the 
process of worldview change in Christian conversion. It is 
a fundamental Christian belief that the power of the gospel 
changes people at the deepest level of human consciousness, 
or the worldview level, as Kraft puts it.1 Thus Christian 
conversion represents a radical shift in one's value 
orientation. This shift frequently appears to be rather 
threatening, for it causes disequilibrium at the center of 
the culture, and it subsequently affects the rest of the 
culture. An understanding of worldview should provide 
enlightenment on the process and implications of such change 
as it relates to Christian conversion.
Third, an understanding of worldview is basic to any 
serious consideration of missionary communication. Grant 
believes that worldview is probably the single most critical
■Kraft, "Worldview, A Society's Map of Reality," 38-
39 .
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topic in the cross-cultural communication of the gospel.1 
Hesselgrave regards worldview as a starting point for 
missionary communication.2
Communication involves both the communicator and the 
receptor. Christian communicators must first understand 
their worldview assumptions. They need to be acquainted 
with their presuppositions to know what causes them to act 
and react as they do. They cannot adequately understand 
another worldview until they understand their own.
Second, a Christian communicator must be conversant 
with the receptor's worldview. Failure in this respect is 
likely to result in noncommunication. Kraft relates the 
experience of an Asian student who was having a trying time 
in the United States:
Not only was he struggling with culture stress in 
general, but he was nearly starving to death as well.
He was living with an American family and eating every 
meal with them. In his culture it was considered polite 
when somebody offered additional food at a meal to turn 
it down. One must turn it down three times and then, 
with a show of reluctance, only accept it when it was 
offered the fourth time. When the hostess offered him 
food, he said, "No, thank you." He responded that way 
when she offered it the second time. Then she didn't 
offer it again. Here he was getting thin and didn't 
know what to do. First of all, he concluded that this 
American family was not very polite and even greedy and 
didn't want to give him enough food to eat. Meanwhile, 
they were quite concerned because he wasn't eating and 
was losing weight. They thought he didn't like their 
food. Neither he nor they realized that their
'Ian L . Grant, ed., Worldview and Worldview Change: 
Source Book (Pasadena: Fuller Theological Seminary, 1985; , 
1 .
:Hesselgrave, 121-29.
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assumptions were different, and until they found out, 
they had no idea what was happening. He didn't know 
that it was not normal for an American hostess to offer 
food more than twice, and she didn't know that he 
expected her to offer it at least four times. She was 
assuming that he was really not interested in more food 
when he refused it. He, of course, assumed that she 
knew she must continue to press it upon him before he 
would do what he really wanted to do— accept more food.1
Fourth, a proper understanding of worldview provides 
the foundation for research on how the gospel can be 
contextualized. Luzbetak maintains that the investigation 
of "culture dynamics is perhaps the most urgent and most 
basic missionary research called for."2 The Willowbank 
Report of the Lausanne Committee for World Evangelization 
highlights two "cultural blunders" that may be inadvertently 
committed by missionaries.1 One is the perception on the 
part of the receptors that missionaries undermine the local 
culture when presenting the gospel. "Sometimes people 
resist the gospel not because they think it false but 
because they perceive it as a threat to their culture, 
especially the fabric of their society, and their national 
or tribal solidarity."'1 Second, the missionaries may be 
misunderstood as seeking to impose a foreign culture on the
'Kraft, "Worldview, A Society's Map of Reality,"
38-39.
:Luzbetak, 2 04.
;The Willowbank Report: Report of a Consultation on
Gospel and Culture. Lausanne Occasional Papers No. 2 
(Wheaton, IL: Lausanne Committee for World Evangelization, 
1978), 13-14.
'Ibid., 13.
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locals. When the gospel is presented in alien cultural 
forms, it may be resisted on terms extrinsic to it3elf. 
Missionaries may be regarded as foreign agents imposing 
their own way of life. In order for the gospel to engage in 
terms that are intelligible, meaningful, and nonthreatening, 
it must be communicated in terms that engage within the 
cultural milieu of the receptor. Effective
contextualization must be undertaken in the conceptual frame 
of reference and terms of the worldview of the people 
concerned.
Conclusion
Worldview may be defined as the philosophical 
assumptions upon which reality is constructed and 
interpreted by a social group. It is an all-pervasive force 
that informs everything a group thinks and does. Worldview 
lies at the center of culture. It is deep down in one's 
consciousness and is seldom brought out for examination. 
Although worldview assumptions are mostly implicit, they 
wield immense power over beliefs, values, and behavior. 
Worldview are seldom static and are subject to change.
The study of worldview is valuable in that it 
provides a point of reference from which one may understand 
a culture. It is also pertinent to our understanding of the 
ways culture may change in the processes of modernization 
and secularization. Moreover, an understanding of worldview
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is essential to a consideration of the communication of the 
gospel.
So far in this study the process of secularization 
in its Western context, its historical development, and its 
impact on religion and the individual have been examined. 
The meaning, function, and significance of worldview have 
also been explored. The focus of the next chapter is the 
intricate network of themes in the traditional Chinese 
worldview.
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CHAPTER I I I
THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE WORLDVIEW
Introduction
In chapter 2 we examined worldview and its 
missiological significance. We also noted the multi-faceted 
relationship between worldview and culture change. The 
focus of this chapter is on the application of Chapter 2 in 
one particular area, namely, Chinese culture. Chapter 3 
serves as a base line by which to measure the kind and 
extent of change engendered by the process of secularization 
in East Asia. As we study the traditional Chinese 
worldview, perhaps Luzbetak's appeal needs to be reiterated: 
"Research into culture dynamics is perhaps the most urgent 
and most basic missiological research called for."1
At first glance, the Chinese culture may appear 
unclear and subtle, sometimes even enigmatic and 
paradoxical. Admittedly, Chinese culture is complex. Any 
attempt to simplify it runs the risk of oversimplification 
and, therefore, of misrepresentation. In more ways than 
one, it is impossible to speak of a single Chinese 
worldview. National and ethnic diversity as well as
‘Luzbetak, 204.
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political, historical, and ideological dissimilarity make it 
foolhardy to assume that there is only one traditional 
Chinese culture. Even if there were only one culture, 
subcultures would exist within each of its clans and groups.
Its complexity notwithstanding, Chinese culture has 
maintained an amazing degree of continuity over two thousand 
years. A characteristic identity has been retained despite 
long episodes of political and social upheaval and change.
In this identity, one may discern regularly repeated and 
identifiable worldview assumptions that transcend time and 
space.
Suffice it to say that no single person, not even a 
Chinese scholar, can completely and exhaustively grasp the 
Chinese worldview in its totality. However, studying this 
worldview is exceedingly helpful because it is the all- 
pervasive force that, to a large extent, controls the 
thinking and behavior of millions of Chinese. It is an 
invaluable theoretical construct in probing the Chinese 
mind. Confucius once told his disciples that one thread ran 
through his teachings. He was later taken to have meant 
that human beings share a single mind, which penetrates all 
things, much as blood does the body. The Chinese worldview 
may be considered to be analogous to the thread of 
understanding continuously woven through millennia of 
Chinese history and philosophy.
At the risk of doing some injustice to the intricacy
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of Chinese culture, the study of Chinese worldview through a 
theoretical framework necessitates some generalization. The 
worldview described in this chapter is that generally held 
by a wide spectrum of Chinese in China prior to the 
Communist era. The description that follows is more typical 
of the worldview of the middle and lower classes, rather 
than that of the upper class Chinese.
Before focusing the worldview proper, however, the 
manifold factors that have contributed to the Chinese 
worldview through the ages are examined.
The Genesis of the Chinese Worldview 
Introduction
Most historians agree that Confucius and Lao-tzu, 
the founders of Confucianism and Taoism respectively, were 
two of the most influential figures in Chinese history. The 
concepts at the heart of these cultural systems constitute 
the foundations of Chinese culture. In addition Mahayana 
Buddhism took root in Chinese life and thought in the second 
century A.D. These three systems were distinct and separate 
in origin and in the contribution each made to Chinese 
culture. Confucianism gave new codes for social life,
Taoism provided a mystical and aesthetic interpretation of 
the world and nature, and Buddhism brought in meditation and 
enlightenment. Yet in the later stages of their 
development, these systems interacted and to some extent
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coalesced inextricably with one another and with the 
traditional folk religion as well. The traditional Chinese 
worldview, as we know it today, emerged from the interplay 
of this foursome and other socio-political forces.
Confucianism and the Chinese Worldview 
Confucianism was the official state ideology for 
nearly two thousand years of Chinese history and represents 
one of the major strands of Chinese thought and piety. 
Confucius (557-479 B.C.) has been acclaimed as the first 
major philosopxier and educator in Chinese history. Despite 
his unpretentious self-evaluation of himself as a 
transmitter rather than an originator of ideas,1 Confucius 
imperceptibly molded the basic pattern of the Chinese mind 
in almost every aspect of life. He contributed much toward 
the remarkable stability of Chinese civilization for the 
ensuing twenty-five centuries.3 Even today, the Chinese
:Confucius repeatedly depreciated his innovations in 
Chinese culture. He preferred to regard himself simply as 
"a lover of the ancients. . . . For none but a sage can 
originate, but to transmit is within the range of a worthy" 
(Analects VII, 1, 20). See Confucius quoted in William E. 
Soothill, The Analects of Confucius (New York: Paragon Book 
Reprint, 1968), 324, 325. Huston Smith aptly remarks that 
although Confucius was not the author of Chinese culture, he 
remains its supreme editor. Huston Smith, The Religions of 
Man (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), 216ff. See also Hans 
Steninger, "The Religions of China," in Historica 
Reliaionum. ed. C. J. Bleeker and G. Widengren, vol. 2, 
Religions of the Present (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), 465- 
515 .
:Huston Smith gives an historical account of the 
profound influence of Confucianism in China. "During the 
Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-200 A.D.) Confucianism became in
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reverently and affectionately speak of Confucius as the 
First Teacher, or Teacher of the First Degree, because he 
stands above all other teachers in rank.1
The pre-Confucian period was marked by political and 
social disintegration and widespread breakdown of morality. 
In the context of this severe crisis, Confucius set out to 
reform society. His reflections centered on human beings 
rather than on nature. His contention was that if people 
could not know themselves, how could they hope to know and 
control nature? Confucius believed that the source of human
effect China's state religion. In 130 B.C. it was made the 
basic discipline for the training of government officials, a 
pattern which continued in the main until the establishment 
of the Republic in 1912. In 59 A.D. sacrifices were ordered 
for Confucius in all urban schools, and in the seventh and 
eighth centuries temples were erected in every prefecture of 
the empire as shrines to him and his principal disciples.
To the second half of the twelfth century his Analects 
remained one of the classics. But in the Sung Dynasty it 
became not merely a school book but the school book, the 
basis of all education." Smith, Religions of Man. 260.
lrThe fortunes of Confucianism changed in the early 
twentieth century, however, when Western science and 
political thoughts were introduced. The internal decay and 
corruptions of the imperial government precipitated the 
founding of the Republic. Confucianism and other ancient 
traditions came under attack. Since the "cultural 
renaissance" of 1917, China has tried to cast off its 
Confucian shackles. Even some of the policies of the 
present Communist government represent attempts to 
"deconfucianize" the country. In Taiwan today, however, 
there is a resurgence of interest in Confucianism. See 
Laurence Thompson, The Chinese Wav in Religion. Encino, CA: 
Dickenson, 1973), 231-41; Donald E. Maclnnis, Religious 
Policy and Practice in Communist China (New York: Macmillan, 
1972). See also C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society: A 
Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some 
of Their Historical Factors (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1967), 341-404.
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happiness is to be found within oneself. It is this concept 
that gives Confucius' teaching an inevitable humanistic 
bent.
Confucius' desire to reform society led to his 
teachings on family and social life. Among them, filial 
piety (.Hsiao) was accentuated. The rationale was that if 
relations at home were correct, other social relationships 
would also be proper. Confucius stressed the value of the 
home. He believed the family circle was the training ground 
for a person's lifelong dedication to humanity (jen) and 
ritual propriety (li), and that faithful filial relationship 
to one's parents and those in the kinship system would root 
one firmly in both jen and li.
Another of his major contributions to the Chinese 
worldview lies in his wholistic approach to nature.
Confucius regarded human affairs as part and parcel of a 
bigger cosmic whole.1 The present was linked with the past, 
and the traditions of the ancients were valuable because 
they represented wisdom on how to live harmoniously with 
nature. If humans were to prosper, they would have to walk 
the virtuous path trod by the heroes of China's golden age.
The third area of Confucius influence on the Chinese 
worldview stems from his emphasis on the importance of the 
Golden Mean. Confucius preferred a middle-of-the-road
‘Denise L. Carmody and John T. Carmody, The Storv of 
World Religions (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co., 
1988), 373.
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approach to life and rejected extremist doctrines. He 
counseled moderation in all things. Confucius' philosophy 
of the Golden Mean had a profound influence on the Chinese 
propensity to inclusiveness and pragmatism in religious 
matters.
Confucius' esteem for hierarchial relationships also 
made an imprint on the Chinese mind. He placed high value 
on a cosmic hierarchy of beings that at the lower end 
included humans. Of particular importance in this system 
was an hierarchy of patriarchal kinship that Confucius 
repeatedly affirmed was crucial to the well-being of the 
entire social fabric. The emperor was thought to be part of 
this cosmic hierarchy, and the Chinese were scrupulously 
taught to respect their ruler's connection with heaven.
Taoism and the Chinese Worldview
Lao-Tzu, the founder of Taoism, is said to have been 
a contemporary of Confucius. His name, which can be 
translated as "the Old Boy," "the Old Fellow," or "the Grand 
Old Master," is obviously a title of endearment and respect. 
Like Confucianism, Taoism had its beginnings as a response 
to the social upheaval of the Warring States period (402-222 
B.C.). Lao-Tzu's Tao Te Ching. Taoism's basic text, was 
written as a philosophy designed to find solutions to the 
conditions of the times.
Examination of the content of Tao Te Ching reveals 
that everything Lao-Tzu taught revolves around the pivotal
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concept of Tao,1 the cosmic and moral "way" or "path." But 
Taoism is more than Tao itself. It is a complex and 
baffling blend of theories and practice.2 Nevertheless, 
Taoism has left it mark on the Chinese worldview in two 
general areas--philosophical and popular Taoism.
Philosophical Taoism
Philosophical Taoism is characterized as a 
"nondualistic naturalism."3 While Confucianism stressed the 
moral goodness of humans as the key to happiness, Taoists 
accented the harmony and perfection of nature. Lao-Tzu 
considered the ideal life to be simple and harmonious, 
unlike the kind of well-regulated life suggested by 
Confucius. The development of a well-regulated life through 
rites and ceremonies seemed not only artificial to him, but
‘in the opening passages of Tao Te China. Lao-Tzu 
maintains that "the Tao that can be expressed in words is 
not the eternal Tao; the name that can be named is not the 
eternal name." Hence, Tao as a metaphysical reality is 
nameless, invisible, inaudible, infinite, formless, and 
transcendent. See Charles W. H. Fu, "Confucianism and 
Taoism," in Historical Atlas of the Religions of the World, 
ed. Ismail Ragi al Faruqi (New York: Macmillan, 1974), 118.
:Taoism is reputed to be a mixed bag of philosophy 
of Lao-Tzu and other philosophies such as the yin-yang 
doctrine of Tsou Yen. It includes famous legends of the
Isles of the Blessed such as Mt. Peng Lai and the Taoist
Immortals (hsien) . It also incorporates alchemy, magical 
talismen, Chinese yoga, collective sexual orgies, 
revolutionary secret societies, folk religion, a growing 
pantheon of gods including Buddhist bodhisattvas and 
national heroes, as well as Confucian moral doctrine and the
Buddhist belief in karmic retribution and hell. See Fu,
121.
3Ibid., 118.
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also to interfere with nature. Thus, following Tao means 
supporting all things in their natural state, allowing them 
to transform spontaneously.
The basis of Lao-Tzu's philosophy is found in the 
concept of the unity of humans and nature. The two were 
regarded as being inseparable.
In Confucianism human beings and nature are 
differentiated, and goodness and well-being are 
considered to proceed from what belongs to humanity 
rather than nature. Taoism sees humanity and nature as 
a unity and does not differentiate between the two. 
According to this philosophy, the basis of humanity is 
not of our own making, but is contained in the being and 
the function of the totality of the universe. 
Consequently, in its critical and negative aspects, 
Taoism analyzes the deficiencies and evils confronting 
human society and concludes that they stem primarily 
from a wrong view of humanity and the universe.
Constructively, Taoism offers a view of the universe 
and man as a unity. Human knowledge transcends the 
limits of precepts and concepts. It is direct and 
immediate, not being dependent upon a false duality 
between the knowing subject and the known object. The 
principles that should guide life and regulate the 
actions of human beings are the principles that regulate 
nature. Life is lived well only when people are 
completely in tune with the whole universe and their 
actions are the action of the universe flowing through 
them. The institutions of society are regulated by 
allowing them to be what they are naturally; society, 
too, must be in tune with the universe.
The task of philosophy is to lead humans to a unity 
with the universe by illuminating its Tao, or Way. The 
word Tao refers to a path or a way, and in Taoism it 
means the source and principle of the functioning of 
whatever exists. When the Tao of h uiuSni ty and the Tao 
of the universe are one, human beings will realize their 
infinite nature. Then peace and harmony will reign.1
Since the practice of Tao has ecological
‘John M. Koller, Oriental Philosophies (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985), 284-85.
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implications, the Taoists were great environmentalists. A 
Taoist would never describe the scaling of Mount Everest as 
"the conquest of Everest," but rather as the "befriending of 
Everest." Taoist temples did not stand out from the 
landscape, but were nestled against the hills, back, under 
the trees, blending in with the environment. Taoism also 
left its mark on Chinese art. Smith believes that it is no 
accident that the seventeenth-century "great period" of 
Chinese art coincided with a great surge of Taoist influence 
on the Chinese mind.1
Popular Taoism
Taoism did not always remain as it was from the 
beginning. Later Taoists incorporated mystical aspects into 
the Taoist philosophy which some call the perversion of 
Taoism. The doctrine of Tao might have been too subtle to 
be grasped by the average mind. When Taoism made contact 
with the general populace, its tenets were adulterated.
Thus the lofty heights of Tao practiced by the philosophers 
progressively became the priestcraft of popular Taoism. 
Mysticism became mystification. Religion was perverted into 
necromancy and sorcery.2 The art of meditation became 
exorcism. Later, Taoism was known for its pursuit of 
immortality through trance meditation, embryonic
■Smith, Religions of M an. 284.
2Ibid., 272.
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respiration, elixirs, alchemy, and sexual yoga.1 It even 
developed its own set of priesthood, rituals, and monastic 
institutions.
Perhaps most significantly, Taoism was known to be 
associated with the worship of gods and spirits. Welty 
explains the phenomenon this way:
Many important Chinese gods, such as the gods of 
rain, fire, medicine, and agriculture and the kitchen 
gods, arose from the Taoist school. The impersonal and 
infinite force beneath nature became transformed into 
individual, finite human souls that, after death, became 
powerful spirits. The popular Taoism of later times 
increasingly filled the need for the magic that people 
often turn to when other resources fail them. The 
Chinese peasant sought the help of unseen powers because 
he lived on a narrow economic margin, and hard work and 
skill were not always enough for survival. As a 
consequence, the average man began to associate the 
Taoists with the world of spirits who must be placated 
and appeased. The Taoists were called upon more and 
more to select lucky days for weddings, and funerals, to 
choose sites for housing, and in general to regulate 
those human activities peculiarly related to the world 
of spirits.2
It is no wonder that some scholars lament that 
Taoism is but a systematization or dressed-up version of 
magic and animism. Suffice it to say this popular version 
of Taoism left an indelible effect on the Chinese worldview 
in terms of an affinity for geomancy, magic, and spirit 
worship. It may be for this reason that Taoist priests have
'For a more detail treatment of Tao and longevity, 
see Wen-3han Huang, "On Longevity," Bulletin of the 
Institute of Ethnology Academia Sinica 46 (Autumn 1978) : 
141-5.
2Paul T. Welty, The Asians: Their Heritage and Their 
Destiny (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1966), 164.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
7 5
been described by leaders of Communist China as "agents for 
the perpetuation of gross superstition. 1,1
Buddhism and the Chinese Worldview
Buddhism made its entry into China in the first 
century A.D. or earlier.2 Being an Indian import. Buddhism 
created a significant cultural gulf between itself and the 
Chinese traditions. Wright notes that both Buddhism and the 
Chinese traditions appreciably differed in terms of 
language, literary mode, attitude, and in their concepts of 
time and space.3 The Chinese language was uninflected, 
logographic, monosyllabic, with no systematized grammar. 
Indian languages were highly inflected, alphabetic, 
polysyllabic, and with a highly elaborated grammatical 
system. In terms of literary modes, the Chinese preferred 
concrete thinking and familiar objects, whereas the Indian 
literature was full of metaphors and abstractions.
As to their attitudes, the Chinese showed little 
enthusiasm for personality analysis, while the Indians had a 
highly developed science of psychological analysis. Both 
were also radically different as regards concepts of time 
and space. The Chinese tended to think of both as finite
'Steininger, 511.
2Hans Rung and Julia Ching, Christianity and Chinese 
Religions (New York: Doubleday, 1389), 200.
3Arthur F. Wright, Buddhism in Chinese History 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 33-34.
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and to reckon time in life-spans, generations, or political 
eras; the Indians, however, perceived time and space as 
infinite and tended to think of cosmic aeons rather than of 
units of terrestrial life. Moreover, Buddhism seemed 
relatively "agnostic" compared with traditional Chinese 
animism with its worship of countless gods, spirits, and 
ancestors. Despite these striking dissimilarities, Mahayana 
Buddhism found a wide following in China after centuries of 
conflict, change, and adaptation.1 Some of its doctrines
‘See Wright, Buddhism in Chinese History. 34-59.
The illustrious "domestication" or "contextualization" of 
Buddhism in China has been noted by many scholars. Welty, 
for example, gives a brief account of how Buddhism managed 
to become grafted into the Chinese religion: "Buddhism in
China played down its foreign elements and made itself as 
Chinese as possible. The abstract concept of Nirvana--the 
state or condition of aesirelessness--was minimized, and a 
concrete place of happiness, like the Western Heaven of 
Amitabha Buddha, was given prominence. It built on the 
foundations of the other ideologies popular during the early 
part of the Christian era. Since Taoism was popular among 
the commoners and intellectuals alike, Buddhists used Taoism 
as an instrument of conversion by taking over Taoist terms, 
writing commentaries on Taoist books, and identifying 
Buddhism with Taoist teaching and practice. The common 
elements in Taoist and Buddhist doctrines were deliberately 
stressed over and over again. At times, the truth was 
stretched in order to make Taoism and Buddhism agree. They 
honored Confucianism by speaking of a Bodhisattva as being 
an incarnation of Confucius, by naming a temple after 
Confucius, and by stressing the virtue of filial piety as an 
aspect of Buddhist teaching. Buddhist monks pointed out the 
similarities between Confucian and Buddhist morality, even 
going so far as to set up ancestral tablets in a special 
hall to honor the memory of their dead monks. . . .  By 
showing itself not as an exclusive religion but as a 
complement to other Chinese beliefs, Buddhism penetrated and 
permeated Chinese life and became as Chinese as the native 
philosophies of Confucianism and Taoism. The Chinese were 
never hereafter at any particular period either 
Confucianists, Taoist, or Buddhist--they were all three 
simultaneously." Welty, 176-77.
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had to be sinicized before they were accepted.1
Chinese religion was never the same after the 
inception of Buddhism into China. Significantly, Buddhism 
brought a new consciousness to the Chinese mind. This 
consciousness was in stark contrast to the this-worldly 
orientation of Confucianism which accentuated the human, 
historical dimension. Cutting through the familism and 
particularistic ethics of the Chinese, Buddhism taught a 
universal ethic and a doctrine of salvation outside the 
family.
Buddhism was also partly responsible for the 
reconceptualization of the Chinese understanding of 
happiness. The Chinese tended to be preoccupied with the 
establishment and fulfillment of human life on earth. 
Buddhism, however, was deeply pessimistic about human
!A popular goddess worshipped by the Chinese in East 
Asia has been Kuan Yin who, unknown to many, had a Buddhist 
origin. "Liu Chang-?o, former director of National Central 
Library [in Taiwan] points out that the original Kuan Yin 
was a follower of Amitabha in the Western Lands, and thus of 
course a male. But in the Yuan dynasty, monks attempting to 
spread Buddhism depicted Kuan Yin as--after getting 
agreement from two Taoist deities--returning to the 
reincarnation cycles to give merciful assistance to people 
entranced by fame, fortune, and pleasure. This story became 
widespread among the people, but it is truly dumbfounding: 
not only has Kuan Yin changed sex, she is interacting with 
Taoist deities, and has turned into a merciful spirit who 
saves people pain and difficulty! Yet in the eyes of 
Chinese, Kuan Yin's popularity far exceeds that of Buddhist 
founder Sakyamuni. Kuan Yin is so popular, in fact, that 
Chinese often slaughter animals as offerings at Kuan Yin 
festivals--never mind that Buddhism forbids killing any 
sentient being!1’ Laura Li, "The Chinese Otherworld View," 
Sinorama 15 (January 1990): 15.
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prospects for earthly happiness. Buddhism did not deny the 
existence of a great variety of temporary experiences of 
joy. But it insisted that there was no such thing as 
absolute happiness in mortal life. As such humans should 
mistrust the possibility of realizing bliss on this earth. 
Only Nirvana offered deliverance from the curse of all 
existence.1
Buddhism gained a respectful hearing in China among 
the intelligentsia and plebeians alike.2 The educated 
perceived Buddhism as a more profound consideration of 
death, immortality, psychic liberation, and meditation than 
the native traditions. For the commoners, Buddhist rituals 
for the dead were especially consoling, and the Buddhist 
Bodhisattvas came to be regarded as helpful, comforting 
saints to whom one might pray in adversity. Buddhism won 
the loyalty of Chinese commoners because it had accommodated 
itself to the folk beliefs and practices to which they were 
accustomed and in addition it was believed to accord access 
to magical or superhuman power.
’Wolfgang Bauer, China and the Search for Happiness: 
Recurring Themes in Four Thousand Years of Chinese Cultural 
History. trans. Michael Shaw (New York: Seabury Press,
1976), 153-59.
:Success not withstanding, Buddhism did encounter 
obstacles in China. For example, there were the Chinese 
suspicion of works and ideas not sanctioned by the Confucian 
'canon,' the aversion to asceticism, the misgiving if not 
outright rejection of celibacy, and the Chinese prejudice 
that foreign things could not be better than things 
originated from the center of the earth--the Middle Kingdom. 
See Carmody and Carmody, World Religions. 353.
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Folk Religion and the Chinese Worldview 
Folk religion may be defined as the beliefs and 
practices of the masses, in contrast to the views of the 
intelligentsia and religious officials. It is a mix of 
local religious traditions and animistic beliefs. It deals 
with the problems of everyday life, not with ultimate 
realities.1 Folk religion tends toward pragmatism. It 
answers the question "Does it work?" rather than "What does 
it mean?" Folk religion by nature is somewhat inarticulate, 
incoherent, and unreflective, but it may be no less rich or 
meaningful to its believers.
The bifurcation between "folk" and "elite" religions 
or "great" and "little" traditions has long been a subject 
of debate. In the study of Chinese religion in recent 
years, the trend has been to talk of "popular" religion,2 
"local" religion, or "popular religious cultures"3 rather
'Hicbart, Anthropological Insights. 222.
:Studies in European religions have generally made a 
distinction between 'popular1 religion and 'institutional' 
religion. Studies in Asian religions, however, have been 
influenced by Robert Redfield's differentiation of 'great' 
and 'little' tradition. See Robert Redfield, Peasant 
Society and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1956), 42ff.
3See Catherine Bell, "Religion and Chinese Culture: 
Toward an Assessment of 'Popular Religion," History of 
Religions 29 (August 1989): 35-57. See also Mary R.
O'Neil, "From 'Popular' to 'Local' Religion: Issues in
Early Modern European Religious History," Religious Studies 
Review 12 (July/October 1986): 222-26; Hendrik Vrijhof and 
Jacques Waadenburg, eds., Official and Popular Religion: 
Analysis of a Theme for Religious Studies (The Hague:
Mouton, 1979), 1.
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than elite and folk religions. The trend toward the 
terminological alternatives appears to be in line with 
Maurice Freedman's assessment that in the context of the 
Chinese religion, elite culture and peasant culture were not 
two different matters, but were versions of the same thing.1 
Freedman's evaluation is similar to Creel's suggestion that 
the body of popular knowledge was by no means confined to 
the unlettered masses alone.2 Popular religion was also 
deeply ingrained in the philosophers, the rulers, and the 
statesmen who were humans and, therefore, experienced the 
same desires and met the same crises in life.3
Creel further suggests that while folk religion is 
not identical with elite religion, it does not conflict with 
elite religion either. Where the two impinge on each other, 
they are similar on the essentials. In the study of Chinese
'Maurice Freedman, The Study of Chinese Society. 
Essays bv Maurice Freedman, selected and introduced by G. W. 
Skinner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979), 355. 
Freedman's thinking is akin to that of C. K. Yang who 
objects the two-tier elite/folk bifurcation in a society 
known for its wholistic perspective to culture and religion. 
Yang proposes Chinese religion as having two aspects, 
"diffused" and "institutional." Yang, 20-21, 294-95.
2H . G . Creel, Sinism: A Study of the Revolution of
the Chinese Worldview (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 
1929), 113.
3In a comprehensive study of folk religion in 
Southwest China, Graham discovers that while it is true the 
ideas of the scholars influenced the ordinary Chinese 
people, it is also true that the beliefs and practices of 
the common people strongly influenced the scholars and 
rulers of China. David C. Graham, Folk Religion in 
Southwest China (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Press, 1967), 
110.
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religions, Creel concludes that:
It is this fundamental agreement between the ideas 
of the common people, on the one hand, and those of the 
high philosophers, on the other, which provides the most 
certain evidence that sinism was not the chance creation 
of a handful of Chinese intellectuals led by Confucius, 
but that it was rather the expression, in philosophical 
term, of the historically-evolved worldview of the 
Chinese people.1
It is recognized that Confucianism generally made 
its greatest impact on the ruling class. As in most other 
traditional civilizations, the Chinese ruling class was a 
minority sitting atop a vast peasant majority. Undoubtedly, 
Confucius1 teaching came to shape the thought and practice 
of this majority in such matters as family life and respect 
for civil rulers. Yet, at the bottom of the Chinese 
pyramid, it was believed, were unseen forces of folk 
religion. More ancient but less rational than Confucianism 
and Taoism, these folk beliefs had at least equal influence 
on the populace.
Chinese folk religion became part and parcel of the 
Chinese worldview in terms of widely-held beliefs in matters 
relating to challenges in everyday life. These beliefs 
included protection on journeys, the interpretation of 
dreams and diseases, general guarantees of livelihood, quest 
for longevity, and acquisition of good luck. Chinese folk 
religion had tended to accentuate the utilitarian aspects of 
Chinese religion. It was more experiential than analytical.
'Creel, 120.
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It was also more ritualistic. Most Chinese, whether 
intelligentsia or peasantry, experienced religious reality 
directly through purposeful behavior such as rites and 
rituals on a regular basis.1 Though the inodes in which 
these rituals were practiced were many, their impact on the 
Chinese worldview was both deep rooted and far-reaching. In 
fact, the perceived importance of such popular beliefs as 
feng-shui has shaded the Chinese worldview perhaps as 
remarkably as has Confucianism.
Having studied the contributing factors that 
influenced the ancient Chinese worldview throughout the long 
history of Chinese civilization, we must now identify the 
major worldview assumptions that constituted the traditional 
Chinese mind.
Traditional Chinese Worldview Themes
The Chinese worldview as described in this chapter 
is based on two primary assumptions. First, it is based on 
the traditional worldview of the masses, and not necessarily 
on the value system subscribed to by the minority literati 
and elite who tended to be more philosophical than 
pragmatic. Second, the traditional Chinese worldview is 
based on the commonality of Chinese culture.
!Steven Harrell, "The Concept of Soul in Chinese 
Folk Religion," Journal of Asian Studies 38 (May 1979) :
520. See also Lewis R. Lancaster, "Elite and Folk:
Comments on the Two-Tiered Theory," in Religion and the 
Family in East Asia, ed. George A. DeVos and Takao Sofue 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 88.
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Understandably, the Chinese of the diaspora are not totally 
homogenous in their perceptions of the Chinese culture and 
worldview.1 However, it has been found that the Chinese 
culture, though complex, has retained remarkable constancy 
around the world, so much so that one may speak of the 
universals of Chinese culture.1
Nakamura's analysis of the characteristic Chinese 
way of thinking provides a helpful paradigm to study the 
Chinese worldview. His description of eleven Chinese
‘For the complexity of the Chineseness of the 
Chinese, see Vivienne Wee, What Does "Chinese" Mean? An 
Exploratory Essay (Singapore: National University of 
Singapore, 1988) . See also Vincent Y. C. Shih, "On Being 
Chinese: A Philosophical Reflection," in Understanding
M o d e m  China, ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa (Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 1969), 202-213.
2Perhaps the most outstanding research to 
substantiate this assumption is Hendrick Serrie's 
dissertation "Constancy and Variation in Chinese Culture:
An Analysis of Fourteen Mainland, Offshore, and Overseas 
Communities in Terms of the Hsu Attributes," Ph.D. 
dissertation, Northwestern University, 1976. Serrie field- 
tested Francis u. K, Hsu's four attributes of the Chinese 
culture: continuity, inclusiveness, authority, and
asexuality. Its strategy was to analyze the social 
organizations of a substantial number of the most highly 
variant Chinese communities around the globe. These 
includes five provinces in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, California, Mississippi, and 
England. Results of the study shows a universal presence of 
all four of Hsu's attributes in all the communities 
selected.
The present study on Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Singapore seems to bear out Serrie's conclusion. Granted 
there are differences and diversities in each locale where 
Chinese culture is found, however, the innermost worldview 
assumptions of the Chinese appear to bear distinctive 
semblance.
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attributes1 have been consolidated in this study into a 
five-theme theoretical construct that forms the basis for 
the description of the Chinese worldview that follows. The 
selected trait3 are: hierarchy, antiquity, particularity,
harmony, and practicality. The order of progression is not 
intended to indicate a ranking in the order of importance.
Esteem for Hierarchy 
One of the outstanding features of Chinese 
civilization has been its emphasis upon social relations. 
Proper social relations were indispensable to achieving and 
maintaining an orderly society. Each social relation must 
be viewed in its proper place, and each person has his or 
her proper responsibilities and duties. This is what 
Confucius called ming fen, or the "rectification of names," 
ming meaning "name" and fen, "duty." Every title in the 
social order implied status and responsibility, and if each 
person knew his or her place and duty and acted accordingly, 
there would be social order and peace. Confucius reiterated 
this in his statement: "Let the prince be prince, the
minister minister, the father father, and the son son. "2 
This proclivity to hierarchy is reflected in the 
famous Chinese belief in cosmic hierarchy. Human existence
'Haj ime Nakamura, Wavs of Thinking of Eastern 
Peoples: India-China-Tibet-Japan, ed. Philip P. Wiener
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1971), 175-294.
:Soothill, 581.
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was regarded as the highest and most important order of 
being. A clear demarkation was established between human 
beings and other living creatures.1 The rationale behind 
the high value placed on a proper hierarchy of being may be 
attributed to Confucius' teaching regarding li, or rules 
governing life. Li was ideal moral conduct. It was 
considered to be the fundamental morality of Chinese 
society. Li gave a high value to order of rank and social 
position.
Chinese society was traditionally divided into four 
main classes which, in descending order, were the scholar- 
administrator, the farmer, the artisan, and the merchant. 
The scholar-administrator enjoyed the highest rank because 
an educated person was thought to be morally superior. 
Further, scholarship led to bureaucratic positions which in 
turn brought wealth and prestige. To be a scholar- 
administrator was the most cherished dream of most Chinese.
The same hierarchical order prevailed in terms of 
relationships. Thus men were ranked above women, parents 
over children, masters over peasants, teachers over 
students, etc. A teacher generally would not visit just 
anyone, and for a pupil to come into town and not quickly 
pay a visit to his teacher was a serious slight.
’Nakamura, 259-60.
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Kinship System
The kinship system in China was basically 
patrilineal and the most important groups have been the 
extended family and the lineage, sometimes called the clan. 
The extended family seems to have been an economic unit, 
whereas the clan was the legal, ritual, and property holding 
unit.1
The Extended Family
The basic and most characteristic Chinese 
institution was the family. The family played a leading 
role in economic life, social organization, moral education, 
and in government. Confucius himself upheld family ethics 
and stressed familial continuity. The five well-defined 
relationships that made up the web of social life were those 
between father and son, elder brother and junior brother, 
husband and wife, elder friend and junior friend, and ruler 
and subject. That three of the five relationships were 
determined by kinship is indicative of the importance 
Confucius attached to the family institution.
The traditional ideal Chinese family was the 
extended family which usually included two or more nuclear 
families united by consanquineal kinship bonds. A typical 
case would include the parents and families of their two 
oldest adult sons. In China, a married son seldom
‘Maurice Freedman, "The Family in China: Past and
Present," Pacific Affairs 34 (1961): 323-36.
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established a new home of his own but continued to live with 
his bride in his parents' house. When his sons married, 
they and their wives, in turn, lived in the same household 
with their parents and grandparents. Consequently families 
with several generations residing together were not 
uncommon.1
The two general types of extended family in China 
were the stem family and the joint family. A typical stem 
family consisted of parents, all their unmarried children, 
and one married son with his wife and children. This type 
of family could be broken up in cases when only one of the 
parents was alive or when the son had no children. The 
joint family differed from the stem family in that more than 
one married son or daughter remained with the parents and 
their unmarried children. Sometimes other close relatives 
such as grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, and nephews 
might also live under the same roof. Usually the father was 
the head of the joint family, but sometimes the eldest 
brother supervised the common property and presided over the 
lives of the members.2 The large joint family was
'Morton H. Fried, Fabric of Chinese Society: A
Study of the Social Life of a Chinese County Seat (New York: 
Octagon Books, 1974), 69ff; G. P. Murdock, Social Structure 
(New York: Macmillan, 1949), 24. See also two books written 
by Marion J. Levy, The Family Revolution in Modern China 
(New York: Atheneum, 1968), 50ff; and Modernization and the 
Structure of Societies (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1966), 414-17.
:01ga Lang, Chinese Family and Society (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1946), I4ff.
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considered the ideal by all classes of Chinese.
The extended family system, though encouraged, was 
often held in check by poverty. The destitute had to be 
contented with having conjugal families. The stem and joint 
families might include two or more generations, but the 
conjugal family was limited to two: parents and unmarried
children.
In any case, the Chinese family system was usually 
both hierarchical and authoritarian. The status of each 
person depended on position by birth or marriage in the 
family. The gradations of relationships among members of 
the household were carefully spelled out. This was 
expressed in a complex system of kinship terminology which 
differentiated between the paternal and maternal uncles, 
aunts, cousins, and in-laws. Special attention was given to 
seniority and rank.
The Clan
The clan, tsu, or the lineage constituted a 
prominent unit in the Chinese kinship structure. A clan was 
a collective descent group sharing a common patrilineal 
ancestry in a given locality. Only patrilineal descendants 
were considered clan members. Because marriage within a 
clan was not allowed, a woman always married outside her 
father's clan, and her children belonged to her husband's
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clan.1 Clan members bore the same surname, but families 
with the same surnames did not necessarily belong to the 
same clan. There are about 470 surnames in use today, but 
there were many more clans.:
One of the crucial roles of the clan was to support 
ancestor worship and the institution of ancestral halls. 
Ancestor worship perpetuated the kinship system, and its 
integrating function fostered unity and continuity among its 
members. It was a constant reinforcement of one's common 
social origin. It kept group-orientedness alive in the clan 
member's consciousness. Clan members were also reminded of 
their consanguinity by the use of kinship terminology.3
Concomitant with this integrating function, the 
clans also served other functions in respect of the 
economic, educational, judicial, and political well being of 
the group. The social and financial status of clan members 
varied greatly. Part of the responsibility of the clan was 
the redistribution of money and goods donated by wealthier 
clan members. They also supplied means for the education of 
children from poorer families, cared for orphans and the 
indigent elderly. Clan aid was sometimes rendered to 
members in the form of loans. Sometimes assistance was also
1 Chang-Tu Hu, China: Its People. Its Society. Its
Culture (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1960), 166.
:Ibid.
3The discussion of ancestor worship is expanded 
later in this chapter.
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provided to help out in funerals and weddings of the 
members.
Most clan leaders enjoy considerable prestige and 
respect. They wield considerable power in mediating 
disputes and punishing erring clan members according to 
tradition and the rules set down by the clan. They often 
ignore government authorities, especially in rural areas.
In the event of some crimes, the clan might usurp the power 
of the government and local officers would be relegated to 
making face-saving investigation.1
Though they appear to have remarkable solidarity, 
clans have been known to have frequent internal and external 
conflicts. Intra-clan tension usually revolve around 
complaints regarding the inequitable sharing of wealth and 
matters of prestige or power among the sub-branches. Inter- 
clan hostility and feuds also plague many clan 
organizations. Most squabbles are related to rivalry and 
competition between clans in the same geographical area.
Some have even broken out in open confrontation.
Filial Piety
Inasmuch as their social organization centered in 
family and kinship, the Chinese believed hsiao or filial
‘Ibid., 168.
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piety was tneir cardinal virtue.1 The duty of children to 
their parents was regarded as the foundation whence all 
virtues spring.
The concept of hsiao is summed up in the famous 
Confucius dictum, "When the parents live, serve them with 
decorum; when they are dead, bury them with decorum, and 
sacrifice to them with decorum."2 Filial deeds are extolled 
throughout the various Chinese Classics such as Lun Yu 
(Analects) and Li Chi (Book of Rites) .
The concept of hsiao is deeply ingrained in the 
Chinese language. For example, the word lao (old) is often 
incorporated into such terms as lao shih (teacher) and lao 
yu (old friend) to teach respect and deference.
Hsiao was rooted in the father-son relationship, 
which according to Hsu was the most important relationship 
in Chinese culture.3 The son had been called to life 
because of his parents, his ancestors, and the deceased. It 
was his duty to render them services which included 
veneration and obedience. Veneration implied veneration of
■Steninger, 487. See also Francis L. K. Hsu,
"Filial Piety in Japan and China: Borrowing, Variation and
Significance," Journal of Comparative Family Studies 2 
(Spring 1971): 67, and Marcel Granet, The Religion of the 
Chinese People, trans. Maurice Freedman (London: Basil 
Blackwell, 1975), 82-88.
2Soothill, 153.
3Francis L. K. Hsu, "A Hypothesis on Kinship and 
Culture," in Kinship and Culture, ed. Francis L. K. Hsu 
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1971), 55.
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the living parents as well as ancestor veneration, since the 
family tree extended backward far beyond the present 
generation.1
Obedience implied the central role parents played in 
one's life, both before and after one was married. As such, 
the twenty-first year as the age of independence was alien 
to the Chinese mind. As long as one's parents were alive, 
it was one's obligatory duty to follow their wishes even if 
they did not agree with one's own. In the Confucian code, 
to disobey one's parents was a heinous offense. Crime, 
laziness, nonachievement, even inability to procreate 
brought great dishonor and mortification to the family. In 
ancient China, parental power was believed to be almost 
absolute. According to the law, a son or grandson who 
reviled or assaulted a parent or grandparent could be killed 
with impunity, since such unfilial acts were considered 
capital crimes.2
Customarily, children at an early age were 
vigorously trained to be completely obedient and responsive 
to commands and concerns for the well-being of parents, 
grandparents, teachers, and othe^ authority figures. The 
essence of their home training was the children's
’Ancestor veneration or worship is discussed in the 
next section entitled "Esteem for Antiquity."
2Richard J. Smith, China's Cultural Heritage: The
China Dynasty 1644-1912 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 
217 .
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obligations to parents and never vice versa.1 For centuries 
Chinese children were carefully instructed by tales known as 
Er Shlh Ssu Hsiao (twenty-four examples of filial piety). 
They were taught to follow Confucius' dictum that "parents 
are always right." Support of parents, therefore, must 
precede all other obligations and must be fulfilled even at 
great expense.
One of the most poignant displays of hsiao was at 
the funeral. Lavish expenditure on a funeral was common.
No expense was considered too great to ensure the comfort of 
the dead. Hsu gives a vivid description of what a funeral 
involved:
Among the wealthy the coffin is kept in the house 
for long periods while hired monks and priests recite 
sutras. The home is filled with life-sized paper mache 
images of commodities, livestock, and servants, all of 
which are eventually burned to provide for the comfort 
of the dead. An overflowing crowd of guests is served 
expensive feasts and entertained by story tellers. The 
less well-to-do and even the relatively poor often make 
similar stupendous efforts. Since filial piety requires 
a man, rich or poor, to consider the welfare of his 
parents before all else, it follows that the living 
should spare no effort to assure the comfort of the 
dead. But it is equally imperative that an auspicious 
funeral meet the definitive expectations of the living.
A man who fails to make his best efforts on such an 
occasion soon finds himself handicapped and slighted on 
all sides. Here there can be no excuses, for in this 
social environment, a person's worth is known to 
practically everyone. . . .  In the Chinese context, if 
individuals break the economic backbone of their 
families because of lavish funerals for their parents, 
no one would say they were wrong. Instead, they would 
become known as outstanding examples of filial piety.
‘Francis L. K. Hsu, Americans and Chinese: Passage 
to Differences. 3d ed. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1981), 80-81.
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These same expectations also apply to birthday 
celebrations for aged parents, family weddings.1
Hsu maintains that the ethic of hsiao is by no means 
a one-sided relationship. As in all relationships, the 
parent-child relationship was based on the principle of 
reciprocity:
In the Chinese context, the son owes to his father 
absolute obedience, support during his life time, 
mourning when he passes away, burial according to social 
station and financial ability, provision for the soul's 
needs in the other world, and glory for the father by 
doing well or even better than he. But the father must 
provide for his sons when they are young, educate them 
in the ancestral tradition, find mates for them, and 
leave them good names and ample inheritances. Fathers 
and sons have to do these things not merely because they 
owe them to each other, but because they are both 
obligated to the generations that went before and those 
yet to come.2
But Levy contends that in practice the principle of 
reciprocity was seldom applied. More often than not filial 
piety had to be imposed by s t e m  discipline. The 
relationship between the son and the father was 
characterized more by fear and resentment than by love and 
admiration.3 Hu Shih, one of the main figures in the 
Chinese renaissance movement, maintains that filial piety in 
actuality scarcely existed and that "in those rare cases 
where it was consciously cultivated the price paid for it 
was nothing short of intense suppression resulting in mental
‘Hsu, Americans and Chinese. 315-16.
:Hsu, "Filial Piety in Japan and China," 68.
3Levy, 75-84, 166-75.
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and physical agony."1 If Hu Shih is right, filial piety 
might not have been a natural and accepted attitude in China 
but rather a notion largely idealized by tradition.
Concept of "Love"
Hsu maintains that the Chinese terms lien ai or
romantic love is strictly a modern linguistic creation to
fill the need of an expression for its Western equivalent.2
In classical Chinese literature, the words lien and ai were
used separately. Both words meant love or devotion, not
between a man and a woman, but as corollaries to the concept
of loyalty (emperor-subject) or of filial piety. The word
"love" as used and understood in contemporary Western
society has never been respectable in conservative China.
It comes close to having the connotation of the term
"licentiousness."
In fact, if a man said that he loved a girl, the 
statement usually carried the implication that something 
irregular was afoot. If a woman told anyone that she 
loved some man, it would be tantamount to her downfall. 
This is probably why the word ai was used to describe 
the feelings of lovers in a few novels; in the 
vernacular it usually implied an illicit relationship.3
It is no wonder that public display of affection
between the sexes was frowned on. Even for husband and
wife, showing of affection must never be exhibited beyond
'Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1934), 110.
:Hsu, Americans and Chinese. 49-50.
3Ibid. , 50 .
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the bedroom door. The relationship between husband and wife 
appeared to be one of aloofness.
The Chinese esteem for hierarchy is believed to be 
one of the reasons for such aloofness. The requirements of 
the social situation tended to overshadow individual 
enjoyment. Individual conduct must not overflow its social 
boundaries. Instead, it must be kept contained by the two 
parties concerned.1
Status of Women
In the Chinese male-oriented society, a woman's 
status was one of subordination and subservience to men.
The misogynistic tradition of Confucianism dictated that 
women obey their fathers in youth, their husbands in middle 
life, and their sons in old age. Once married, a woman was 
expected to serve her husband, and her husband's parents.
She was considered useless until she bore a male heir, in 
which case her status rose substantially for she would have 
done her part in carrying on the family lineage. Hence, the 
highest aspiration for a woman was to be a wife and mother. 
It was unthinkable for any woman not to marry. Singleness 
was a social stigma that branded a single unmarried woman as 
queer or even abnormal.:
‘Ibid., 59.
:The traditional status of women in China can be 
seen from many sociological studies on the Chinese family. 
See, for example, Sidney D. Gamble, T i m  Hsien: A North 
China Rural Community (New York: Institute of Pacific
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Since a woman's lot was early marriage,1 child 
bearing, and household duties, her education was minimal, 
except in cases where the family was wealthy or where the 
daughter happened to be the father's favorite child.
Because the male line took precedence over the female line, 
only sons could carry on the family name and lineage. Girls 
were considered a poor social investment, since after years 
of nurture most of them would simply marry to become members 
of other households. It was not uncommon that baby girls in 
impoverished families were sometimes sold, deserted, or 
victims of infanticide. Many believed it was better to 
destroy the child than to doom her to a life of poverty and 
shame.
Except for the dowry given by the groom's family at 
their wedding, a woman had no property rights, since the 
patriarchal father controlled the family property. Women 
had no say in family affairs. Even their physical movements
Relations, 1954); C. K. Yang, The Chinese Family in the 
Communist Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1959); Daniel H. Hulp II, Country Life in South China (New 
York: Columbia University, 1925); Florence Ayscough, Chinese 
Women: Yesterday and Today (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1937); Yueh-Hwa Lin, The Golden Wing (London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner & Co., 1947); and Carolyn Matthiasson, ed., 
Many Sisters: Women in Cross-Cultural Perspective (New
York: Free Press, 1974). For a more recent book that gives 
a laconic historical review of Chinese women's lives and 
status, see Esther S. Lee Yao, Chinese Women: Past and
Present (Mesquite, TX: Idle House, 1983).
‘It is believed that the marriage age for brides 
averaged seventeen and eighteen years.
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were curtailed by the customary footbinding.1 A woman's 
destiny improved only with age when she became a mother-in- 
law herself, perhaps typically as dominating and autocratic 
as her predecessors.
Marriage and Divorce
Most marriages in China were arranged by the 
families of the betrothed. Sometimes the services of 
professional match makers (mei-jen) were used. The match 
makers first investigated the social, financial and personal 
status of the two families involved. They then examined the 
ba zi (horoscopes) of the proposed couple. A Chinese 
marriage was literally "made in heaven," for the ancestors 
were often consulted as to the compatibility of the match 
and the choice of auspicious days for the various rituals 
connected with the marriage.
Marriage was generally preceded by a contract to 
marry. The contract was either oral or written. If it was 
an oral contract, the go-between served a very important
'Dworkin describes how women were grotesquely 
crippled from a very early age through the ritual of 
footbinding. The resulting three-inch "lotus" hooks were in 
reality useless stumps. The patriarchs were said to use 
such means to make sure their girls and women would never 
'•run around." Andrea Dworkin, Women Hating (New York: 
Dutton, 1974), I03ff. Others disagree and argue that a 
bound foot was admired for its unsurpassed erotic beauty.
See Richard Smith, China's Cultural Heritage. 226; Howard 
Levy, Chinese Footbinding: The History of a Curious Erotic
Custom (New York: W. Rawls, 1966); and Paul Ropp, Dissent in 
Early M o d e m  China (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press, 1981), 122-26.
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function. as witness to the negotiations and cho final 
contractual agreement. Later if disputes arose about the 
contract, the go-between was a logical witness to the 
details of the agreement. In cases where contracts were in 
written form, they were written by literate members of the 
community who also served as witnesses to the contract.1
The system of arranged marriage symbolized the 
person's subordination to the family. Individual interest 
was to be subjected to group interest. As such, marriage 
was more a union of families than of individuals. It was 
not a partnership but a relationship of servitude to a 
husband and his family. The Chinese woman was primarily her 
husband's source of sons who were the reason for her 
marriage. The purpose of marriage was to benefit the family 
from ancestors on down. Personal relationships between 
husband and wife were of secondary importance. Thus the 
Confucian view of marriage gave little place for romance.
After marriage, women were expected to be faithful 
to their husbands and not to remarry if widowed. Men on the 
contrary were allowed to take secondary wives and concubines 
into the household.
The traditional Chinese marriage took on the 
character of a purchase and sale. Marriage was regarded as
'David C. Buxbaum, "A Case Study of the Dynamics of 
Family Law and Social Change in Rural China," in Chinese 
Family Law and Social Change in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective. ed. David C. Buxbaum (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1978), 223.
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a reciprocal exchange between two groups of clansmen and the 
wife was given no freedom of choice in either marriage or 
divorce. The husband received the wife into his family, and 
in exchange the wife's family received a substantial 
marriage gift or dowry.1 The dowry was returned with the 
bride in the form of furniture, bedding, and clothing, which 
contributed to the establishment of a new household.2 Some 
argue that dowry was not purchasing property per se but 
compensating her relatives for her loss and loss of her 
children. The compensation should be considered as evidence 
of respect for the bride. Be it as it may, C. K. Yang 
points out that the practice of "buying and selling" of 
marriage precipitated the low status of women. It was a 
reprehensive way of treating women. The dowry gave husbands 
the right and excuse to abuse their wives. Moreover, women
lThe Chinese understanding of dowry is the opposite 
of its usual anthropological usage that refers to a 
substantial transfer of property from the bridal group to 
that of the groom. In classical China, the custom of the 
groom and his relatives paying a bride and her relatives is 
closer to what anthropologists call bride price or bride 
wealth. See Robert B. Taylor, Introduction to Cultural 
Anthropology (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1973), 65-66, 251-52; 
and Conrad P. Kottak, Anthropology; The Exploration of 
Human Diversity (New York: Random House, 1974), 311ff.
;William L. Parish and M. K. Whyte, Village and 
Family in Contemporary China (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1978), 180-2. The dowry was considered the 
woman's property and was not under normal circumstances 
absorbed into the household economy. S. Shiga, "Family 
Property and the Law of Inheritance in Traditional China," 
in Chinese Family Law and Social Change in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective, ed. D. C. Buxbaum (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1978), 118.
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were economically dependent on men and the threat of hunger 
often forced them to submit.
Under the Imperial Penal Code, a husband could 
divorce his wife unilaterally on seven grounds: failure to
produce a son, adultery, unfilial behavior towards parents- 
in-law, loquacity, stealing, jealousy, and a malignant 
disease.1
Since the continuation of the family and the 
ancestral lineage was the primary purpose of marriage, 
failure to produce a male heir was considered a legitimate 
reason for divorcing a wife. Divorce on the ground of 
adultery was allowed in order to protect the purity of the 
clan. This ground applied only to the wife. For the 
husband, only adultery with the wife's mother was considered 
a ground for divorce.
Another purpose of marriage was service of the 
parents-in-law. Failure of a wife to serve them with care 
was deemed unfilial and flagrantly immoral. The definition 
of being unfilial was subject to ambiguous interpretations. 
In many cases, simple personal displeasure on of
the parents-in-law was sufficient cause for the daughter-in-
*Yen-Hui Tai, "Divorce in Traditional Chinese Law," 
in Chinese Family Law and Social Change in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective, ed. David C. Buxbaum (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1978), 86ff. See also Jack 
L. Dull, "Marriage and Divorce in Han China: A Glimpse at
'Pre-Confucian' Society," in Chinese Family Law and Social 
Change in Historical and Comparative Perspective, ed. David 
C. Buxbaum (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), 
23-74.
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law to be regarded as "unfilial."1 The term "parents-in- 
law" included not only the husband's parents, but also 
grand-parents, foster parents, the father's principal wife, 
and the step mother. If a wife was disobedient to any of 
these people she could be divorced.
A garrulous wife could likewise be divorced.
Talking too much could cause discord among the relatives. 
Being loquacious included not only talking nonsense but also 
saying anything that could disrupt the harmony of the 
family. In the Han period, for example, a wife was actually 
divorced for complaining that her husband's younger brother 
did not help with the family work.
Theft committed by a wife constituted grounds for 
divorce, not only because it was immoral but because it 
tarnished the reputation of the husband's family, causing 
them to lose "face" in the community. No younger members of 
the family, including the daughters-in-law, could have any 
privace goods or savings from family property as long as the 
parents were still alive. To do so was regarded as stealing 
from the family.
Jealousy was a ground for divorce because it was 
said to destroy order and propriety in family life, 
especially between wives and concubines. In the Han period,
’in the late Han period, one wife was divorced for 
being late in fetching water for her mother-in-law, and 
another was divorced for scolding a dog in front of her 
mother-in-law. Ibid., 87.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 0 3
for example, a wife was divorced because her jealousy 
prohibited her husband from taking a concubine who would 
have helped with the housework. As it turned out, the 
children had to do the housekeeping themselves.
Malignant disease prohibited a wife from worshipping 
the ancestors with her husband, and therefore constituted 
grounds for divorce. The term "malignant disease" was 
generally interpreted to mean leprosy or similar diseases.1
At least in theory, three types of divorce were 
allowed: by mutual consent; by order of an authority such
as the family head, the clan head, or government authority; 
or by either husband or wife. But after the feudal period
!Tai indicates that provisions were set in place to 
restrict some divorces from going through. The following 
are three limitations for divorce. First, divorce was 
prohibited during the period of mourning for the parents-in­
law. It was thought that the husband owed a debt of 
gratitude to his wife who had done so. Second, a husband 
who had been poor when he married was restricted in 
divorcing his wife if he had become rich and noble later.
It was considered a violation of li (rules of propriety) for 
a rich man to abandon a wife who had shared a time of 
poverty with him. Third, divorce was also restricted if a 
wife had no family to return to. "Family" was interpreted 
to mean the persons who could have presided over the 
marriage. The persons who would have been qualified to 
preside over the marriage were: paternal and maternal
grandparents, parents, paternal and maternal uncles, 
brothers, and maternal aunts and cousins. However, the wife 
could not be sent back to her maternal uncle, aunts, or 
cousins who did not live together nor own property together, 
even if they had presided over the marriage. See Tai, 90.
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of China's history, divorce became almost exclusively a male 
prerogative.1
Traditionally, divorce was suffered with utmost 
disgrace, and remaniage after divorce was unthinkable for 
women. It was resorted to only by the very poor. Divorce 
was rare,2 however, and most marriages were terminated by 
the death of the husband or the wife. But whereas widows 
generally went to live with their sons following the death 
of a husband and rarely remarried, widowers had the option 
of remarriage, perhaps to a concubine.3
The rare occurrence of divorce may be attributed to 
the stability of traditional marriage. Francis Hsu believes 
that the traditional marriage relationship was regarded as 
immutable. It was considered to be a part of the 
"unchangeable order of nature."4 Second, unlike Western
'G. R. Leslie, The Family in Social Context (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1967), and S. A. Queen and S. 
A. Habenstein, The Familr in Various Cultures (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, 1974).
2G. W. Barclay, A. J. Coale, M. A. Stoto, and J. J. 
Trussell, "A Reassessment of the Demography of Traditional 
Rural China," Population Index 42 (1976): 610; Ksiao-Tung
Fei, Barthbound China: A Study of Rural Economy in Yunan
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), 59-60.
3G. 3. Spanier and F. F. Furstenberg, Jr.,
"Remarriage and Reconstituted Families," in Handbook of 
Marriage and the Family, ed. M. B. Sussman and S. K. 
Steinmetz (New York: Plenum Press, 1988), 419-34.
Vesterr marriage emphasizes individual 
independence. When a problem arises, each partner tends to 
think of his or her interest first. Hsu, Americans and 
Chinese. 153-55.
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patterns of marriage in which marital bonds are a matter of 
individualized adjustment and choice and in which separation 
and divorce are viewed as solutions to problems of 
adjustment, the Chinese lived in a cultural atmosphere where 
the permanence of family ties was taken for granted. Hence, 
the possibility of separation and divorce hardly arose to 
their consciousness.1 Third, the marital relationship was 
only one of the many relationships that functioned in the 
context of the extended family. The parent-child 
relationship was especially important.2 "Being situation
‘ibid.
:Hsu feels that of all parent-child relationships, 
the father-son tie was predominant. This tie was inherently 
characterized by continuity, inclusiveness, authority, and 
asexuality. Continuity inheres because every father-son 
relationship is potentially a link in an eternal chain of 
father-son dyads. It is inclusive because while every son 
has only one father, every father actually or potentially 
has many sons. Therefore the father-son relationship is 
inherently tolerant toward sharing with others. Authority 
means that a father's most important responsibility towards 
his son is to raise him, and this requires his ability to 
give commands and assistance. Finally, the attribute of 
asexuality simply means a quality which has nothing to do 
with sex. Hsu concludes that the Chinese lineage was an 
ultimate expression of the attributes of continuity, 
inclusiveness, authority, and asexuality. The traditional 
lineage maintained relationships between ancestors and 
descendants. It was a continuum between the present life 
and the next life. Lineage was inclusive in that it 
provided material and psychological security. Its authority 
was maintained through the gradations of organizations and 
relationships. Strong values against any expression of 
sexuality, via the husband-wife relationships, ensured the 
dominance of parent-child relationship, in general, and 
father-son relationship in particular. Francis L. K. Hsu, 
"Chinese Kinship and Chinese Behavior," in China in Crisis, 
vol. 1, book 2, China's Heritage and the Communist Political 
System, ed. Ping-Ti Ho and Tang Tsou (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1968), 583-87. See also Francis Hsu, "A
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oriented, the Chinese finds enough security in his basic 
human ties to allow him to relax and even to stop competing 
altogether, for he is embedded in a net of human ties. The 
removal or breakdown of any one of them does not lead to the 
collapse of his entire w o r l d . C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  the Chinese 
man was secure in his primary relationships. There was 
little need to seek satisfaction in wider alliance and 
association.
Group Orientation2
The security of primary relationships precipitated 
the Chinese proclivity to group orientation. One was always 
tied to one's own web of social relationships. A Chinese 
was never a lone Chinese. He or she always belonged to the 
primary groups in which mutual support was found.
The Chinese affinity to the group may be seen from 
studying the Chinese names. The Chinese put the family name 
first and the individual name last, whereas Westerners put 
the individual name first and the family name last. The 
former implies that the individual exists for the family,
Hypothesis on Kinship and Culture," 13.
‘Hsu, Americans and Chinese. 156.
:Francis Hsu's writing in this area is informative. 
The major portion of this section is indebted to his book, 
Americans and Chinese, pp. 78-91. See also his earlier book 
Clan. Caste and Club (Princeton, N J : Van Nostrand, 1963), 
and K. S. Yang, 'Psychological Studies in Chinese National 
Character: A Review of the Literature," Thought and Word
(Chinese) 2 (1965): 390-406.
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but the latter stresses that the family exists for the 
individual. The Chinese individual was considered 
significant only as the family or group to which he belonged 
was significant.
Emotionally, the Chinese had an unusual sense of 
security. They were safely anchored in close ties. A 
Chinese did not have to defend his or her success or failure 
by continuous acts of conquest. The success of the 
individual was the success of the group, because success 
could never be attributed to personal acts alone but to the 
accumulated efforts of fellow kinsmen and remote ancestors. 
For this reason, a person of fame often made it a point to 
return to the home village where glory could be shared with 
those who had a part in his or her upbringing and success.
Although the family name gave the Chinese a sense of 
belonging, it carried with it a certain degree of protracted 
and at times untenable expectation of success and 
excellence, a concept which is related to this matter of 
"face" which is discussed below. This build-in expectation 
of the high esteem of the family name did not allow much 
room for failure and forgiveness.
The Chinese pattern of socialization reflected the 
importance of group orientation. In a typical home, there 
was no privacy to speak of. Parents often shared the same 
room with their children until the children reached 
adolescence. There was little individual ownership of
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things. Whatever was in the house belonged to the family.
Chinese children were introduced to the world early 
in life. Small children were taken to such social 
activities as wedding feasts, funerals, religious 
gatherings, and even business meetings. Inasmuch as they 
took part in adult activities, children were given a head 
start in the adult world. Thus sharing the same world with 
their parents, children had few surprises when they entered 
the real world.
Equally important was the way Chinese children 
perceived the world. In China, parents had fewer exclusive 
rights over their children than they would have liked to 
have. Due to frequent and continuous contact with other 
members of the extended family, children mingled freely and 
learned to see the world in terms of a network of 
relationships. As a result, the generation gap was 
practically non-existent, for the children'3 world was fused 
with the adult world. In addition, instances of juvenile 
delinquency were rare, for most Chinese children found 
satisfaction and security in the kinship group and seldom 
felt any compulsion to leave.
Perhaps it was this group-oriented affinity that 
developed into group control characteristic of the Chinese 
culture. Since one belonged to a group, one was subject to 
the externalized controls of the group. A premium was 
placed on conformity rather than on individual initiative.
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The approval of the group dictated the behavior of the 
individual. Any deviation from the group brought shame. 
There was little internal, self-reliant, individualized 
control such as the conscience. An individual's conscience, 
as it were, was the group's conscience.
In spite of the strong external control exercised by 
the group, conflict between individuals was inevitable. The 
services of an intermediary were used to resolve conflicts.1
Adjudication and even arbitration were regarded as last 
resorts. The unusual importance traditional Chinese 
regarded mediation in the resolution of disputes is 
reflected in the Chinese proverb: "It is better to die of
starvation than to become a thief; it is better to be vexed 
to death than to bring a lawsuit."
Mediators were employed for at least three reasons:
1. The Chinese did not encourage a direct, strong, 
emotive, confrontational approach. They preferred to 
convert person-to person matters into broader group affairs.
2. The traditional Chinese' view of the formal law 
was one of relative insignificance. Li or propriety was 
preferred as a guideline to action and behavior.
3. It was believed that government interference was 
to be avoided. It was considered preferable to resolve
‘Bernard Gallin, "Conflict Resolution in Changing 
Chinese Society: A Taiwanese Study," in Political
Anthropology, ed. M. J. Swartz, V. W. Turner, and A. Tuden 
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966), 268.
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local conflict on the local level by individuals whose words 
would be heard and respected. Since intermediaries were 
usually men familiar with both the conflict situation and 
the adversaries, they were in a good position to bring about 
a satisfactory solution. Success in settling disputes was 
largely dependent upon how well the "face" of each disputant 
was preserved, rather than on how well "justice" was finally 
served.1 In addition, the more senior the intermediary, the 
greater were the chances of success.
The Concept of "Face"
The concept of lien or "face" is an intangible set 
of attitudes and values that are important to the Chinese 
but difficult to describe. Hu defines "face" in a communal 
context. She says face is "the respect of the group for a 
man with a good moral reputation: the man who will fulfill
his obligations regardless of the hardships involved, who 
under all circumstances shows himself a decent human 
being."2 Thus, "face" refers to personal integrity, good 
character, and the confidence of society in a person's
‘Ibid.
:Hsien-Chin Hu, "The Chinese Concepts of 'Face,'" 
American Anthropologist 46 (January-March 1944): 45. See 
also Dennis Bloodworth, The Chinese Looking Glass. revised 
and expanded edition (New York: Farrar, 1980), 299-306; and 
Leon E. Stover, "'Face' and Verbal Analogues of Interaction 
in Chinese Culture: A Theory of Formalized Social Behavior
Based upon Participant-Observation of an Upper-Class Chinese 
Household, Together with a Biographical Study of the Primary 
Informant." Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1962.
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ability to perform expected social roles. On a personal 
level, "face" is somewhat equated with "ego." Thus the fear 
of losing face is analogous to the fear of having one's ego 
deflated. This can be caused by a wide range of factors 
including the failure of a child to pass an examination, the 
marriage of a daughter to a poor man, or receiving a gift 
that is inexpensive.
In traditional China, the communal sense of "face" 
represented the confidence of the community in the 
trustworthiness of a person, and since a person with a 
feeling for "face" could be relied on implicitly, "face" was 
worth more than what money could buy. A business person 
noted for honest business deals would be less likely to 
cheat. In this sense, "face" served as an internalized 
social sanction for enforcing good moral standards in a 
society that operated largely on the basis of trust. Thus 
the loss of face, or the betrayal of one's integrity, meant 
that the confidence of society in one's character was 
impaired, and the offender was in danger of being despised 
and isolated.
The "loss of face" implied not only the loss of 
confidence of the community in one's integrity but also 
signified 3hame on the group to which one belonged. A 
person's family, friends, and superiors had an interest in 
his or her advancement or set-back3. Hence, a public 
disgrace resulting in "loss of face" negatively affected the
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reputation of the family. If a woman violated the rules of 
propriety, she brought shame upon herself, and her family 
upbringing was inevitably called into question. Members of 
the extended family reckoned that her family should have 
taught her manners consistent with proper behavior. Her 
mistakes also shamed her husband's family because, even if 
she had been insufficiently educated by her family, her 
husband's family should have assumed the responsibility of 
improving her manners.
To the group-oriented Chinese, "face" was often used 
as a means to stimulate the young to greater effort and 
correct behavior. In fact socialization in China was 
performed mainly by instilling a feeling of shame in the 
family. Shame was felt when social obligations were 
violated. The parents or the elders would often say to the 
children, "Don't lose 'lien' for us!" or "Don't shame us in 
what you do!" Moral education not only implanted the 
concept of lien in the minds of the young, but brought to 
their realization the collective responsibility the family 
bore in regard to their behavior. They were impressed with 
the fact that their character should befit the standing of 
the family.1
In a society like China where shame was used to keep 
everyone in line, there was an built-in resistance to 
change. A Chinese aphorism states, "One should never
'Hu, 50.
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display family shame to an outsider." Conflict in the 
family was a closely guarded secret. No member of the 
family, especially in the ruling class, would bring to light 
a shameful situation in his family because it would mean 
loss of status for himself and the entire group. This 
prevalent attitude may explain why most Chinese were 
inflexibly reluctant to use mental health facilities even if 
they badly needed them. Besides, this belief tended to 
shelter wrong-doers and perpetuate corruption in high 
places.
To the Chinese, the loss of "face" was a weighty 
matter. In some cases, group condemnation leading to the 
"loss of face" drove individuals to suicide. Suicide was a 
means of "saving face" that liberated the person and the 
family from shame. Thus suicide might be invoked to escape 
the loss of self-respect and to recompense for falling 
seriously short of the expectations of one's peers and to 
enable one's relatives to again face society without 
humiliation.1
Western observers have often remarked that the 
Chinese are excessively modest about their attainments and 
status, so much so that they appear to be hypocritical.
This exaggerated sense of humility may be explained by the 
Chinese belief that over-estimation of one's ability was 
frowned upon by society. So, rather than inflating one's
'Smith, Religions of Man. 261-62.
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capacity and face the possibility of "losing face" later, 
the Chinese found it a better strategy to depreciate one's 
intelligence on every occasion, always confident that that 
would prompt others to have an even higher opinion of one.1 
Thus if a Chinese man said he did not feel that he was good 
enough for a particular responsibility, he did not really 
mean it. What he meant was that he was humble. It was up 
to the listener to perceive the virtue in his humility and 
convince him that indeed he was the most capable person for 
the job. In so doing, the person was accorded "a lot of 
face."
Esteem for Antiquity 
Perhaps one of the most outstanding characteristics 
of the Chinese civilization has been its seeming 
changelessness. Many political, economic, biological, and 
religious explanations have been given for its static 
nature.2 One probable answer may be found in the Chinese 
over-riding concern for antiquity.
Attachment to Past Events
The traditional Chinese worldview was strongly 
oriented to the past. The past was regarded as the model 
for the present and the primary source of information on
‘Hu, 49.
2See Raymond Dawson, The Chinese Chameleon: An 
Analysis of European Conceptions of Chinese Civilization 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 65-89.
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human society. Utopia was not something yet in the future, 
it had already occurred in the past. The experience of 
people in olden times aroused in the Chinese mind a sense of 
validity.1 This past-orientation may be seen in a wide 
spectrum of Chinese culture. It appears in such areas as 
ancestor worship, filial piety, a strong sense of family 
traditions, and an almost compulsive concern with record 
keeping.2
Chinese reverence for antiquity is also reflected in 
their mode of learning. The essence of learning was to 
acquire knowledge of the precedents of the past. History 
was highly regarded. An old axiom said:
"No gentleman of high standing will be found among 
those who repudiate the past in discussing the present, 
and no gentleman of wisdom will be found among those who 
are ignorant of the past and are easy-going in their 
achievements. Even though one may be completely 
virtuous in his own conduct, if he repudiates the past, 
he will be a mediocre man."3
China's former pre-eminence was accounted for by the 
legacy of the wise rulers and sages of remote antiquity who 
had formulated and developed moral principles which were 
valid for all times and all people. Literate and 
responsible persons of each generation were selected as 
guardians of the wisdom of the past. Their duty was to see
'Nakamura, 204.
'Kearney, 97.
3W. A. Rickett, Kuan-tzu (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 1965), 103.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
116
that the present reality was measured against immutable 
ancient norms.
The Chinese preoccupation with the past may also be 
seen in their literary expressions. Metaphors, for example, 
are based on historical particularity. To understand an 
idiom is to understand the history from which the idiom 
evolved. This explains why Chinese idioms, though concise, 
are pregnant with historical facts and meanings. 
Consequently, Chinese literature became very extensive and 
profound.1
The backward-look of the Chinese may be attributed 
to another significant factor-- respect for the classics. 
Nakamura maintains that the life and thought of the Chinese 
were strongly conditioned by the classics,2 especially Vfu 
Ching (the Five Classics) which is comprised of: I Ching
(Classic of Changes), Shu Ching (Classic of Documents), Shih 
Ching (Classic of Songs), Li Chi (Book of Rites), and Chun 
Chiu (Spring and Autumn Annals). Nakamura believes that the 
five Classics were esteemed as having unquestionable 
authority over the Chinese way of life:
The Five Classics were established as a pattern for 
the life of the Chinese people. It offered the 
precedents par excellence, ruling over all other 
precedents, so that in time the work came to be 
considered truth itself and perfection. It was thought 
that no matter how much human life might change, all the
truth vital to human life was to be sought in these Five
‘Nakamura, 205.
2Ibid.
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Classics. . . . Though dynasties in China have often 
changed, each dynasty has accepted the Five Classics as 
the supreme authority and treated them as the pattern 
for human life.1
Besides the Five Classics, the Four Books, Lun Yu 
(The Analects), Ta Hsueh (The Great Learning), Chung Yung 
(The Doctrine of the Mean), and Meng Tzu Shu (The Book of 
Mencius), were also greatly extolled. Both the Five 
Classics and the Four Books taught the cardinal virtues of 
hsiao (filial piety), li (propriety), I (righteousness), 
chung (loyalty), etc. Ancient historical works showed the 
working of these principles in past events. Thus the 
cultural legacy of the past was the repository of wisdom and 
the guide to perfection and right action. Since the past 
was a repository of morally meaningful experience, the study 
of monuments and historical texts to rediscover and 
reconstruct China's cultural past was a highly regarded 
profession.
Perhaps the Chinese orientation to antiquity may be 
summed up in a statement in which Confucius referred himself 
as "a transmitter and not an originator, a believer in and 
lover of antiquity."2 Thus knowledge of the classical way 
was passed from one generation to another largely without 
change or innovation. Chinese life was fixed Chinese 
thought was a continuum of the past.
‘Ibid., 206-07.
:Soothill, 325.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 1 8
Exaltation of the Aged
It is no accident that ancient China, because of the 
esteemed position of the elderly in the family and the 
general veneration of the aged, is sometimes described as a 
gerontocracy.1 In contrast to the "youth culture" of the 
West, the "age culture" of classical China accorded every 
Chinese a gradual increment in his or her social standing 
with every passing year. Hence the aged were greatly 
prized, even more than children.2 The rationale was that, 
unlike children, elders could never be duplicated. In 
contrast to the West where youth is eulogized as the best 
years of life, in China the sunset period of one's life was 
exalted. Age bestowed unsurpassed value and dignity on 
people. In the West when someone confesses to being fifty, 
the response is likely to be ,"You don't look a year over 
forty." In China, if the same fact were disclosed, the 
response would very likely be, "Why you look every bit of 
sixty." In each culture the intent is courtesy. The 
difference is in its direction.3
■See A. P. Chandler, "The Traditional Chinese 
Attitudes towards the Old Age," Journal of Gerontology 4 
(1949) : 239-44 .
:The stark contrast of the way the aged are treated 
in the East and West has prompted someone to remark that 
"China turned its old people into community elders; America 
turns them into dilapidated youth." Marc J. Swartz and 
David K. Jordan, Culture: The Anthropological Perspective
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980), 181.
3Smith, Religions of Man. 261.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 1 9
In ancient China, the services of the aged were 
often treasured and utilized. During the Han and Tang 
dynasties, for example, experienced senior citizens were 
often invited by the community to teach practical courses 
such as family relations and agriculture. Some over fifty 
years old were selected as San Lao or "political 
consultants" in courts.1
The Book of Rites records an example of the extent 
to which the aged were esteemed. Each year the local 
government hosted the Hsiang Yin Chiu ceremony in honor of 
the aged on the twelfth month of the lunar year. Leu 
believes that such annual ceremonies were held from the 
earliest history of China right up to the late Ching 
dynasty. He adds:
Both the young and the aged of the community were 
invited, with the former presenting a banquet for the 
aged in honor of their contribution to society... Rules 
for the ceremony included the following: "Those over 60
years old may sit in the ceremony; those under 50 should 
stand." Food also depended on age. The older people 
were served more and better quality dishes.2
Exemplified by the concept of filial piety, the aged 
were held in respect because they represented a wealth of 
accumulated wisdom and experience. Chinese men and women 
continually sought the counsel of their elders. Their words 
were listened to and implemented by virtue of the fact that
•Chien-Ai Leu, "Filial Piety Modernized," Free 
China Review 39 (March 1989): 19.
2Ibid.
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they had eaten more salt than the children had eaten rice, 
and had gone further on bridges than the latter could ever 
have travelled by road. Further, the aged were accorded 
great honor because they were only a step away from becoming 
ancestors. This forthcoming ancestral status could be of 
great future benefit to the family in terms of prosperity 
and happiness.
Chinese children were taught from very young years 
to do everything possible to ensure the comfort and bliss of 
the elders. One of the filial obligations was the support 
of parents in their old age. Another important duty was to 
faithfully carry out ceremonial rites for them after their 
death. Inasmuch as most aged were taken care of by their 
children, no social security system was needed. Only the 
destitute were taken care of by clans and local communities.
The most important birthdays of a Chinese person 
were at sixty, seventy, eighty, and up. To be a centenarian 
was a crowning achievement for both the person and the 
family. Annual birthday dinners were usually a family 
affair, attended by members of the family, relatives, and 
close friends. The sixtieth birthday celebration took on a 
grander scale, for it heralded the beginning of a new life 
cycle. According to the Chinese calendar, a life cycle was 
comprised of sixty years. Thus, birthday celebrations 
beginning at the sixtieth birthday were actually a 
celebration of longevity.
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Traditionally, children's birthdays were not 
celebrated except by the wealthy. Children's birthdays, if 
celebrated at all, were occasions for adult celebration at 
which children might be present but certainly not as the 
center of attraction.1
Clearly, old age took on a different meaning for the 
aged. Old age was not a symbol of defeat but a blessing and 
a sign of a new beginning. For this reason, most aged ones 
did not dolefully admit they were old. They were proud to 
be old. In fact, they lived in anticipation of old age, for 
growing old was congenial and pleasurable. It was a time of 
leisure and of little responsibility. Even the women 
achieved respect and superiority with increasing age. No 
longer afraid as they once were, they grew into mothers-in­
laws . They were given authority as well as obedience and 
support from the family.
Ancestor Worship
The Chinese respect for elders and the premium 
virtue of filial piety made ancestor worship one of the most 
important institutions in traditional China. From the 
beginning of Chinese history, ancestor worship had been an 
integral part of the Chinese culture.2
‘Hsu, Americans and Chinese. 90.
:K . G. Creel, The Birth of China: A Study of the
Formative Period of Chinese Civilization (New York: F. Ungar 
Publishing Co., 1937), 80, 126, 174. See also James T. 
Addison, Chinese Ancestor Worship: A Study of Its Meaning
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Hsu indicates that the Chinese had at least three 
basic assumptions about ancestor worship. First, all living 
persons owed their fortunes or misfortunes to their 
ancestors.
"A great official may attain prominence by 
excellence of scholarship and strength of character, and 
everyone who knows him may testify to these virtues.
But his very achievement is de facto evidence of his 
ancestors' high moral worth. Therefore, since the 
remotest times, the Chinese have said that their 
individual successes derived from the shadow of their 
ancestors and that their individual successes, in turn, 
shone upon their ancestors."1
The second assumption was that departed ancestors 
needed to be cared for.2 The Chinese maintained a close 
relationship with their departed ancestors as they did with 
their living kinsmen. They believed the ancestors continued 
to live in another world as spirits and that they depended 
upon their descendants for the necessities of life.
Confucius himself taught, "Serve the dead as they were 
served when alive, and those who have passed away as if they
and Relations with Christianity (Shanghai: Church Literature 
Committee of the Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui, 1925), 3; and 
Francis Hsu, Under the Ancestor's Shadow: Chinese Culture
and Personality (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), 
182-91.
'Hsu, Americans and Chinese. 248-49.
2See also J. J. M. DeGroot, The Religious System of 
China. vol. 1, Disposal of the Dead (Taipei, Taiwan: Ch'eng- 
Wen Publishing Co., 1969), 120; Anna Seidel, "Buying One's 
Way to Heaven: The Celestial Treasury in Chinese
Religions," History of Religion 17 (February 1978): 419-31; 
and Stephen F. Teiser, "Ghosts and Ancestors in Medieval 
Chinese Religion," History of Religions 26 (August 1986): 
47-67.
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were still abiding amongst us, this is the summit of filial 
conduct." If not properly tended, reverenced, and fed, the 
ancestors could degenerate into vagabonds, capable of 
inflicting misfortune on the living. It was most important, 
therefore, that a man had male descendants who could carry 
on the proper rites for him after his death. Mencius, the 
most famous disciple of Confucius, said that the most 
unfilial act was to leave no posterity. The Chinese took 
his words so seriously that if a man had no children of his 
own, he would adopt a son to carry on his line and ensure 
his comfort in the afterlife.
The third assumption was based on the belief that 
the living and the dead were mutually interdependent. The 
ancestors were thought to have the power to protect and 
assist their earthbound relatives if the proper rites were 
rendered them. Thus a person's present lot might be 
improved by the endowment of the merits of the departed 
ancestors, and the spiritual welfare or misery of the 
ancestors might likewise be enhanced or mitigated by the 
actions of living descendants. Part of these actions 
included the hiring of priests, monks, and nuns to perform 
elaborate rituals. Many also patronized mediums and 
attended seances to determine the situation and needs of the 
departed loved ones.1
A prominent part of ancestor worship was the worship
'Ibid., 250.
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of the ancestral tablets in the homes and in the ancestral 
temples. The Chinese believed that each person had three 
main souls and seven lesser souls. After death the fir3t 
soul remained in the casket, one stayed in the ancestral 
tablet, and the third went to heaven, hell, or was reborn in 
the transmigration of souls into some creatures. It was 
thought that the soul of the deceased actually dwelt in the 
ancestral tablets, and the tablet was thought of and treated 
as if it were the ancestor himself.1 The seven lesser souls 
disappeared in seven weeks after death, one each week.
Liaw notes that ancestor worship was normally 
divided into three stages.2 The first stage involved the 
paper tablet. After a person's death, a paper tablet was 
established as a symbol of the deceased. Mounted on a stick 
and placed on a table together with an incense pot, the 
rectangular piece of paper was believed to contain the 
spirit of the departed.
The second stage involved the wooden tablet. After 
the paper tablet had been destroyed, the deceased ancestor'3 
name was written on the front of a piece of wood and the 
time and date of his birth and death on the back. The piece 
of wood was then placed in the box of the ancestor tablet,
‘Graham, Folk Religion. 121-22.
:Stephen Liaw, "Ancestor Worship in Taiwan and 
Evangelism of the Chinese," in Christian Alternatives to 
Ancestor Practices, ed. 3ong Rin Ro (Taichung, Taiwan: Asia 
Theological Association, 1585), 186.
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an act which signified that the spirit had left the paper 
tablet and now resided in the wooden tablet. The spirit 
would stay there to receive the worship ot the descendants 
forever. The tablet was placed on the deity table in the 
center of the living room. A separate ancestor hall was 
built when there was no more room on the table to 
accommodate more tablets. Every large family generally had 
its own ancestral temple. Each temple had a caretaker who 
daily burned incense and worshiped the ancestors before 
their tablets for the family.1 Only male descendants had a 
part in the ancestral ceremonies. This explains why it was 
so important that in each family son3 be b o m  to continue 
the family line and maintain the worship of the ancestors.
The third stage of ancestor worship centered on the 
ancestral tomb. The location of the tomb had to be in 
harmony with the feng-sui (wind and water) of the locality 
to ensure positive ancestral influence. When the wind and 
water which represented the breaths of heaven and earth were 
harmonious, blessings and prosperity would ensue.2 The 
graveyard wa3 the center of activities during the Ching Ming
'Special worship services were held on special 
occasions such as the Lunar New Year, the fifth day of the 
first month, the fifteen day of the first month, Ching Ming 
Festival, the fifth day of the fifth month (Dragon Boat 
Festival), the fifteenth day of the seventh month (Ghost
Festival), the fifteenth day of the eighth month (Moon
Festival), the ninth day of the ninth month (Tsung Yun
Festival), winter solstice, and the last day of the lunar
year.
2The importance of feng-shui is discussed below.
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(literally pure and bright) Festival, known also as the 
Feast of the Dead. The descendants cleaned the tomb and 
rendered the necessary rituals which included bowing to pay 
obeisance as if the dead were present.
The question as to whether ancestor worship was the 
worship of the deceased departed spirit or a memorial 
service has long been debated. Addison maintains that the 
Chinese did not worship the deceased ancestors as deities.: 
But others are not so sure. Western missionaries were known 
to have fought among themselves about its meaning. Some 
found ancestor rites idolatrous, while others found them to 
be praiseworthy expressions of familial love.: One thing is
certain, however, ancestor worship had so powerfully and 
fundamentally shaped the traditional Chinese mind that the 
two had become inseparable. Moreover, ancestor worship 
epitomized filial piety of the highest degree. Marion Levy 
succinctly says, "Ancestor worship was in effect the 
canonization of the value of filial piety. 1,3
Inertia and Resistance to Change
The Chinese esteem for antiquity has led some 
observers to comment on the static nature of Chinese
‘Addison, 52.
:For an Asian assessment of ancestor worship, see 
Bong Rin Ro, ed., Christian Alternatives to Ancestor 
Practices (Taichung, Taiwan: Asia Theological Association, 
1985) .
1Marion Levy, Family Revolution. 250.
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civilization. In fact, the Chinese have been described as a 
people of eternal standstill.1 Historians used to say that 
China was the model of a static nation, so unchanging that 
it had, so to speak, gone out of history.2
The Chinese inertia and resistance to change may be 
attributed to Confucius who taught the value of the 
preservation of things as they were and the maintenance of 
the status quo of society and its institutions. His 
attitude was that nothing new ever happened in the present 
or would happen in the future. It had all happened before 
in the far distant past. Change of any kind was not 
encouraged. Even when there were changes in rulership, the 
system was to remain untouched. As noted by Hsu, "Revolt is 
regarded not as a weapon of destruction but as a tool of 
restoration; revolt is a lever to restore the balance of 
society, not to upset it."3 The Chinese were taught to 
accept life as they found it and to follow the beaten paths. 
They had no compulsion to embark on crusades or reform 
movements.
Esteem for Particularity
The Chinese had a high regard for history, and this 
included attachment to many historical particularities. The
■Dawson, 65-89.
:Ben-Ami Scharfstein, The Mind of China (New York: 
Dell Publishing Co., 1975), 4.
3Hs u , Americans and Chinese. 378.
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Chinese tended to think concretely, instead of in nebulous 
and abstract terms. Much of the entire spectrum of the 
Chinese tradition was concrete in character. The family was 
a visible entity; so were the clan, the ancestral tablets, 
clan temples, and ancestral graves. Several factors 
contributed to this proclivity; these include linguistics 
and the Five Classics.
Linguistic Factor
From the third century B.C. until today, the written 
Chinese language has provided remarkable cultural unity 
across space and time. Its script could be read by any 
literate person from any dialect group. Some scholars 
believe there is a link between the Chinese language and the 
Chinese pattern of thinking. They think the reality- 
centered orientation of the written Chinese language 
predisposed the Chinese to reality-centered thinking.1
Hieroglyphic Form
Chinese characters were originally hieroglyphics. 
They were simplified pictures of objects (pictographs) and 
ideas (ideographs). For example, the character which 
symbolizes the sun is derived from a drawing of a circle.
‘Alfred H. Bloom, The Linguistic Shaping of Thought: 
A Study in the Impact of Language on Thinking in China and 
the West (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1981), 
33-59; Nakamura, 177-80, 185-88; Scharfstein, 133; and A. C. 
Graham, "The Place of Reason in the Chinese Philosophical 
Tradition," in The Legacy of China, ed. Raymond Dawson 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 54-55.
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"Tree" is a picture of a tree, and "man" of a man. Examples 
of ideographs are: a short horizontal line means "one," two
such parallel lines mean "two," the character with a line 
pointing down means "down," and a line pointing up means 
"up" and so on. More complex characters are created by 
doubling up simple characters. Two trees placed side by 
side represent a "forest." A sun and moon together convey 
the meaning "bright." A sun with a short horizontal line 
below means "dawn."
One of the most important Chinese characters hsiao 
(filial piety) has two parts. The upper part, meaning "old" 
or "old person," is a picture represents a hunch-backed 
person walking with a cane. The lower part of the character 
means "child." Taken together, the pictogram "hsiao" means 
"a child bearing an older person." This word-picture 
implies that as one grows up, one does not leave the older 
folks behind, but continue to support them affectionately 
and faithfully. Such is the ability of the Chinese 
hieroglyphics to represent reality in vivid and moving 
written forms and to predispose the Chinese to concrete 
thinking.
Grammatical Ambiguities
Nakamura believes the various grammatical 
ambiguities of the Chinese language make it an awkward
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medium for expressing abstract thought.1 The Chinese used 
uninflected monosyllabic words. No distinction was made 
between parts of speech. Words corresponding to the 
prepositions, conjunctions, and relative pronouns of Western 
languages were very rare in Chinese. There was also no 
difference between singular and plural. A single character 
jen could mean a man, men, some men, or mankind. Further, 
there were no cases. One word could be a noun, an 
adjective, or a verb. Because of this, the Chinese language 
tended to be ambiguous, and this explains why exegesis of 
the Chinese classics has produced a bewildering array of 
interpretations, many of which are contradictory. This 
ambiguity also reveals why the Chinese had great difficulty 
understanding the Buddhist sutras which were originally 
written in a radically different kind of language.2
Besides its grammatical ambiguities, the Chinese 
language can "see" reality much better than other languages 
can. Graham explains it this way:
In Indo-European languages word-inflection forces us 
to think in categories, such as thing, quality, and 
action, past, present, and future, singular and plural, 
the muddles and inconsistencies of which show us that 
the forms of thought present difficulties as well as its 
content; but in Chinese words are uninflected and their 
functions marked only by particles and by word-order, so 
that there is much more complete illusion of looking 
through language at reality as though through a
'Ibid., 188.
2Ibid. , 187.
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perfectly transparent medium.1
The Chinese language, seen hieroglyphically and 
grammatically, predisposed the Chinese to shun abstract 
patterns of thought and to orientate them to a reality- 
centered mode of thinking. The Five Classics also played a 
part in this proclivity.
The Five Classics and Particularity
As noted above, the Classics had an immense 
influence on the Chinese for they were regarded as providing 
the authoritative pattern for human life. For generations, 
the Five Classics taught the Chinese not merely the general 
principles of life, but about specific instances of human 
need, government, and morals. Imperceptibly they shaped the 
Chinese tendency toward particularity. Nakamura explains:
The Five Classics, which are the works of the 
highest authority regarded as providing the norms for 
human life, contain, for the most part, descriptions of 
particular incidents and statements of particular facts. 
They do not state general principles of human behavior. 
Even the Analects of Confucius records mostly the 
actions of individuals and the dicta of Confucius on 
separate incidents; these dicta for the most part have a 
personal significance. Through the classics and their 
commentaries the Chinese sought valid norms of moral 
conduct through individual instances.2
The third century B. C. Confucian philosopher Hsun-tzu 
made the following statement in reacting to the work of the 
Kung-sun Lung-tzu:
'Graham, "The Place of Reason," 55.
:Nakamura, 196.
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There is no reason why problems of "hardness and 
whiteness," "likeness and unlikeness," "thickness or 
thinness" should not be investigated, but the superior 
man does not discuss them; he stops at the limit of 
profitable discourse.1
Following the paths of the sages, the Chinese 
consequently viewed historical particularities with great 
interest. This preoccupation with particular instances is 
related to their inclination to concretize abstractions.
Affinity for Concretized Concepts
The Chinese loved the immediately perceptible, 
especially the visually perceptible. The Chinese scholar 
Lin Yu Tang saliently points out that Chinese thought always 
remained on the periphery of the visible world.2
In Chinese, abstract concepts were often expressed 
in two concrete terms, as "big-small" for "size," "long- 
short" for "length," "broad-narrow" for "breadth," etc. The 
term "epigraphy" in Chinese simply meant "writing on metal 
and stone," and "enthusiasm" became "the spirit of the 
dragon and the horse." Sometimes numbers were used to 
express quality. Thus, for a "fast horse," they used tsien- 
li-ma, meaning "a horse good for a thousand miles." For a 
person endowed with clairvoyance, they used the expression
•Hsun-tzu in Joseph Needham, Science and 
Civilization in China, vol. 2, History of Scientific Thought 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1956), 202.
:Yutang Lin, Mv Country and My People (New York: 
Revnal & Hitchcock, 1938), 83.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 3 3
tsien-li-yen, or "thousand-mile vision."1 Perfection was 
often expressed as round, for it was believed the heart of a 
sage was round.:
In the Chinese language, descriptive statements were 
preferable to hypothetical ones. Rather than saying, "If 
Lee had been able to speak Chinese, he would have gone to 
China," the Chinese would say, "Lee couldn't speak Chinese 
and therefore he did not go to China."
Another unique linguistic feature is the shift from 
an extraction of the idea of the condition as a theoretical 
entity to a description of a condition.3 So rather than 
talking about "Mary's sincerity," the Chinese would say 
"Mary is sincere." Instead of saying "bravery of the 
general," the Chinese prefer to say "the general is brave."
Non-Development of Universal Truth
One implication of the Chinese esteem for 
particularities is that the Chinese showed little interest
■Nakamura, 179.
2Ibid., 180. Lin gives several examples showing how 
abstract literary styles are described in concrete 
expressions: "The method of watching a fire across the
river" (detachment of style); "the method of dragon-flies 
skimming the water surface" (lightness of touch); "the 
method of painting a dragon and dotting its eyes" (bringing 
out the salient points); "the method of a sharp precipice 
overhanging a ten-thousand feet ravine" (abruptness of 
ending); the method of letting blood by one needle prick" 
(direct, epigrammatic gibe); "the method of going straight 
into the fray with one knife" (direct opening), etc. Yu- 
tang Lin, 84.
3Bloom, 40.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 3 4
in universal propositions which transcended individual or 
particular instances. They seldom created a universal out 
of particulars. Even ethics was not understood as part of a 
universal law, but was taught on the basis of particular 
experiences, and was then utilized to realize human truth.1 
To the Chinese, truth was to be obtained through concrete 
experience, not through universal propositions. As such, 
truth was always relative for it was defined according to 
one's situation. As situation changed, so did truth. Hence 
there was no universal truth to speak of, for truth by 
nature had different shades of meaning.
Non-Development of Science
Nakamura believes the Chinese tendency toward the 
non-development of universal truth might have led to the 
non-development of deductive science in China.2 Joseph 
Needham, in his major work on the history of science in 
China, presents an impressive array of evidence in support 
of the claim that traditional China had no lack of 
inventions.3 The Chinese have always been practical and
‘Nakamura, 185, 198.
:Nakamura, 190.
3See Needham's chapters 13 and 14 for discussion of 
the lack of development of a theoretical orientation to 
science in early China; and chapter 18 for a discussion of 
the lack of development of a theoretical approach to law in 
China; See also A. L. Kroeber, Conficrurations of Culture 
Growth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), 
183-199.
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pragmatic people. They were making wheelbarrows and iron- 
chain suspension bridges a thousand years before they 
appeared in Europe.1 Ancient China was also ahead of many 
countries in the field of natural sciences. The Chinese 
were well known for their mathematical prowess. As early as 
the fifth century, Chinese scholars calculated the value of 
pi to lie between 3.1415926 and 3.1415927. The accuracy of 
pi was rediscovered by the Europeans only in 1585. Some of 
the more notable Chinese inventions included the 
seismograph, printing, water clock, functions of hormones, 
anesthetics, gun powder, etc.
Kroeber notes that it is significant that the 
Chinese made many important inventions, but not one major 
scientific discovery; neither did they seek an understanding 
of nature beyond that which was useful or practical.2 
Nakamura describes earlier Chinese scientific research as 
being inductive, but this inductive methodology was replaced 
by deductive when precedents in the classics were quoted as 
authority.3
The Chinese disinclination toward a theoretical 
orientation was perhaps the reason why China did not develop 
a scientific tradition as we know it. With their inherent
‘Michael Griffiths, Changing Asia (Downers Grove,
IL: InterVarsity Press, 1977), 35.
:Kroeber, 184.
Nakamura, 190.
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proclivity to particularity, the Chinese were not 
predisposed to leave the world of practical application 
behind in order to construct and test theoretical 
hypotheses. This may have been the reason why the Chinese 
preferred an applied instead of a theoretical approach to 
mathematics in general, and why geometry, which depended 
most on theory, was least developed in China.1
Esteem for Harmony 
Another aspect of the Chinese worldview is a high 
esteem for harmony--harmony between humans and nature, and 
harmony between humans. The concern for harmony partly 
accounts for the Chinese propensity to tolerance of 
pluralism and a syncretistic approach to life and religion.
Harmony between Human Beings and Nature
A basic element of the classical Chinese tradition 
is that the natural world and human society were closely 
bonded. Human beings were the correlates of nature. Both 
were regarded as integral parts of the cosmos. There was no 
real separation of humans from nature. One was simply an 
extension of the other.2 Because nature was not opposed to
'Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, 
vol. 3, Mathematics and the Sciences of the Heavens and the 
Earth (Cambridge: University Press, 1959), 152-68.
:KlucJchohn and Strodtbeck contrast this harmony- 
with-nature orientation with subjugation-to-nature and 
mastery-over-nature orientations. A subjugation-to-nature 
orientation is akin to fatalism. Those who believe it 
simply accept what they consider to be the inevitable.
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humans, nature was not to be mastered, manipulated, or 
exploited. This may have been one of the reasons why for 
many years China lagged behind other countries in the 
development of the natural sciences.1
The harmony between humans and nature formed the 
basis for the Chinese wholistic approach to life. Practice 
and theory were parts of a whole. The sacred and the 
secular were never dichotomized. Death was the continuation 
of living.
Chinese cosmology was based on the theory of yin and 
yang and the Five Elements (water, fire, wood, metal, and 
earth) .: The yin and yang represented negative and positive
forces at work. Everything in China was divided info either 
yin or yang. The moon was yin and the sun was yang. Women 
were yin and men were yang. The weather was affected by 
interaction between yin and yang elements. When the weather 
was cloudy, the yin predominated. Thus a cloudy day was 
called yin tien, and a sunny day a yang tien. Too much yin 
caused rain and flood, while too much yang caused drought.
Mastery-over-nature orientation, on the other hand, 
accentuates the belief that natural forces of all kinds are 
to be overcome and put to use. The motto is "God helps 
those who help themselves." Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 
Variations in Value Orientations. 13.
'Nakamura, 2 81.
2Laurence G. Thompson, The Chinese Religion: An
Introduction. 3d ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 
1979), 3-15; Needham, Science and Civilization. 216-345; and 
Schuyler Cammann, "Some Early Chinese Symbols of Duality," 
History of Religion 24 (February 1985): 215-54.
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Chinese medicine operated on the assumptions of yin 
and yang. When the two elements were properly balanced, a 
person wa3 healthy. If the yin prevailed, a person had a 
yin sickness, and was likely to have chills. Superiority of 
the yang produced a yang sickness, usually associated with a 
fever. All medicines were classified as yin or yang. For a 
yin sickness, a person must take yang medicine until the yin 
and yang were balanced, and then he would recover. In 
short, sickness and misfortune were ascribed to imbalance 
between yin and yang; health and prosperity were the result 
of balance restored and harmonized.
Doctrine of the Golden Mean
Confucius' counsel of moderation in all things has 
profoundly contributed to the Chinese tendency in harmony. 
Confucius' Doctrine of the Golden Mean was considered so 
important that it had become part of the Confucian canon.
The word "mean" or Chung yung literally means 
"middle" and "constant." Thus, the Mean is the way that is 
"constantly in the middle" between life's excesses and 
extremes. The Mean was highly prized as one of the cardinal 
Confucian virtues. It was Confucius' vision of the good 
life. The aim of Chinese classical education had always 
been the cultivation of the reasonable person--a person who 
guarded against excess, over-indulgence, and fanaticism, and 
who exercised moderation with regard to human's seven
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passions of pride, covetousness, lust, envy, gluttony, 
anger, and sloth.
The effect of the Doctrine of the Golden Mean on the 
Chinese worldview can be seen from the traditional Chinese 
preference for negotiation and mediation rather than 
confrontation and settlement by lawsuits. Legal action was 
generally regarded as something of a disgrace, reflecting an 
incapacity to work things out by compromise and consensus.1 
The Doctrine of the Golden Mean is also reflected in the 
Chinese apathy to politics. The Chinese judiciously 
abstained from talking about political issues.1
Inclusive Approach to Religion
The Chinese propensity to harmony is best 
illustrated by the way they approach religion. Two 
characteristics of this approach are noted here. First, it 
is characteristic of the Chinese to acknowledge the 
individual significance of every religion as possessing some 
degree of truth. Naturally this attitude led to tolerance
'Smith, Religions of Man. 261. Smith concludes with 
these words, "We must remember China's reputation for having 
tne most pacific people in the world. She has exalted the 
life of reasonable enjoyment and despised the destructive.
As a result she has been able to unite an immense area of 
fertility and preserve the longest continuous civilization 
man has ever achieved, one which at its height united one- 
third of the human race. The political structure of this 
civilization alone, the Chinese Empire, lasted under various 
dynasties for 2133 years (from 221 B.C. to A.D. 1912)--a 
stretch that makes the empires of Alexander the Great and 
Caesar look ephemeral." Ibid., 2 63-64.
2Yu-tang Lin, 172.
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of the thought and actions of others and promoted sympathy 
and appreciation for what was different. It was not 
surprising, therefore, that when Buddhism was introduced 
into China, it was not rejected outright. Rather, it was 
discussed and admired by the Chinese.1
Second, it is characteristic of the Chinese to 
underscore complementariness rather than contrariness. 
Differences regarded from t-«o opposing viewpoints were seen 
as completing each other, thereby constituting a whole.2
Instead of thinking, "A and B are opposed, therefore 
one must take either A or B,n one thinks, "A and B are 
opposed, therefore both are needed for the whole." For 
example, one does not choose between practice and 
theory, but chooses both theory and practice.3
This emphasis on complementariness may be a partial 
explanation of the Chinese proverbial tolerance of religious 
differences. Rather than excluding various alternative 
views as false, the Chinese tended to believe truth 
consisted in a combination of partially true views. A case 
in point would be the Chinese syncretistic attitude toward 
their three principal traditions--Confucianism, Taoism, and 
Buddhism. Confucianism espoused the ethical philosophy of 
life created by the great moral sages; Taoism taught that 
eternal happiness centered in total identification of human
‘Nakamura, 28 6. The religious tolerance of the 
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beings with nature; and sinicized Buddhism, shed of its 
other-worldly transcendentalism, prescribed a pragmatic 
nirvana for this life. Despite the inconsistencies between 
these three systems of thought, the Chinese saw an 
underlying harmony and regarded them as different roads 
toward the same destination. This nondiscriminating 
attitude toward religious beliefs often led them to conclude 
that all religions were of equal virtue and validity.
This emphasis on inclusiveness blurred Chinese 
religious identity. The majority of the Chinese did not 
profess to have a particular religion of their own. They 
not only respected all religions, but adopted beliefs and 
practices from several religions at the same time. For 
centuries, elements of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and 
folk religion have been combined in belief systems and 
rituals. Most Chinese had no qualms in reverencing 
Confucius, participating in Buddhist burial services, and 
resorting to Taoist blessings of health and wealth at the 
same time. Even the charms that were used to ward off 
demons were collectively written and sold by Buddhist and 
Taoist priests, and tuan kungs, the priests of black magic.1 
A recent archaeological find in China confirms the eclectic 
nature of the Chinese religious experience. The China Daily
'Graham, Folk Religion. 125-27. See also Chu Chai 
and Winberg Chai, The Changing Society of China (New York: 
Mentor Books, 1962), 145-49, and Hsu, Americans and Chinese. 
255.
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reported on June 19, 1987 that an ancient painted scroll, 
called Heng Ting which means the Spirit's Roadmap, was 
discovered in Southwestern China. Measuring about fifty-one 
feet long and one foot wide, the scroll contains features of 
Taoism, Buddhism, Lamaism, and the Tongba religion, a 
pantheistic worship of the gods of mountains, rivers, wind, 
and fire.1
Esteem for Practicality 
The last aspect of the Chinese worldview considered 
in this study has to do with the Chinese proverbial 
practicality. The Chinese esteem for practicality is by no 
means the least of the five worldview assumption0 in the 
theoretical paradigm. It is, in fact, as Chinese as the 
other aspects of the Chinese worldview. Three areas of this 
propensity are noted: an anthropocentric tendency, a this-
worldly attitude to religion, and an utilitarian approach to 
religion.
Anthropocentric Tendency
The Chinese tended to consider all things from an 
anthropocentric perspective. Even abstract ideas were 
expressed in relation to human beings.2 Perhaps more than 
anything else, the classics had a part in bringing about
‘Chin-Ning Chu, The Chinese Mind Game: The Best Kept 
Trade Secret of the East (Beaverton, OR: AMC Publishing,
I S  8 8 )  , 4 5 .
:Nakamura, 233.
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this affinity. The classics were records ahout the human 
world--the world of people's morals and right way of living 
and governing. As a result, the Chinese perceived all 
events from the standpoint of their own group and often did 
not see themselves as others saw them.
This anthropocentric tendency contributed to their 
national pride as a race. To be a Chinese implied an 
identification with the noble heritage of the longest 
continuous civilization of the world. It implied that the 
Chinese not only were a civilization but that they were 
civilization. The Chinese with this ideology of superiority 
viewed their own land as Chung Kuo, the Middle Kingdom, or 
the Central State, from which every other country revolved. 
All foreigners were often referred as "barbarians" or 
"foreign devils."1
As a result, the Chinese did not develop the study 
of logic for it was considered to have no utilitarian 
purpose,2 nor were they interested in principle apart from 
its practical utility. Similarly, metaphysical thought was 
not cultivated. Even Buddhism was transformed from a
‘The Chinese cultural superiority has been 
characterized by sinologist John Fairbank as "culturalism," 
and "sinocentrism" by C. K. Yang. John K. Fairbank, The 
United States and China (New York: Viking Press, 1962);
Yang, Religion in Chinese Society. See also Robert S. 
Elegant, The Center of the World: Communism and the Mind of
China (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968); and James 
McDonald, "China and the Barbarians," New Society 10 
(August 31, 1967) : 295-6.
:Ibid. , 2 34.
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metaphysical to a humanistic religion, with the result that 
Buddhism was popularly perceived by the commoners as a 
religion of spells and charms. It was not uncommon for the 
Chinese to pray to various Buddhist bodhisattvas just as 
they did to other folk deities.
Because of their humanistic devotion to the present 
life, the Chinese loved practical subjects and everything 
that pertained to the earth. Proportionately little thought 
was given to the hereafter. When Confucius was asked about 
the question of death, his famous replay was, nWe don't even 
know life, how would we know death?"1 Confucius' contention 
was that one should seek the meaning of this life rather 
than engage in fruitless inquiry into life after death. In 
his view, one was unqualified to speak of serving the 
spirits without being first able to serve humans. The 
modern Chinese scholar Lin Yu-tang terms the question of 
immortality an "unnecessary metaphysical worry, a kind of 
preposterousness that an Oriental mind cannot understand."2 
To the Chinese, life was too full to be preoccupied with 
thoughts of immortality, too good to forsake the visible 
earth for an invisible heaven. Lin goes on to draw an 
analogy with the Chinese roof. Like the Chinese roof, and 
unlike Gothic spires, the Chinese spirit did not aspire to 
heaven but brooded over the earth. Its greatest achievement
‘Soothill, 521-23.
:Yu-tang Lin, 103.
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was to attain a measure of harmony and happiness in this 
earthly life.1 As the Chinese roof might also have 
suggested, happiness was first to be found in the home, the 
symbol of Chinese humanism. The close-knit Chinese primary 
group system seemed to offer such a superlative degree of 
contentment and fulfillment that the Chinese finally came to 
believe that perfect existence must be in this world.
This-worldly Attitude in Religion
The predominant this-worldliness of the Chinese 
worldview did not mean it was completely free of any 
conception of the supernatural. Evidences of the 
supernatural may be observed in ancestor worship, in the 
pantheon of gods, and in the spirits in Chinese worship.
The Chinese approach to the world of the 
supernatural was essentially the same as their approach to 
life on earth. They believed that gods and spirits were 
3imply transformations of human beings. Therefore the 
supernatural world was more or less a replica of the earthly 
world in terms of hierarchy and fallibility.
Hierarchy
The Chinese' love of hierarchal order naturally led 
to the bureaucratization of the gods. Some of them were 
considered officers or "department heads" responsible to 
high-ups in a divine chain of command. The hierarchy in the
■ibid., 108.
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spirit world consisted of three interrelated domains: the
Domain of Judgment, the Western Paradise, and the court of 
the Supreme Ruler of Heaven.1 The Domain of Judgment was 
the judgment hall where the judges reviewed records of the 
merits and demerits of all humans. The wicked were banished 
to a eighteen-story hell where they were punished, and the 
meritorious were given eternal bliss in the Western 
Paradise.
The Supreme Ruler of Heaven presided over all gods 
and humans, including the emperor himself. Inasmuch as the 
Supreme Ruler was not omnipresent, he depended upon a large 
number of functionaries who held title and rank similar to 
the earthly pattern of hierarchy. These functionaries 
executed his order and meted out judgment on the living as 
well as on the souls of the dead.2
Wolf maintains that there was a pervasive 
parallelism between the Chinese view of the hierarchy of the 
gods and that of earthly bureaucrats.3 For instance, Tu Ti
Rung and the Stove God were not of the same rank. Tu Ti
Xung was like a policeman who could only report to lower 
gods such as Cheng Huang. The Stove God wag more like a 
plainclothesmar who reported directly to Tien Rung or the
‘Hsu, Americans and Chinese. 240.
:Ibid.
3Arthur P. Wolf, "Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors," in
Relicrion and Ritual in Chinese Society, ed. Arthur P. Wolf
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), 138.
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Supernatural Emperor.1 Communications among the gods must 
be by way of another god, who himself should be one of the 
higher-ranking deities. Lowly deities could not approach 
the Yu Huang Ta Ti anymore than a district magistrate could 
approach the emperor.2
The bureaucracies of the natural and supernatural 
worlds were regarded as two parallel systems. The 
bureaucrats of the other worlds were not necessarily thought 
of as possessing an authority superior to that of human 
bureaucrats. Rather, the higher-ranking members of one 
bureaucracy had authority over the lower-ranking members of 
the other. Thus, when the gods failed in their duties, they 
could be tried by magistrates and condemned to public 
beating!3
Fallibility
The resemblance between the Chinese gods and their 
human counterparts did not end in their bureaucratic 
compatibility. The gods were also subject to the same 
weaknesses as earthly mortals. The notion of an one and 
only infallible god was inconceivable to the Chinese.
Shrvock Ojl 3 c[od ndir.cd cricrij
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identified as a thief. Knowing he was innocent, the boy 
wrote a letter of complaint condemning the god. The letter 
was burnt and was subsequently picked up by one of the 
wandering inspector gods who brought it to the attention of 
the Jade Emperor. The Emperor immediately issued a decree 
banishing the city god 1,115 11 from his city for three 
years.1
Utilitarian Approach to Religion
The Chinese attitude to religion tended to be 
utilitarian. As their social roots lay in human primary 
relationships, the Chinese felt that they did not stand or 
fall with the gods. The gods were invoked only when they 
were needed for specific and practical purposes.2 There was 
no staunch or permanent commitment to speak of. In fact, 
the notion of having a close relationship with a god was 
alien to the Chinese view of religion. For this reason, Hsu 
asserts that to the Chinese, personal prayers were as 
incongruous as they were unnecessary.3 He further 
elaborates:
In spite of their desire to obtain the god's favors, 
the Chinese do not seek too close an association with 
them. In the normal course of events, gods are located 
in the temples or in special shrines. The closest the
‘John Snryock, The Temples of Anking and Their 
Cults: A Study of M o d e m  Chinese Religion (Paris: Librairie
Orientaliste, 1931), 113-14.
:Hsu, Americans and Chinese. 257-58.
3Ibid. , 255.
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Chinese come to "living" with gods and spirits is in 
respect to the household altars. But this is no more 
than physical proximity, for the worshiper pays homage 
at appointed times before such an altar, and as soon as 
he leaves it, the gods are left behind. The same 
respectful distance that separated the people and the 
emperor, separates the people and their gods. The 
Chinese believe that those who have gods hovering about 
them are mediums or persons nearing death or in some way 
peculiar.1
The upshot of this utilitarian tendency was that the 
Chinese resorted little to prayers. Even when prayers were 
used, the "utterances were little mere than an express 
request for godly favors."2 This practical attitude may 
have precipitated the phenomenon of the so-called "rice 
Christians" in China.3 Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
Chinese approach to Christianity was consistent with their 
approach to other religious traditions. As they turned to 
Taoism and its magic to fulfill the present, Confucianism 
for wisdom and morals, and Buddhism for salvation, they 
turned to Christianity for its temporal materialistic 
benefits. The immense missionary enterprise in China and 
the wealth of its institutions such as hospitals, schools,
‘Ibid., 243.
: T h \ d . . 2 F S .
3See the two stories related by Hsu. A Mr. Liu 
published in the local newspaper his experience of 
overcoming poverty by joining the Catholic Church. He 
thought it was perfectly natural to advertise his ulterior 
motive so that others might benefit from the relief supplies 
given by the church if they were willing to be baptized.
The second story was about a Chinese student who applied for 
financial aid from Northwestern University. On the 
application form where one's religion was to be indicated, 
she wrote, "Willing to be a Methodist." Ibid., 272-73.
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orphanages, and other social organizations gave the poverty- 
stricken the impression that the church commanded enormous 
wealth and technical know-how. Hence, what appeared to be a 
mercenary approach to Christianity may actually have been a 
reflection of the customary Chinese utilitarian attitude to 
religion.
Feng-Shui
The Chinese passion for this-worldly values such as 
wealth, health, and longevity resulted in the development of 
numerous kinds of divination, geomancy, astrology, dream 
interpretation, fortune-telling, and the like.1 Because of 
the significance attached to feng-shui or geomancy, further 
explication is necessary.
Feng-shui is a complex system of beliefs about luck 
and prosperity associated with the direction of sites of 
graves, houses, and buildings. Feng-shui, literally "wind" 
and "water," involves the study of wind and water in 
relation to the outward signs of the working of yin and yang 
in nature. It assumes a worldview in which directions, 
astral influences, the winds, and the waters were considered
Lu have yuwei uvci liuiuaiiS • r’ciiy'-ohu-L WaS I T c L S
exceedingly important to the Chinese. In fact, it was 
almost synonymous with being Chinese.
To harmonize the cosmic forces of yin and yang,
‘Joseph M. Kitagawa, Religions of the Bast 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 75.
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houses must be built according to the feng-shui of the 
locality. Topographical features such as mountains, 
streams, valleys, and temples were held to affect the 
operation of the cosmic forces. Straight lines were 
believed to be evil influences, but trees or a fresh water 
pond could ward them off. It was not surprising, therefore, 
that the basic design of Chinese villages included trees and 
ponds for protection. It was believed that if the feng-shui 
of the house was good, its residents would prosper, become 
wealthy, and have many descendants.
Feng-shui was especially crucial in the location of 
ancestral graves. The coffin and the corpse must point in 
the righc direction. If the feng-shui of the graves was 
bad, calamities would ensue among the descendants. That was 
the reason why before each burial, a feng-shui professor was 
hired to assess the locality for good feng-shui.
Freedman maintains that feng-shui is actually the 
reverse of ancestor worship. The deceased ancestor was only 
a corpse. As a set of bones, he was no longer in command of 
his descendants. On the contrary, he was at their disposal. 
They no longer worshiped him; he served their purposes.1 
Freedman explains:
‘Maurice Freedman, "Ancestor Worship: Two Facets of
the Chinese Case," in Social Organization: Essays Presented 
to Raymond Firth, ed. Maurice Freedman (Chicago: Aidine 
Publishing Co., 1967), 87. See also Maurice Freedman, 
Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung (London:
Athlone Press, 19 71).
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Geomancy delivers a man's ancestors into his hands. 
He may determine his own fortune by siting one or more 
of his ancestral graves in such a way that the geomantic 
influences (the "winds and waters") of the landscape are 
channelled through the bones of the ancestors to their 
agnatic descendants. By geomancy a Chinese may seek 
riches and success for himself in order to outpace his 
agnates; he can do so by choosing ancestral graves that 
will give him the smallest number of fellow descendants 
with whom to share the benefit induced, and by procuring 
(through geomancer) that the siting and orienting of the 
graves favor him among the descendants. It is for this 
reason that brothers will often wrangle long among 
themselves over the siting of their father's and 
mother's grave, each one seeking to ensure his private 
success at the expense of the others. Where feng-shui 
is carried to its highest degree of development, bones 
may be exhumed and reburied in the pursuit of good 
fortune. In all this seeking after riches, progeny, and 
success by the manipulation of their remains, the dead 
are virtually passive. They transmit the virtues of a 
site to their descendants, but they cannot initiate the 
flow of benefits or block it off.1
Freedman observes that ancestor worship and feng- 
shui belong to opposite ends of a spectrum. Tn ancestor 
worship, the ancestors are revered; in feng-shui, they are 
subordinated. In the former, the ideal ties between the 
generations are reinforced; in the latter, they are denied. 
The first stands for group solidarity, the second represents 
group differentiation. Freedman concludes that by feng- 
shui , the ancestors are used as things for the attainment of 
worldly desires.2
The prevalence of belief and practice of feng-shui 
in China illustrates the Chinese pragmatic and utilitarian 
approach to life. As noted in the next chapter, this
'Ibid., 87-88. 
:Ibid.
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proclivity to practicality is by no means diminished in the 
contemporary Chinese societies in East Asia.
Conclusion
China's long and essentially unbroken cultural 
tradition has long been the pride of its people. Its 
cultural heritage, though bewilderingly complex, may be 
traced to its early origin in Confucianism, Taoism,
Buddhism, and Chinese folk religion. The interplay of these 
four hereditary legacies through the centuries has produced 
certain repetitive, enduring, and identifiable worldview 
assumptions which form the basis of a theoretical paradigm 
for understanding the traditional Chinese mind. This 
paradigm includes five selected Chinese proclivities, 
namely, hierarchy, antiquity, particularity, harmony, and 
practicality.
The Chinese esteem for hierarchy can be seen in 
Chinese preoccupation with proper social order; the 
centrality of ethics; a strong emphasis on ritual, 
propriety, and morality; a highly developed patriarchal 
family system based on the principle of filial piety and the 
subordination of the individual to cne social group. This 
hierarchical structure is also characterized by control, low 
status of women, and a strong group orientation. The 
Chinese proclivity to antiquity is expressed in an obsessive 
concern with historical particularities and an exaltation of 
past events as models for present and future. It also means
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deference and honor to the aged, and the prominence of 
ancestor worship as an integral part of the culture. The 
affinity to particularity denotes the Chinese penchant for 
looking at reality in concrete rather than in abstract 
terms. It also indicates the non-development of rational 
logic and a lack of concern for universal truth in Chinese 
thinking. The esteem for harmony points to the famous 
Chinese propensity for harmony between human beings and 
nature as well as harmony between human beings. It 
highlights the Chinese perennial concern for moderation in 
all things, and it contributes to their inclusive approach 
to religion. Finally, the inclination toward practicality 
and an anthropocentric orientation lead to the well-known 
Chinese pragmatic, this-worldly, and utilitarian approach to 
life.
The five selected elements described above represent 
the major contours of the traditional worldview that lies at 
the core of the Chinese culture. They are deeply embedded 
in the Chinese consciousness and are scarcely noticeable. 
They form the heart of the Chinese understanding and 
interpretation of reality, and as such help to give meaning 
and shape to relationships and behavior.
Having identified the major dimensions of the 
traditional Chinese worldview presuppositions, we now shift 
our focus to an enquiry pertaining to the extent to which 
these presuppositions have changed during the last twenty
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Our purpose is to assess the impact of 
modernization and secularization on the 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore.
the
Chinese
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CHAPTER IV
THE CONTEMPORARY CHINESE WORLDVIEW: 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
Introduction
If we wish to ascertain the contemporary Chinese 
worldview, we must know the de facto situation in regard to 
the contemporary Chinese. The focus of this chapter is on 
three of the four Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs), 
namely, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Its purpose is to 
examine the effects of modernization and secularization on 
these societies and ascertain the extent to which the 
traditional Chinese worldview has deviated from its 
theoretical framework outlined in chapter 3.
Although the tradition-modemity dichotomy has been 
ahused and overused, it remains useful in ascertaining how 
change has transpired in contemporary Chinese society.1
‘The tradition-modemity dichotomy has been 
developed by social psychologists into various traditional- 
m o d e m  (T-M) attitude scales. For a discussion on the 
construct validity of these measures of traditional and 
m o d e m  attitudes and assessment of the interrelationships 
among these measures, see Pauline A. Jones, "The Validity of 
Traditional-Modem Attitude Measures," Journal of Cross- 
Cultural Psychology 8 (June 1977): 207-39. For studies 
relating traditional-modem attitude scales to the Chinese, 
see John L. M. Dawson, Richard E. Whitney, and Raymond T. S. 
Lau, "Attitude Conflict, GSR, and Traditional-Modem 
Attitude Change among Kong Kong Chinese," The Journal of
156
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Admittedly, there is no unadulterated "tradition," just as 
there cannot be pure "modernity," since both are only ideal 
abstractions. Nevertheless, the tradition-modernity 
dichotomy is a valuable device for understanding reality, 
though its limitations must be acknowledged.
Ethnological Background 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore are chosen as 
samples of this study mainly because they have large 
concentrations of Chinese whose forebears were migrants from 
China. Both Taiwan and Singapore are independent countries, 
whereas Hong Kong is a British colony bordering China on its 
Southeast coast.
Hong Kong was leased from the Chinese government in 
1898 for ninety-nine years and will revert to China in 1997. 
About 9 9 percent of Hong Kong people are Chinese, most of 
them coming from the neighboring Chinese province of 
Guangdong. In 1901 the population of Hong Kong stood at 
380.000. Over the ensuing forty years, the conditions in 
China led to a great influx of refugees to Hong Kong. Many
Social Psychology 38 (December 1972): 163-76; John L. M. 
Dawson, H. Law, A. Leung, and R. E. Whitney, "Scaling 
Chinese Traditional-Modern Attitudes and GSR Measurement of 
'Important1 Versus 'Unimportant' Chinese Concepts," Journal 
of Cross-Cultural Psychology 2 (1971): 1-27; John L. M. 
Dawson and William Ng and Wing Cheung, "Effects of Parental 
Attitudes and Modern Exposure on Chinese Traditional-Modem 
Attitude Formation," Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 3 
(June 1972) : 201-07; and John L. M. Dawson, "The Effects of 
Economic Development and Modernization in Resolving 
Traditional-Modem Attitudinal Conflict," International 
Journal of Intercultural Relations 4 (1980): 43-75.
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emigrated during the Republican Revolution of 1911. More 
crossed over following the eruption of the Sino-Japanese War 
in 1937. The conquest of China by the Communists caused a 
further exodus of refugees to the colony. By the end of 
1950, the population had shot up to 2.3 million. At present 
(1991) about 91 percent of the 5.7 million Hong Kong 
residents live in urban areas.
As in Hong Kong, the Chinese in Taiwan comprise some 
98.5 percent of a population of 20.5 million. Except for 
about 200,000 people indigenous to the island, all the 
inhabitants of Taiwan are descendents of Chinese 3ettlers 
from the mainland, primarily from Fujian and Guangdong 
provinces. The Chinese began arriving from China in 
significant numbers only in the seventeenth century. The 
latest and most significant influx occurred after 1945. It 
peaked in the late forties and early fifties when the 
Communist regime won control of the Chinese mainland. Some 
two million newcomers came, increasing the population by 
more than 3 0 percent. Taiwan's population is relatively 
young, with more than 35 percent under fifteen years of age 
in 1970; only 3 percent are older than sixty-five. More 
than two-thirds of the populacion live in urban areas. Much 
like their counterparts in Hong Kong, most Taiwanese 
embrace, at least nominally, a combination of Buddhist, 
Taoist, and Confucianist beliefs.
Singapore is the smallest nation in Southeast Asia.
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In 1832 Singapore became the headquarters of British rule in 
the region. In 1867 the Straits Settlements, which included 
Singapore, Malacca, and Penang, became the Crown Colony 
whose administration was directly responsible to London. 
After more than one hundred years of British rule, Singapore 
attained internal self-government in 1959 and became 
independent in 1965. The British withdrew militarily from 
Singapore in 1971. The Chinese in Singapore are largely the 
descendents of early migrants from the provinces of Fujian 
and Guangdong in Southeast China. The Singapore Chinese 
community is unique in that it represents the single largest 
concentration of Chinese in Southeast Asia (about two 
million strong). The Chinese are the majority ethnic groups 
of Singapore, comprising about 77.7 percent of a population 
of 2.7 million (1990). Over 70 percent of the Singapore 
Chinese are locally b o m ;  almost 30 percent are not. 
Obviously most of the latter are migrants from China in the 
early part of the nineteenth century.
It is significant to note that though most people in 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore are Chinese, not all of 
them are Chinese by culture; neither are all of them 
racially pure in the sense of being descended exclusively 
from Chinese forebears. Many are third- or fourth- 
generation Chinese whose cultural heritage may be radically
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different from their biological heritage.1 The two are not 
synonymous and a clear differentiation between the two must 
be maintained with vigilance, for it has consequential 
implications in the way they respond to secularization.
The Transformation of East Asia
Over the last thirty or more years, a radical 
transformation has taken place across the socioeconomical 
landscape in East Asia. Today Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Singapore are undoubtedly considered by many as modern 
industrialized societies. Others, however, regard them as 
"latecomers." According to Marion Levy, industrial 
societies can be categorized into two types, indigenous 
developers and latecomers.: The indigenous developers
constructed their m o d e m  societies on their own over a 
relatively long period of time, whereas the late-comers 
imitate models of development from the indigenous 
developers.
The latecomers' borrowing began in the nineteenth 
century when East Asian countries stepped up contact with 
the technologically advanced Western world. There was 
large-scale borrowing of Western techniques, institutions,
‘See Wee, "What Does 'Chinese' Mean?" and Gungwu 
Wang, "The Study of Chinese Identities in Southeast Asia," 
in Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese Since 
World War II. ed. Jennifer W. Cushman and Wang Gungwu (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988), 1-21.
2Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies.
16.
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and political and social systems such as m o d e m  democracy, 
nationalism, and the national state, as well as legal and 
educational systems. The effects of this intensive 
acquisition have been phenomenal, resulting in 
industrialization, rapid economic development, and profound 
social changes. The manner in which these Asian societies 
have been transformed may be more revolutionary than 
evolutionary.
Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig observe that the 
process of adoption of Western technology is sometimes 
described as "Westernization." However, they reckon that 
when the drastic changes of the past century are examined, 
they are generally the more m o d e m  elements of Western 
civilization that have been borrowed. Many things that 
characterize the West before recent times have not become as 
significant in Asia as they have remained in the West. A 
case in point is Christianity. In this sense, Fairbank et 
a l . suggest that the great transformation of East Asia can 
be better described as "modernization" than as 
"Westernization."'
The adoption of Western technology and the pursuit 
of Western standards of prosperity carry with them one major 
labyrinth, that is, the role of tradition in the process of
'John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer, and Albert 
M. Craig, A History of East Asian Civilization, vol. 2, East 
Asia: The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1965), 7.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
162
secularization. Fairbank et al. describe the predicament 
this way:
East Asians in their response to the West generally 
made a distinction between techniques and values, or 
broadly speaking, between means and ends. Western ways 
of doing things might seem necessary, even if 
distasteful, but the people of East Asia for the most 
part intended to maintain their own traditional values. 
Yet the distinction between foreign ways and native 
values inevitably became blurred. For example, the 
anti-Western patriot who was ostensibly reviviny native 
tradition might turn out to be in fact the exponent of a 
new and very modern form of nationalism.1
Modernization and Westernization, therefore, are not 
the same thing, but the fact is they are so closely related 
at times that it is not always easy to dissociate them. The 
dilemma facing East Asian countries is how to achieve 
"industrialization with honor,"2 that is, modernizing 
without being Westernized. Fairbank concedes that they are 
not always successful in their attempt. His conclusion is 
that cultural values are likely to be transformed by 
technological changes, even though East Asians are highly 
selective in their borrowing.3 This is because techniques 
and values, means and ends are closely intertwined. 
Initially, values may determine whether new techniques are 
to be adopted. But sooner or later, new techniques will 
influence the attitudes and values of the people whose way
‘Ibid., 8.
2John M. Steadman, The Mvth of Asia (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1969), 44.
3Fairbank et al., 8.
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of life has been changed by them. If the assessment of 
Fairbank et a l . is correct, we are likely to see deviations 
from the traditional Chinese worldview.
Catalysts of Social Change
Obviously, the new "modern" era in East Asia did not 
start with a tabula rasa. To all intents and purposes, 
significant traces of change had already taken place during 
the period of Western colonialism. After independence, the 
nations entered a new epoch characterized by increasing and 
ultimately decisive Western influence upon the societies.
No single agent is responsible for the metamorphosis of East 
Asian societies emerging from a pre-industrial era to the 
high-tech decade of the nineties, but Western influences 
have been more pronounced in the following five areas: 
education, modern state, urbanization, media, and 
industrialization.
Education is obviously a significant factor of 
change. Many countries adopted a state education system 
modelled upon Western patterns. The new target was 
universal education for every child. The outcome has been a 
marked increase in the literacy of the general population 
over the years.1 The Chinese take education very seriously. 
For centuries, education offered an escape from poverty. It
‘The literacy rates of the general population in 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore are 88.1 percent, 91.2 
percent, and 82.9 percent, respectively. "Social 
Indicators," Asiaweek 17 (February 15, 1991): 13.
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was a symbol of wealth, for only the rich could afford to 
study. Today, however, education is much more affordable 
and prevalent. The high level of educational effort 
spearheaded by the state reflects the traditional Chinese 
emphasis on scholarly prestige and the practical necessity 
of developing marketable skills in a competitive world. In 
Hong Kong, for example, 19,000 applicants competed for 1,999 
places at top-ranked University of Hong Kong. More than 
20,000 left for colleges abroad in 1989, a 40 percent 
increase compared with 19 84.1 Education, whether local or 
foreign, is the ladder leading to success and riches. The 
stress on education has led in one way or another to a more 
egalitarian attitude toward other members of the society. 
This may attribute in part to the rise of women's status and 
the loosening of paternalistic control in the family. 
Education also involves the introduction of novel ideas 
which are often accepted as better than traditional ones.
In an effort to develop internationally useful 
skills for commerce and industry, English has become the 
lingua franca of the Chinese. The ability to speak and use 
English proficiently is a sine qua non of many jobs. In 
Hong Kong there has been a decline in the number of 
secondary schools using Chinese as the principal language of 
instruction. The number of such schools dropped from 104 in
‘"Asia's Brain Wave," Asiaweek. 16 (June 29, 1990):
31.
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1976 to 72 in 1982. During the same period the number of 
Anglo-Chinese secondary schools (using English as the major 
medium of instruction) rose from 283 to 346.1 In Singapore 
English has been stressed since 1965,2 and through the years 
English-medium schools have taken the place of Chinese, 
Malay, and Tamil schools.3
The creation of the m o d e m  state has also 
facilitated change. Government dictates a wide spectrum of 
policies designed for the "good of the nation." The state 
serves as a catalyst to promote trade as well as a 
strategist to help companies maintain their cutting edge in 
the world market. In addition, the state has taken over 
functions previously held by the family. These include 
health care, education, employment, and even moral 
education. The hand of the government can be seen in a 
bewildering number of enterprises, from airlines to 
shipyards, from banking to family planning.
Urbanization has also had an impact on Asian 
societies. The rapid growth of the urban population has
’Hugh D. R. Baker, "Life in the Cities: The
Emergence of Hong Kong Man," The China Quarterly 95 
(September 1983): 474.
:Lim-Keak Cheng, Social Change and the Chinese in 
Singapore (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985), 
126-7.
3See Evangelos A. Afendras and Eddie C. Y. Kuo, eds. 
Language and Society in Singapore (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 1980).
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been a noticeable demographic trend.1 Most countries in 
East Asia have seen a doubling of their urban population in 
the past two decades.2 Urban areas have been the center of 
gravity in economic development. Cities function as 
administrative, judicial, and, above all, commercial 
centers. As cities are developed, rural to urban migration 
ensues as people flock to the cities looking for the "good 
life." Increasingly, women are drawn into the work force. 
The trend now is toward the dual-career family, in which 
both husband and wife work and children are left in day-care 
centers. This situation brings with it a host of 
fundamental socioeconomic changes.
The import of the media should also be considered. 
Marshall McLuhan looks at human history in terms of three 
periods. First, there is illiterate Tribal Man, where 
knowledge is shared by the community through verbal 
communication. Second, there is Gutenberg Man who, as a 
result of Gutenberg's invention of movable type, is able to 
gain information through reading books. Third, there is 
Electronic Man who sees the whole world as a global village
‘See Albert R. O'Hara, Research on Changes of 
Chinese Society (Taipei: Chinese Association for Folklore, 
1974), 135-49.
:Hong Kong's urban population has grown from 2.7 
million in 1960 to 5 million in 1985. So has Singapore's 
population risen from 1.6 to 2.6 million during the same 
period of time. See Prospects of World Urbanization. 1988 
(New York: United Nations, 1989), and World Development 
Report. 1989 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Vice 
President, Development Economics, World Bank, 1989) .
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through the television screen.1 In East Asia, all three 
types of people exist simultaneously. People may be 
illiterate, yet they can understand the spoken word and 
pictures from television. They are electronic people 
without having to learn to read and write. The number of 
people per television set in Taiwan is 3.2; Hong Kong, 4.1; 
and Singapore, 5.1.2 Already a leading barometer of 
affluence, television has rapidly eclipsed cinemas. But 
things have changed in the eighties with the ubiquitous 
video cassette recorder. Experts are now predicting a boom 
in cable television in the nineties.3 Though local 
productions are in abundance, imported programs are not in 
short supply. Millions are daily bombarded by images from 
the developed West, shaping and reshaping people's values 
and thinking. Some call this intrusion of foreign values 
and technology "cultural imperialism."4 This concern has 
been voiced by a number of authors, including Naisbitt and 
Aburdene who state:
Unlike cheeseburgers and jeans, the globalization of 
television is explosive and controversial because it 
conveys deeper values the way literature does. 
Entertainment through the medium of language and images,
'Quoted in Griffiths, 52.
2"Tuning in to the World," Asiaweek 16 (February 23, 
1990): 13.
3"Asia's CaJble Revolution," Asiaweek 16 (March 16, 
1990) : 20-23 .
4George Ann Geyer, "Seeking Cultural Revenge," 
Washington Times. February 27, 1989, sec. D, col. 2, p. 3.
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crosses over the line of superficial exchange and enters 
the domain of values. It goes right to the ethos of a 
culture, addressing the fundamental spirit that informs 
its beliefs and practices. Language is the great link 
to the heart of a culture.1
The prevalent and dominant use of the English 
language appears to be one of the major reasons for such a 
high influx of media material. Where English is used, 
invariably the cultures of English-speaking countries 
dominate.2 As it is, American and British rock music is 
part and parcel of the youth culture in East Asia.
Probably one of the most crucial factors inducing 
change in East Asia is industrialization. These nations 
developed a market economy that is largely based on 
manufacturing industries, international trade, and services. 
They started out with light industries, and then moved on to 
heavy industries. Most manufactured goods are exported.
Most countries have shown spectacular economic growth as a 
result. In recent years, the prominence of the Asia Pacific 
region has gained increasing international attention. The 
rapid economic growth in the region is about five times the 
growth rate of Europe during the Industrial Revolution.3 
Between 1975 and 1988, the four NIEs, or "tigers" as they 
are commonly called, increased their share of the world's
‘John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene, Megatrends 
2000: Ten New Directions for the 1990's (New York: William
Morrow and Co., 1990), 13 9.
:Ibid. , 139.
3Ibid. , 179.
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total export of manufactured goods from 4 to 11 percent. In 
recent years, the emphasis has been on high-technology 
industries. Between 1985 and 1987 they increased their 
share of the world's export of consumer electronics goods 
from 15 to 3 0 percent. They are expected to continue 
growing at annual rates ranging from 7 to 10 percent, 
compared with about 3 percent growth in the U.S.1 Already, 
Hong Kong's vibrant economy has made it one of the great 
financial centers of the world. Nearly all major banks have 
offices there. Singapore is said to have the largest 
seaport in the world. It enjoys the highest living standard 
in Southeast Asia and has one of the highest savings rates 
in the world, 42 percent in 1988 .2 As for Taiwan, its trade 
surplus has grown from $1.8 billion in 1981 to $10.9 billion 
in 1988. It held about $74 billion in foreign exchange 
reserves in 19 88, the world's largest after Japan with $87 
billion.3
The spectacular economic success of Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Singapore has intrigued sociologists. A number 
of hypotheses have been offered. One of them points to 
their shared sinic cultural heritage as a possible 
explanation. It suggests the neo-Confucian or post- 
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sense of responsibility that promotes economic development.1 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss 
whether cultural elements facilitate the adoption of 
industrial capitalism.2 But this much seems to be true, the 
antithesis of a so-called "spiritual East" and 
"materialistic West" does not appear to be valid in 
contemporary East Asia and, therefore, should not be 
regarded as axiomatic.2
Continuity and Change 
Observers of the process of secularization in East 
Asia tend to polarize their views into two camps. There are
'Herman Kahn, World Economic Development: 1979 and
Bevond (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 121-23; and R. 
MacFarquhar, "The Post-Confucian Challenge," Economist 
(London), (February 9, 1980): 67-72. However, Max Weber 
disagreed with this hypothesis, arguing that the traditional 
Chinese cultural values do not engender the capitalistic 
spirit:. In Weber's assessment, Confucianism, though 
rationalistic in form, lacked "an ethical prophecy of a 
supramundane God" and thus lacked"an inward core, of a 
unified way of life flowing from some central and autonomous 
value position." With the absence of the Protestant faith, 
the elements of capitalism were said to be missing in 
traditional Chinese enterprises. Max Weber, The Religion of 
China: Confucianism and Taoism, trans. and ed. Hans H. Gerth 
(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951), 229-32.
20ne of the most recent discussions of the topic is 
Bill Moyers' conversation with noted sociologist Peter 
Berger. See Bill Moyers, A World of Ideas. ed. Betty S. 
Flowers (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 484-93. See also Peter 
Berger and Michael H. H. Hsiao, eds., In Search of an East 
Asian Development Model (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Books, 1988) .
3Peter Berger believes East Asian societies are much 
more materialistic than the West. "Compared to East Asians, 
Americans are mystical dreamers" (Moyers, 485).
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those who believe that the Chinese tradition has maintained 
its status quo for centuries and is unlikely to change 
despite the onslaught of Western influence in modernization. 
Others think that change is inevitable, for no culture is 
ever immune to the impact of industrialization, 
urbanization, m o d e m  education, and communication. The 
latter regard Chinese culture as having been disfigured 
beyond recognition. The truth of the matter probably falls 
in between these two extreme views.
For the rest of this chapter, we will take a closer 
look at patterns of change and continuity in the traditional 
Chinese worldview using the fivefold paradigm outlined in 
chapter 3.
Hierarchy
Hoselitz1 claim that the process of economic 
development involves not merely a reshaping of the economic 
order but also a restructuring of social relations in 
general appears to be true in the three Chinese societies 
under study.1 The traditional Chinese esteem for system of 
hierarchical relationship is showing signs of abating.
Changes in the Kinship System 
Family Structure
Marion Levy remarks that "perhaps the most
‘Berthold F. Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects of 
Economic Growth (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960), 26.
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significant feature of traditional China . . .  is the fact 
that it was family-oriented to an overwhelming degree."1 
Certainly the value of family is the strongest value in 
Chinese culture. It was the single most important social 
institution of Chinese society. For centuries, the strength 
of the family's centripetal ism provided exceptional 
continuity and inclusiveness. But there is evidence in 
recent years of a trend toward a weakening of the family 
system, particularly of the patrilineal extended family 
structure.2 The traditional preference for joint residence 
of sons with their parents is followed less closely now, for 
the joint or stem family system is no longer considered 
ideal. Most have adopted a new ideal, namely, the conjugal 
family. The number of conjugal households appears to be on 
the rise, especially in urban areas. A survey in Kaohsiung, 
a thriving industrial city in Taiwan, shows that 79 percent 
of the population have adopted a conjugal form of marital 
residence compared with 18 percent in the village.3 In a
‘Marion J. Levy, Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, vol. 2 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1953), 165.
2See for example, W. Goode, World Revolution and 
Family Patterns (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); J. 
Kahl, "Some Social Concomitants of Industrialization and 
Urbanization," Human Organization 18 (1959): 65-69; George 
M. Foster, Traditional Cultures and the Impact of 
Technological Change (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 31-34; 
and Joseph C. K. Wang, The Changing Chinese Family Pattern 
in Taiwan (Taipei: Southern Materials Center, 1981).
William L. Parish, "Modernization and Household 
Composition in Taiwan," in Chinese Family Law and Social 
Change in Historical and Comparative Perspective, ed. David
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1983 survey, 54.1 percent of the household in Taiwan were 
the conjugal type, 23.6 percent were extended, 5.7 percent 
were single-parent households, and 12.4 percent were single- 
person households.1
The trend toward conjugal family structure also has 
been observed by William Goode. Goode points out that the 
process of industrialization involves a breakdown in the 
economic control of the large patrilineal kin group over its 
members, and the emergence of the conjugal family as the 
accepted ideal. Goode refers to the latter as "conjugal 
ideology.
A number of reasons account for this new ideology. 
One is the declining importance of the economic functions of 
large family units. Traditionally, the family was an 
economic unit. The larger the family, the more viable was 
the family's economic position. But now, with the rise in 
employment opportunities, many youth leave home to work in 
cities. The rapid growth in wages has meant that fewer and 
fewer young married couples are economically dependent upon 
their parents. They are now financially independent and set
Buxbaum (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), 
284-87. For a look at the situation in Singapore, see Peter
S . J . Chen, Asian Values in a Modernizing Society: A
Sociological Perspective (Singapore: Chopmen Enterprises, 
1976), 10-11.
'"Marriage Tensions," Free China Review 38 (December 
1988): 16.
^oode, 19.
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up small nuclear family homes.
The lack of space due to urbanization may be another 
reason for the change. Increasing urbanization makes land 
in the city scarce and expensive. Many families are 
confined in small apartments. During the era of housing 
development in Singapore, the traditional housing areas were 
broken up and people were forced to resettle in high-rise 
apartments. Space limitation in crowded apartments made 
conjugal families a necessity. The government later sought 
to rectify the situation by introducing legislation to 
encourage young families to apply for an apartment next to 
that of their parents.1 It was a return to the classical 
stem family structure comprising parents, their children, 
and the grandparents.
The decision to set up a separate household apart 
from the parents also may be promoted by the desirability of 
avoiding quarrels and unpleasantness which some consider 
inevitable in stem families. Further, it may be fostered by 
the young people's aspiration for freedom and independence. 
Moreover, the emulation of the Western lifestyle may play a 
part in the increasing preference for a conjugal style 
family.
A change in family structure also means a change in 
family composition. The traditional system was mostly 
patrilineal and patrilocal. Recent studies have shown an
‘Nanyana Siang Pau. December 14, 1977, 3.
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increasing number of couples living with the wife's parents. 
This change in living arrangement may be partially due to 
the rising status of women. Thus, for some, the trend has 
been to move away from the traditional patrilineal, 
patrilocal family system to a bilateral and bilocal pattern 
in which both the wife's kin and the husband's kin are 
equally important and the married couple may choose to live 
with either or neither.
Family Size
Change in the structure of the traditional family 
brings with it the trend toward smaller families. The 
traditional large family is no longer considered ideal by 
most young people. The average household size in Hong Kong 
was 3.84 in 1981.1 The birth rate is also on the decline, 
falling from 20 to 17 per thousand in the decade ending in 
19 83 .2 The same trend applies to Taiwan. Thirty years ago 
Taiwanese families had an average of five children, but now 
the average is less than two children per household.3
Willmott's research has also shown a relationship 
between education and family size. There is reason to 
believe that as the level of education increases, average
‘Baker, "Life in the Cities," 474.
2Ibid.
3Kao-Chiao Hsieh, "Attitudes in Flux," Free China 
Review 38 (December 1988): 25.
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family size decreases. This is especially true of educated 
women.1
Among respondents1 fathers who did not attend high 
school, the average number of children was 5.0; among 
those fathers who had at least some high school 
education, the average was 5.2. The difference, 
however, is not statistically significant. Among 
respondents' mothers who had no education at all, the 
average number of children was 6.9; among those mothers 
with primary school education, the average was 5.0; and 
among those with at least some high school education, 
the average was 4.8. The differences between the last 
two figures and the first are significant at the 0.001 
level. Within each of the three socio-economic 
categories used for analytical purposes, differences in 
education were consistently related to differences in 
family size. Again the greatest differences were among 
the women.2
Willmott concludes that the most important correlate 
of family size is the education of the mother. He also 
suggests several factors that account for this relationship. 
First, education predisposes the educated woman to seek a 
less traditional role. Education also gives her aspirations 
incompatible with a large family. Moreover, education 
raises the status of woman and gives her more say in 
determining family size. Education may also delay marriage, 
shortening the child-bearing period. One of the most 
conspicuous changes in the age pattern of marriage in 
Singapore after World War II has been the postponement of
‘D. E. Willmott, The Chinese in Semarana: A
Changing Minority Community in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1960), 267-68. Although 
Willmott's research is on the Indonesian Chinese, much of 
what he has written appears to be applicable to the three 
Chinese communities under study as well.
:Ibid.
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marriage among women. Mere women are marrying late and a 
rising proportion choose to remain single.1 These factors 
have caused a sharp decline in Chinese birthrates.
Willmott's conclusion is similar to the findings of the 
People of Kwun Tong Survey carried out by the Social 
Research Center of The Chinese University of Hong Kong,2 as 
well as a separate study conducted among 293 women in 
Taiwan.3
The trend toward falling birthrates can be seen from 
the increasing number of one-child families. One 
implication of one-child families is that many of the 
children will grow up without brothers or sisters and, upon 
reaching adulthood, will have no uncles, aunts, nieces, or 
nephews. Chinese terms describing these consanguineous 
relationships will have become obsolete in time to come. 
Moreover, the overprotective me-generation syndrome of an 
only child is unnerving to many.4
!Chen-Tung Chang, Fertility Transition in Singapore 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1974), 93-5.
:Pedro Pak-Tao Ng, "Social Factors Contributing to 
Fertility Decline," in Social Life and Development in Hong 
Kong, ed. Ambrose Y. C. King and Ranee P. L. Lee (Hong Kong: 
The Chinese University Press, 1981), 242ff.
3Yu-Hsia Lu, "Women's Attitudes toward Career Role 
and Family Role Underthrough Taiwan's Social Change," 
Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology Academia Sinica 50 
(Autumn 1980): 25-66.
•‘"Marriage Tensions," 18.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 7 8
Filial Piety: The New Ambivalence
Filial piety has long been held as the cardinal 
virtue of Chinese culture. It constituted an important 
element in the primordial and fundamental aspects of the 
Chinese worldview. It was one of the highest expressions of 
what it meant to be a Chinese. Although filial piety 
includes the devotion of younger brother to elder brother, 
wife to husband, subject to sovereign, and friend to friend, 
the focus has been on the devotion of a son to his parents. 
Conrucianism has been influential in making the traditional 
Chinese son display unqualified submissive respect to the 
his parents irrespective of how he might feel. It was 
unthinkable for Chinese young people to strike back at their 
parents directly or symbolically.
Empirical studies of the traditional concept of 
filial piety suggest it is often associated with 
authoritarianism, particularly authoritarian submission, 
authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism.1 More 
recently, however, filial piety as understood in terms of 
absolute obedience to parents has begun to show signs of 
erosion. Several important factors account for this.
First, the role of the family is diminishing. In 
today's society, the family no longer functions as the 
provider of education, health care, and vocational training
’Yau-Fai Ho and Ling-Yu Lee, "Authoritarianism and 
Attitude toward Filial Piety in Chinese Teachers," Journal 
of Social Psychology 92 (April 1974): 305-6.
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for its members. These functions have now largely been 
taken over by government and other agencies. Moreover, the 
family is no longer the only source of moral training. More 
and more schools, nurseries, clubs, and the state are 
molding the worldview of the Chinese. Consequently, the 
traditional centripetal loyalty is shifted from inside to 
outside the family system. Although still considered 
important, devotion to parents has lost much of its earlier 
status.
Second, modern education tends to produce a 
generation which values achievement and the making of 
decisions on rational grounds more highly than it does the 
authority of parents and elders. Advice from parents and 
elders is listened to, but its implementation is regarded as 
the prerogative of the individual. Further, economic 
independence has bolstered rational and independent thinking 
and behavior.
Third, the situation of the overseas Chinese is 
different from that of those in mainland China. Although 
many overseas Chinese retain regular contacts with relatives 
in China, the fact of overseas residence separates them from 
much of the traditional family and clan structure and 
kinship obligations. Their new sociological, psychological, 
and geographical situations make them amenable to another 
value system.
Fourth, solidarity between husband and wife has
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become the dominant relationship in the family. This is 
mainly because of the collapse of arranged marriages. With 
more young people choosing their own marital partners, the 
tie between husband and wife takes precedence over that 
between children and parents, especially between sons and 
fathers. This seems to be a reversal of the traditional 
pattern, in which the father-son relationship was 
predominant. Potter rightly observes that in today's 
Chinese family "relations between husband and wife tend to 
approximate Western ideals."1
Fifth, perhaps most importantly, there has been a 
decline of parental authority, especially the father's.2 
Traditionally, the father was not only the head of the 
family; he was also the head of the family business. The 
father in a patrilineal extended family enjoyed nearly 
complete authority in making decisions concerning every 
member of the family. But such authoritarian control has 
been subject to considerable challenge and change in
‘Jack M. Potter, "The Structure of Rural Chinese 
Society in New Territories," in Hong Kong: A Society in 
Transition, ed. I. C. Jarvie (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1969), 24.
2A case study of five families shows that parental 
authority has faced a serious challenge. Yin-Chang Chuang, 
"The Chinese Family in a Changing Society: Case Analysis of
Five Families in Nan-Tsun," Bulletin of the Institute of 
Ethnology Academia Sinica 52 (Autumn 1981): 1-31. See also 
an earlier study by Robert Edward Mitchell and Irene Lo, 
"Implications of Changes in Family Authority Relations for 
the Development of Independence and Assertiveness in Hong 
Kong Children," Asian Survey 8 (1968): 309-22.
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contemporary Chinese society. When a mutually 
interdependent family moves to the city, the children begin 
working for other employers, and the father stops being the 
employer. Soon the children know more about living in the 
city than their father does. He is no longer as highly 
esteemed as before. His position is further weakened when 
his sons begin to find high-status and high-salaried 
positions. When they finally move out to form their own 
families, parental authority is likely to be beyond reach. 
The economic independence and financial power of the sons 
frequently enables them to achieve a dominant position in 
the family, and a more egalitarian relationship with their 
parents. Thus parent-child relationships are being 
fundamentally altered.1 Total obedience to parents is 
likely to be questioned by the younger generation.2
So, what does all this mean? Has filial piety 
vanished amidst social change? Research on the present 
Chinese attitude toward filial piety returns a mixed signal. 
On one hand, filial piety is strongly affirmed. One survey 
conducted among Taiwanese young people reveals that over 85 
percent felt that filial piety is still necessary in m o d e m
‘David Y. F. Ho, "Continuity and Variation in 
Chinese Patterns of Socialization," Journal of Marriage and 
Family 51 (February 1989): 154.
:See David Podmore and David Chaney, "Family Norms 
in a Rapidly Industrializing Society: Hong Kong," Journal
of Marriage and the Family 36 (May 1974): 400-407.
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societies.1 Other surveys, however, show a different 
picture. For example, Yang's survey on land reform 
indicates discontinuity between the patterns of the father's 
authority and the son's submission.2 Yang found that though 
64 percent of the respondents still claimed that the father 
controlled all the affairs of his children, about 32 percent 
believed that the father's authority no longer extended to 
all areas of his children's lives. In other words, parents 
are perceived by young people to still hold substantial 
power over them, but the degree and areas of control have 
been tempered with reason and restraint and thus become more 
tolerable.
Moderation of parental authoritarianism seems to be 
substantiated by another survey conducted by the Taiwanese 
government among college students. The purpose of the 
survey was to find out the methods students chose to resolve 
conflicts between themselves and their parents. Nearly 40 
percent of the respondents selected "discussion of the 
problem with the parents," and about 15 percent chose to 
"stick to my position."3 It seems apparent that the trend
‘Chin-Hou Hwang, "Filial Piety from the 
Psychological Point of View," Bulletin of Educational 
Psychology 10 (June 1977): 11-20.
:Martin M. C. Yang, Socio-Economic Results of Land 
Reform in Taiwan (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1970), 
446-55.
3Ta Hsueh Sheng Tui Tan Chien Sheng Ho Huang China 
Ti Kan Fa (The Opinion of College Students toward Their 
Living Environment) (Taichung: Bureau of Civic Affairs,
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is moving away from complete domination and control to a 
more democratic process of discussion and persuasion.1 
While most parents prefer to have considerable control over 
the up-bringing of their children, they tend to exercise it 
rationally.
The liberalization of parental control and its 
subsequent adjustment have not been easy for the parents, to 
say the least. To many Chinese parents who are used to 
giving orders, carrying on a dialogue to settle differences 
with a child seems outlandish. It is so much easier to do 
it the "efficient" way, to impose their will on the child as 
their parents had done to them when they were children.
That may be the reason why many parents complain that they 
were far more obedient to their parents than their children 
are to them today. Some say with resignation that after 
their sons are married, they will have gained a "daughter- 
in-law, but lost the son."2
To sum up, it may be said that filial piety as 
practiced by the ancient Chinese is undergoing a degree of
Taiwan Provincial Government, 1970), 31-2.
lK. S. Yang, "The New Filial Piety in M o d e m  
Society," Chung Hua Wen Hua Fu Hsing Yueh Kan (Chinese 
Cultural Renaissance Monthly) 19 (1986): 51-67. See also 
Hsieh, "Attitudes in Flux," 25; and Leu, "Filial Piety 
Modernized," 21.
:Chin-Han Chang, "Gaining a Daughter-in-Law, But 
Losing the Son: On the Intergenerational Conflicts in
M o d e m  Families," in Che I Tai Ching Nien Tan Tai Wan.
(Taiwan from the Eyes of the Young Generation) (Taipei: 
Huan-Yu Tsu Pan She, 1970), 156-62.
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modification. In precept, the principle of filial piety is 
still widely accepted by the contemporary Chinese. In 
practice, however, it is often redefined with greater 
emphasis on respect and mutuality and less on obedience and 
submissiveness. In addition, the parent-child relationship 
tends to take on characteristics of companionship.
The Rising Status of Women
In traditional society, the role of women was wholly 
defined by their relationship to men. They were to obey 
their father before marriage, their husband after it, and 
their eldest son on widowhood. Women were expected to be 
subservient to men. Unless a woman produced a male heir, 
she had no status in the family. All of this seems to be 
drastically changing in the last thirty years, for the 
metamorphosis of the new womanhood is emerging.
Increasingly women are coming out of their former domains of 
homemaking and motherhood and are given a chance in 
education. Since the seventies, primary and secondary 
education have been made compulsory for all students in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Nine years of free education 
is provided for all, irrespective of gender. It must be 
noted that beyond the compulsory limit, some prejudice still 
remains against girls pursuing university education. For 
instance, in 1985 4,046 male students were registered at 
Hong Kong University in comparison with 2,218 females. At 
the Chinese University (also in Hong Kong) in the same year,
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3,3 92 males compared with 2,259 females were attending.1
With better education and an expanding economy, more 
women are being drawn into the labor market. Employment 
means women are no longer economically dependent on men and, 
sometimes, they themselves become the major breadwinners of 
a family. Much of their wages is given to the parents as a 
token of repayment toward the cost of their upbringing.2 
With increased income, women are able to afford services in 
childcare centers, maid services, and other personal 
services. Some even purchase properties on their own, and 
this constitutes a reversal of the traditional right of the 
male only to own land. For instance, between the years 1956 
to 1963, over half of the sales of new apartments in Hong 
Kong were transactions which involved women. Very few of 
the above purchases were made in partnership with men. In 
fact, 34 percent of all purchases were made by married women 
acting by themselves.3
Though present-day women are better educated and 
economically more independent than their traditional
‘Veronica Pearson, "Women in Hong Kong," in Social 
Issues in Hong Kong, ed. Benjamin K. P. Leung (Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 121.
2R. M. Marsh, "The Taiwanese of Taipei," Journal of 
Asian Studies 27 (May 1968): 57-84.
3L . F. Goodstadt, "Urban Housing in Hong Kong," in 
Hong Kona: A Society in Transition, ed. I. C. Jarvie
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 292-3.
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counterparts in China,1 they still suffer from sex-role 
stereotyping in a patriarchal society.1 Males are still 
considered to be better than females. Women who have just 
given birth are often asked if the baby is a boy or a girl. 
If it is a boy, congratulations are quick and hearty, but if 
it is a girl, comforting words are in order.3
Though men and women have equal access to education, 
more women than men are illiterates. In Taiwan, for 
example, out of the 1.4 million people classified as 
illiterates, about 70 percent are women over fifteen years 
of age. The rest are men over the age of sixty.4
The disparity between men and women can also be seen 
in the employment pattern of Hong Kong's Civil Service in 
which only 24.6 percent of the positions were occupied by 
women. Of these only 9 percent were in directorate posts.3
‘Sheldon Appleton, "Sex, Values, and Change on 
Taiwan," in Value Change in Chinese Society, ed. Richard W. 
Wilson, Amy A. Wilson, and Sidney L. Greenblatt (New York: 
Praeger, 1979), 185-203.
2For a study on sex role stereotypes of Chinese and 
American students, see Lucy Jen Huang, "Sex Role Stereotypes 
and Self-concepts among American and Chinese Students," 
Journal of Comparative Family Studies 2 (Autumn 19 71) : 215- 
34 .
■^Winnie Chang, "Coming to Terms," Free China Review 
41 (February 1991): 5.
4Ibid.
Vong May Ling Lai, "Civil Service Attitudes towards 
Women in Hong Kong" (M.Soc.Sci thesis, Hong Kong University, 
1980). In Taiwan, less than one-third of the 540,000 civil 
servants are women, who, on the average, have higher 
education attainment than men. Thirty-four percent of the
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Until 19 81 women civil servants were not entitled to the 
housing allowances and dental or medical treatment for their 
families accorded to their male counterparts in equivalent 
positions.1 Parallel research reveals similar 
stereotyping: male officers on the average took 13.5 years
to reach their present rank whereas females took eighteen 
years.2 The irony is that women share the same negative 
attitudes toward women as do men. Perhaps for this reasoii, 
women themselves express ambivalence about claiming equal 
respect and pay for their work. One woman author admits 
that the discriminatory attitude toward women is "deeply 
entrenched in the family, the school, the society, the work 
place and minds of both men and women."3
Sex-role stereotyping, however, is showing signs of 
dissipating. A survey on men's expectations of women was 
conducted in 19QQ by Ming Sheng Pao, one of the largest 
dailies in Taiwan. The result of the survey revealed that 
almost two-thirds of the 3 00 men interviewed would not mind 
women taking the initiative in courtship. This was in stark
women have bachelor's degrees, and men only 2 8 percent. But 
only 1 percent of the women have graduate degrees, while 28 
percent of men have master's or doctorate degrees. Chang, 
"Coming to Terms," 7.
’Pearson, 124.
'David C . C . Tang, An Evaluation of the Career 
Patterns and Attitudes of Upper Middle Civil Servants in 
Hong Kona (Hong Kong: n.p., 1982).
3Lai, 59.
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contrast to women's attitude only a few years ago when they 
were told that taking the role of an initiator was downright 
degrading and that decent women would never do s o .1
New Patterns in Marriage and Divorce
Traditional marriages were mostly arranged 
marriages. The parents' selection of a bride for their son 
emphasized their authority over the young woman who came 
into the family, for clearly she was chosen by her parents- 
in-law rather than her husband. Thus marriage was regarded 
as a family rather than a personal affair. Nowadays, 
however, Chinese society is more likely to permit a greater 
number of marriages of free choice. The trend among the 
"enlightened" younger generation has switched from 
parentally arranged marriage to "love" marriage.2 Ninety- 
two percent of respondents in one survey among university 
students in Taiwan indicated they wanted love as a basis for 
their marriage--a considerable shift in attitude from only 
one generation earlier.3 Clearly the new emphasis is upon 
the desirability of selecting one's own mate without 
interference from parents.
Most young people have gained a degree of economic 
and social independence. With increased social mobility,
‘Chang, "Coming to Terms," 5.
:0'Hara, Research on Changes of Chinese Society. 21-
26.
3Ibid., 46.
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Che youch have more opportunities of coming into contact 
with potential spouses. Most meet their partners through 
peer-group activities or company-sponsored outings.1
Theoretically young people can refuse the choice of 
a potential spouse chosen by their parents. But in 
practice, "love" marriages take various forms. In some 
rural areas, it is still a common practice to negotiate 
marriage contracts between families, with frequent 
consultations with the prospective bride and bridegroom.
The concerns or even objections of the bride or groom may be 
taken into consideration, but the final decision is a family 
decision. In other cases, the final decision is given to 
the bride and groom, but their decision has been heavily 
influenced by the parents1 prior counsel and consent. The 
fact that most of the announcements of marriage in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore are made in the names of the 
parents avouches at least a nominal recognition of parental 
authority in marriage. Still others do not wish to take 
full advantage of the new-found freedom. As a demonstration 
of filial devotion, they elect to seek approval of uilG match 
and comply to their parents' wishes such as marrying within 
their own ethnolinguistic group or choosing the year or even 
month of the marriage. Indeed, some do postpone marriages
'Janet W. Salaff, Working Daughters of Hong Kona: 
Filial Pietv or Power in the Family? (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 41.
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in deference to their parents.1 And, of course, there are 
those who believe romance supersedes parental consent and go 
ahead with their wedding plan anyway. As a general trend, 
however, there seems to be a loosening of tight family 
control in marriage choices.
The loosening of family control is accompanied by a 
generally more permissive sexual attitude among young 
people. Admittedly, quantifiable data in this respect is 
difficult to gather and verify. Some of Salaaf1s 
respondents became pregnant before their marriages. The 
mothers of most of these cases were actually pleased at 
their daughters1 pregnancy because of their longing for 
grandchildren.1
Sexual permissiveness is also evident in new 
unconventional lifestyles that are gaining acceptance by the 
populace. Many couples choose to live together without 
marrying. Others opt for multiple partners without 
permanent commitment to one.
One popular lifestyle today is commonly called 
"married but separate lives." Couples decide to live 
together for a period of time, then apart for a while. 
They alternate the arrangement so as to enjoy the best 
of both worlds--the freedom of single life and the 
coziness of marriage. Such an arrangement has been 
popular among couples in Hong Kong for a long time, and 
is now gaining adherents in Taiwan. The "DINKS" 
concept, that is "double income and no kids," works in 
well with the married-separate trend ...But these 
tendencies attack the very foundation upon which
‘Salaaf, 268.
:Ibid. , 267.
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marriage rests. Without children, sexual fidelity, or 
family ties, the idea of marriage looks artificial and 
irrational.1
In addition to the above changes in the patterns of 
marriage, there is evidence of an upward spiraling trend of 
legal dissolution of marital union. Divorce was once 
regarded as a taboo that brought great shame to the family; 
increasingly it is being tolerated. Divorce rates in Hong 
Kong in the 1970s rose very rapidly. From 1981 to 1984 
alone, there was a 70 percent increase-- from 2,811 to 4,764 
cases.2 In 1987, there was one divorce for every six 
marriages in Taiwan. Some predict the rate will continue to 
increase. Many view the trend with alarm although the 
divorce rate in Taiwan may still lag behind that of Europe 
and America.3 Recent figures from Singapore also show a 
rapid rise in the non-Muslim divorce cases.4 Only twenty 
cases were reported in 19 60, but 105 in 19 65. The number 
continued to rise since the 1970s, from an estimated 593 in 




divorce in Singapore is controlled by two sets of 
laws, one for the Muslims in accordance with the Muslim 
Ordinance (1957), and the other for the non-Muslims under 
the Women's Charter (1961) and the Women's Charter 
(Amendment) Act (1967).
5Aline K. Wong and Eddie C. Y. Kuo, Divorce in 
Singapore (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1983), 11-20. See also 
C. L. Tai, "Divorce in Singapore," in The Contemporary
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total number of marriages, the average non-Muslim divorce 
rate was 14.1 per 1000 marriages for 1960-69, 12.4 for 1970- 
74, and 36.6 for 1975-81.1 It is noteworthy that during the 
last seven years of this study a threefold increase in the 
divorce rate was registered, and there is no sign that the 
trend of divorce in Singapore is likely to be reversed in 
the future. According to Wong and Kuo, one of the major 
reasons for the sharp increase of divorces is the changing 
function of the family noted above. Previous functions such 
as economic, protective, educational, religious, and 
recreational have been taken over by schools, associations, 
and religious organizations. The implications of this 
change are significant. Wong and Kuo explain:
Since the family has been steadily losing many of 
its earlier functions, the reasons for keeping marriages 
intact are not so compelling as they once were. With 
the decline of the traditional extended kinship system 
and also the decline of moral and religious sanctions 
against marital breakup, individuals are no longer 
subject to the same level of social pressure to maintain 
a marital union which they find personally 
unsatisfactory. Although the number of divorces in 
Singapore is still very small by Western standards (in 
1980 only 0.7% of the census population were divorced), 
there are signs that the social stigma which used to be 
attached to the divorced person is declining, especially 
among certain social groups.2
Family in Singapore, ed. Eddie C. Y. Kuo and Aline K. Wong 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979), 142-67; and
S. B. K. Ho, "Divorce and Social Change in Singapore:
Trends and Relationships in Divorce" (Singapore: University 
of Singapore, Department of Sociology, 1979), photocopied.
‘Wong and Kuo, 20.
:Ibid. , 19.
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It must be noted that even the context of divorce in 
contemporary Chinese communities has undergone change. In 
China, divorce was a family and clam affair; the wishes of 
the individual were secondary. Further, divorce was a 
privilege enjoyed almost exclusively by men. A wife was 
virtually helpless if her husband decided to put her away. 
Today, however, divorce is a matter to be decided by the 
husband or the wife, and their families have no veto power. 
Besides, the rising status of women in society makes a woman 
less defenseless and vulnerable to men's abuses.
One has reasons to believe the rising rate of 
divorce shows no signs of abating. The tendency to think of 
divorce as an easily available solution to domestic problems 
may persist. Though stigmatized, divorce is likely to 
become more socially acceptable.
Changes in the Lineage System
The weakening of the accepted hierarchical 
relationship system affects also the lineage. Next to the 
family itself, the traditional Chinese lineage (or clan) was 
the epitome of embodiment of the Chinese culture. The 
traditional lineage organizations wielded tremendous power. 
Among other things, they owned properties, directed 
inheritance, organized joint ancestral rites, and controlled 
local economy. But among most overseas Chinese there is an 
absence of a strong lineage network. Several reasons 
account for this. First, the migration from China to Hong
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Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore was mostly on an individual 
basis. The immigrants were far from homogeneous. In fact, 
they were highly heterogeneous linguistically, which is 
evident from the wide array of surnames and dialects used. 
Second, there is virtually no lineage because the immigrants 
were reluctant to put down their roots. Although some went 
overseas for political reasons, like those who moved to 
Taiwan in the late 1940s, most Chinese migrated for economic 
reasons, hoping to return to China after accumulating 
sufficient savings. Third, lineages were absent because the 
migrants already had them back home in China where the 
ancestral cult was being perpetuated. As many did not 
desire to stay on in a foreign land for the rest of their 
lives, they hoped to return to China to spend their sunset 
years and eventually to die and be buried in their ancestral 
homes.
Consequently, the Chinese migrants went through a 
process of adaptation to a new cultural and political 
environment. Being highly pragmatic, they formed themselves 
into surrogate kinship organizations, principally mock 
kinship, shared district of origin, and shared surname 
associations. Mock kinship bonds were created by the 
swearing of blood brotherhood. Many of the secret societies 
in Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1950s and 19 60s were 
formed in this way. The shared district of origin 
associations were established for those who came from the
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same geographical areas. These also constituted linguistic 
subcultures that served to forge cohesive ties among their 
members. Often members of associations lived in the same 
neighborhood. Thus, part of the North Point district of 
Hong Kong island is often called "Little Shanghai."1
Of the three types of surrogate kinship 
associations, perhaps the surname associations are most 
prominent. Members of these associations are not 
necessarily blood-related but regard themselves as being 
remotely related by virtue of shared surnames. Thus, these 
groups were formed not on the basis of agnation, but on the 
basis of surnames.2 These associations provide some kind of 
identity for the people, but they are not compatible with 
the lineage groups of traditional China. Nevertheless, they 
help promote a sense of cultural and ethnic identity in a 
pluralistic society. They also maintain ancestor worship 
for their members. There is, however, one important 
difference. The surname associations change the structure 
of kinship grouping, and this has led to corresponding 
changes in the grouping of ancestors. Instead of grouping 
the ancestors according to lineage, they are grouped 
unsystematically in relation to their living descendents.3
‘Baker, "Life in the Cities," 471.
:Maurice Freedman, The Study of Chinese Society: 
Essays by Maurice Freedman, selected and introduced by G. W. 
Skinner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979), 164.
3Ibid. , 165.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 9 6
Members of an association can also arrange to have their 
commemorative tablets set up in the event of death and have 
themselves worshiped not by their immediate family, but by 
members of the association as a whole.1
Despite the adaptive ability of the Chinese 
associations in a m o d e m  society, indications are that they 
are on the wane. In the past they played an important role 
in the formation of marriages, adoptions, and the settlement 
of disputes. But now these corporate functions are 
performed by government and other agencies. One Singapore 
clan leader candidly admits:
One of the clan's functions was to act as mediator 
in family, social and even business disputes. Though 
still influential today the power of clan leadership is 
waning. People are more legal minded these days. So, 
they do not depend so much on the clans. They do not 
respect the clan leaders as much as they used to in the 
past.:
In most cases, clan leaders find that their 
authority has been substantially weakened by the economic 
and social independence of their members. The socio­
economic perimeter of many has been extended from the rural 
to the city. Members can move about at will and behave 
unilaterally. The clan finds itself impotent to exert 
sanctions against its members or opponents. Moreover, the
‘John Clammer, Singapore. Ideology. Society. Culture 
(Singapore: Chopmen Publishers, 1985), 16.
2Quoted in Lee-Ching Chew, "Clan Power on the Wane, 
Despite Wealth and Fame," The Straits Times October 8,
1972, 10. See also Bernard Gallin, "Conflict Resolution," 
270-2.
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weakening of the social hierarchy has been accompanied by a 
general inability to use the traditional respect for clan 
leaders as a force for settling disputes.
There i3 also a growing sense of national 
consciousness. The compulsory national (military) service 
in Singapore, for instance, is one of the key elements in 
this development.1 Chinese in Singapore, for example, 
prefer to be called "Singaporean" rather than "Chinese" or 
"overseas Chinese ■" 'wl’iinss e in Hong Kong, having fumbled 
with their identity for years, are now proud to call 
themselves "Hongkongers" as the 1997 deadline looms closer.3 
Besides having new national identity, the contemporary 
Chinese are not inclined to trace their ancestry. Many do 
not speak the dialects of their parents. As such, clannish 
loyalty appears to be diminishing.
In addition, the clan, as an organization in which 
social status is acquired and confirmed, has declined in 
importance. In an industrialized society, social status is 
largely determined by education, occupation, and personal
‘Seong-Chee Tham, "The Status and Role of Youth," in 
Singapore: Society in Transition, ed. Riaz Hassan (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976), 319.
2In a "Singapore National Identity Survey" in which 
1,000 samples were collected from all races, it was found 
that nine out of ten citizens preferred to call themselves 
"Singaporean" rather than Chinese, Malay, Indian, or any 
other ethnic group. The Straits Times. 11 May, 1970, 1, 5. 
See also Cheng, Social Change. 190.
3"Younger Ones Proclaim HK Roots as Deadline Nears," 
The Straits Times. 7 January, 1991, 2.
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wealth, and hence the traditional means of validating status 
are no longer as meaningful as they once were. Now people 
look for new status symbols that are more significant in the 
modern social context.
Other socio-cultural changes also have accelerated 
the erosion of these associations. The termination of 
immigration from China since the end of the Second World War 
and the increase in the number of locally b o m  Chinese mean 
that contacts with home villages in China have been 
drastically reduced, and are likely to terminate with the 
passing of the China-born generation.1
There are indications that lineage organization are 
likely to play a much smaller role in society than 
previously. It would be premature, however, to conclude 
that lineage organizations will vanish in the process of 
rapid social change.2 In some Chinese societies, lineage 
organizations have modified their roles so as to meet 
changing social conditions. They have been asked by the 
state to widen their contribution to social, cultural and 
educational activities to include not only members of their
‘Cheng, Social Change. 190-3, 196. See also Jack M. 
Potter, Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant: Social and
Economic Change in a Hong Kong Village (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), 164-70.
:Morton H. Fried, "Some Political Aspects of 
Clanship in a M o d e m  Chinese City, " in Political 
Anthropology. ed. M. J. Swartz, V. M. Turner, and A. Tuden 
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966), 299.
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own clans but citizens at large.1 In addition, lineage 
organization can continue to provide warmth and a sense of 
belonging. Gallin maintains that kin and village-based 
relationships continue to be significant for the urban 
dwellers, even though in the city these relationships 
function only on an individual rather than a group level.
In fast-paced societies that are getting more impersonal, 
these relationships still contribute to the socio-economic 
and psychic security of the people.3
Kin and Non-kin Relations
When the lineage loses its influence, people seek 
new relationships elsewhere. Potter's research reveals that 
as the scope and intensity of traditional relations within 
the family slacken, relations with fellow workers, friends, 
and business associates become increasingly important--in 
many cases more important than relations with kinsmen and 
relatives.3 Sometimes kinship terms are extended to non-kin 
contexts. Unrelated persons known to the individual may be
!Cheng, Social Change. 191; and Jack M. Potter, 
Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant. 170.
:Bernard Gallin, "Rural to Urban Migration in 
Taiwan: Its Impact on Chinese Family and Kinship," in
Chinese Family Law and Social Change in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective, ed. David C. Buxbaum (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1978), 281.
3Potter, Capitalism. 172.
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addressed by such kinship terms1 as "uncle," "grandfather," 
and "brother," depending on their age and social status.
Thus a supervisor may be called "uncle" or a colleague's 
mother "aunt." Some young men call each other "brother."2
The use of kinship terms for non-kin relations 
indicates an extension of the kinship network to include 
non-kin relations, although the non-kin relations tend to be 
based on kinship models. While kin relations seem to be on 
the decline, non-kin relations appear to be strengthening, 
both in scope and intensity.
Group Solidarity Versus Individualism
As noted in chapter 3, one of the most deeply 
ingrained aspects of the Chinese worldview is the 
preeminence of the group over the individual. A person's 
feelings must be subordinated to the reguirements of the 
group. Chinese ethics demand discipline and achievement to 
guarantee the success not of the individual but of the 
group. The individual was first a member of the family or 
community, and the primary goal was the welfare of the
‘The Chinese kin terminology in its present form was 
established in the first century A. D. as part of the 
official Confucian canon. See T. S. Chen and J. K. Shryock, 
"Chinese Relationship Terms," American Anthropologist 34 
(October-December 1932): 623.
;A1though Potter's research was done in Hong Kong, 
subjective observations reveal the phenomenon is equally 
prevalent in Taiwan and Singapore. See also Robert Moore's 
dissertation, 177-79.
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group. Individual goals were considered upsetting to the 
harmony of the group.
Emphasis now appears to be moving away from the 
group to the state and the individual. People are told that 
the interest of the state must precede any other interests, 
personal or otherwise. If necessary, individual welfare 
must be sacrificed so that the collective interest of the 
state may prevail. This is reflected in the first of the 
five values recently debated by the Singapore parliament: 
"Nation before community and society before self."1 Some 
believe the centrality of the family has been deeply- 
ingrained for so long that sometimes it may be difficult for 
a Chinese to transfer his loyalty from a family to the 
state.-’ But with the dawning of the new national 
consciousness, even that may be changing.
Concomitant to the stress on loyalty to the state is 
the accent on the individual. Goode observes that the 
"ideology of the conjugal family" is the inevitable result 
of industrialization, and this ideology tends to breed 
individualism:
The ideology of the conjugal family proclaims the 
right of the individual to choose his or her own spouse, 
place to live, and even which kin obligations to accept, 
as against the acceptance of others' decisions. It
'"Words to Live by in Singapore," Asiaweek 17 (1 
February, 1991): 41.
:Teh-Yao Wu, The Cultural Heritage of Singapore: The 
Essence of the Chinese Tradition (Singapore: University of 
Singapore, Occasional Paper Series, 25, 1975), 17.
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asserts the worth of the individual as against the 
inherited elements of wealth or ethnic group. The 
individual is to be evaluated, not his lineage.1
Although group solidarity is still very much a part 
of the Chinese culture, it is imperceptibly giving way to a 
more individualistic orientation. Many research studies 
have been done on this. One of them has to do with a 
phenomenon which sociologists call social loafing. Research 
conducted in the United States indicates that people exert 
more effort when they perform individually than when they do 
so in a group, and this tendency is social loafing.: It is
hypothesized that members of cultures whose value and 
institution have been identified as group-oriented tend to 
place group benefit over individual benefit. Given the 
Chinese traditional de-emphasis of internal wishes and 
stress on collectivist achievement orientation, one would 
expect them to show little social loafing. Contrary to this 
expectation, the result of an experiment conducted in Taiwan 
reveals that Taiwanese students indulged in social loafing.'
'Goode, 19.
:Hofstede/s study of individualistic trait among 
employees of a multinational corporation in forty countries 
revealed that respondents from the United States were 
highest in individualism, followed closely by Australia and 
New Zealand. Nations whose workers exhibited lowest 
individualistic tendency included Venezuela, Colombia, 
Pakistan, and the Chinese in Taiwan. See G. Hofstede, 
Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-
Related Values (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980) .
‘William K. Gabrenya, Jr., Bibb Latane, and Yue-Eng 
Wang, "Social Loafing in Cross-Cultural Perspective:
Chinese in Taiwan," Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 14
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The conclusion of this study seems to fit in a general but 
cross-cultural trend of social loafing in Asia.1
Another survey appears to substantiate the new 
Chinese proclivity to individualism. In a survey conducted 
in 1986 comparing perceptions of family cohesiveness and 
autonomy among Australians and Singaporeans, Singapore 
adolescents were found to exhibit a higher level of family 
cohesiveness. At the same time, they also displayed a high 
perception of autonomy. The exercise of autonomy was 
perceived by them to be an inevitable part of the transition 
to adulthood.-’
The trend toward individualism has been noted by a 
number of sociologists including Jack Potter. Though Potter 
admits this shift in orientation is not always easy to 
explain, he offers his own assessment of the phenomenon:
One part of the explanation might be that the 
lineage groups, based as they are on traditional 
sentiments and values, have simply ceased to be 
meaningful in the new social, cultural, and economic 
conditions. Such sentiments and loyalties are 
considered to be old-fashioned and out-of-date, as well 
as unimportant. Another part of the explanation might 
be that the increased occupational specialization and 
individual social mobility required by the new economy
(September 1983): 368-84.
'Ibid., 379.
:Although Singapore adolescents showed high 
perception of autonomy, they saw themselves as making fewer 
decisions than their Australian counterparts. Millicent E. 
Poole, George H. Cooney, and Agnes C. S. Cheong, "Adolescent 
Perceptions of Family Cohesiveness, Autonomy and 
Independence in Australia and Singapore, Journal of 
Comparative Family Studies 17 (Autumn 1986): 311-32.
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and the new society are simply undermining the older 
system which rested upon a collectivist orientation and 
upon ascribed status and particularistic relationships.1
The growing individualism also may be attributed to 
meritocracy in our modern education system and the work 
place. The accent is on personal achievement. Education 
has inspired the individual with a new sense of confidence, 
confidence in his or her ability to conquer at all odds, and 
to improve his or her life through self-reliance and self­
effort .2
The rise of individualism has its bearing on the 
society. Ferdinand Tonnies suggests that individualism may 
contribute to the shift of society from Gemeinschaft to 
Gesellschaft.’ Back in 1887, Tonnies insightfully 
observed, human relations in the Gemeinschaft (community) 
are highly affective, involving the nonrational, emotional 
dimensions of experience in the intimate relationship of 
kinship groups, comradeship, and neighborliness. Relations 
in the Gesellschaft (society), on the other hand, are 
generally impersonal, affectively neutral, and rational. 
Tonnies underscored the distinction between the affective,
Totter, Capitalism. 168.
:Yung Wei, "Taiwan: A Modernizing Chinese Society,"
in Taiwan in Modern Times, ed. Paul K. T. Sih (New York:
St. John University Press, 1973), 487; Martin Yang, Socio- 
Economic Results of Land Reform in Taiwan. 521-33.
'Ferdinand Tonnies, Fundamental Concepts of 
Sociology (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft). trans. Charles P. 
Loomis (New’ York: American Book Co., 1940) , 42-116.
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emotion-based communal society in which everyone has a sense 
of belonging and the affectively neutral relationships of 
the modern society in which each one builds his or her 
relations with others on an "end-means" utilitarian basis. 
Tonnies' description of the modern society seems to bear 
some resemblance to the Chinese societies under study. 
Indications are that human relations are increasingly 
distant, indifferent, and isolated. A case in point is the 
Chinese attitude to time. Traditionally, Chinese viewed 
time as cyclical in a pastoral and agrarian setting. Time 
was communal fellowship. It was never in short supply. The 
modern overseas Chinese have a penchant for understanding 
time in terms of personal and business achievement. Once 
upon a time, time was shared as a communal commodity; now it 
becomes private property.
In spite of the new emphasis on the state and the 
individual, the Chinese group consciousness has by no means 
vanished in contemporary society. It is, in fact, well and 
alive, according to a number of empirical data. Perhaps the 
most revealing experiment on group conformist behavior was 
conducted by Wilson among children from Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
New York Chinatown, and New Jersey. Two pictures were shown 
to the children, one showing a group of people similarly 
dressed and the other showing the same group in diverse 
clothing. In response to the question which group they 
would like to be a member of, the children from Taiwan and
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Hong Kong responded overwhelmingly in favor of those who 
were similarly dressed (92.5 percent), whereas only 70 
percent of children from New York Chinatown and 41 percent 
of children from New Jersey preferred the group that dressed 
alike. As to why they selected the similarly dressed group, 
Chinese children tended to respond in the following manner: 
"Because their clothes are the clothes of the group," or "If 
clothes are orderly then people will have an orderly 
feeling." American children, when asked why they favored 
the group in varied clothing, tended to answer this way: "I
would have more freedom," "Because they show individuality 
and freedom," or "You don't have to be the same to join in a 
group. You should do what you feel like doing and not be 
the same. 1,1
Wilson also discovered that one of the factors 
favoring Chinese conformity to group norms is the common 
notion that opposition to the group and its leaders is 
undesirable and should be avoidable as much as possible.
The only valid criticism is the kind that will strengthen 
the group. For this reason, criticism of leaders is often 
muted. Besides, criticism of group leaders is tantamount to 
criticism of the group of which one is a member. Wilson 
derived his conclusion from interviewing children from the 
four groups mentioned earlier. In response to the question
'Richard W. Wilson, The Moral State: A Study of the
Political Socialization of Chinese and American Children 
(New York and London: Free Press, 1974), 193-95.
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whether one could go against the group, 17 percent of 
children from Taiwan, 33 percent from Hong Kong, 50 percent 
from New York Chinatown, and 72 percent from New Jersey 
answered in the negative.1 Wilson's work on group 
conformity seems consistent with Balazs' assessment that the 
Chinese focus less on the quality of individual human 
relationships and more on relations between people as 
integral parts of social groups.2
Thomas Gold, Head of the Center for Chinese Studies 
at the University of California— Berkeley, believes the 
contemporary Chinese still strongly believe in group social 
network. He says, "When you look at the Chinese, you don't 
look at the individual Chinese; you look at the network in 
which the Chinese live and work. The family structure may 
be changing, but the individual as part of the network is 
still very very strong."3 Gold's research in China shows 
that forty years of government effort to break apart the 
family and its network has not been successful. Group 
cohesiveness remains strong, as it does in Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Singapore.
In view of the above findings, it is erroneous to
‘Ibid., 196.
■Etienne Balazs, Chinese Civilization and 
Bureaucracy: Variation on a Theme, trans. H. M. Wright, ed.
A. F. Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 195.
'Thomas Gold, interview by author, 5 November, 1990, 
Berkeley, tape recording, University of California,
Berkeley.
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conclude that the group orientation has dissipated from the 
contemporary Chinese society. The individualistic 
orientation of present-day Chinese may be a radical 
departure from the traditional worldview, but it is a far 
cry from the extreme individualism evidenced in the West. 
Suffice it to say that although individualism is on the 
ascendancy, the Chinese group orientation has not been 
eradicated by any means. In fact, affinity for both group 
unity and individualism is at once present in the 
contemporary Chinese mind. This phenomenon is not to be 
considered unusual in view of the Chinese propensity for 
harmony.
Face-saving and Losing
The weakening of group orientation has a 
corresponding effect on the concept of "face." In a 
vestigial way face is still very much a part of Chinese 
society. Dicta such as "A man needs face like a tree needs 
its bark" enjoy widespread popularity. Unquestionably there 
is still an obsessive concern with not losing face even at 
the cost of persisting with errors. It has been observed 
that some government officials and civil servants loath to 
admit mistakes. An experimental study in Hong Kong in 1981 
among college students has shown that people in contemporary 
society are reluctant to criticize for fear it may cause
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another to lose face.1 Ho observed that causing another 
person to lose face is typically construed as an aggressive 
act by the person whose face has been discredited.2 Hence, 
people still prefer conflict-avoidance tactics rather than 
meeting problems head on. Further, protecting one another 
from losing face has become a mutual consideration. Bond 
and Lee call the phenomenon the "reciprocal conspiracy of 
face-saving."3 This form of mutuality is considered to be 
essential for social survival in today's highly competitive 
society.
The traditional practice of depreciating one's 
ability and accomplishment so as to avoid any situation that 
may be face-losing is still institutionalized in Chinese 
society. Many consider it unChinese to be "flashy" about 
one's credentials, and the accentuation of one's weaknesses 
in public is a perfectly "normal" Chinese behavior. Some 
call it false humility, but the Chinese regard it as a sure 
way of safeguarding one's cherished face. Thus it is not 
uncommon to hear one say modestly, "I know a little about
‘Michael H. Bond and Peter W. H. Lee, "Face Saving 
in Chinese Culture: A Discussion and Experimental Study of
Hong Kong Students," in Social Life and Development in Hong 
Kong, ed. Ambrose Y. C. King and Ranee P. L. Lee (Hong Kong: 
The Chinese University Press, 1981), 289-304.
:David Y. F. Ho. "Face, Social Expectations, and 
Conflict Avoidance," paper presented at the First 
International Conference of the International Association 
for Cross-Cultural Psychology, Hong Kong, 1972.
3Bond and Lee, 291.
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computers," while in actuality he may hold a doctorate 
degree in computer science. To the Chinese, this is not 
hypocrisy, but practical common sense.
It should be noted, however, that the traditional 
face-value appeared to be more group-oriented than is the 
case today. It was the upholding of the image, integrity, 
and good name of the family and clan, and involved a sense 
of community. The more recent type of face-value is more 
individually oriented. It is much more personal and relates 
more to personal ego than to communal pride.
Summing up, one can say that the data collected thus 
far about the three societies under study indicate a trend 
toward a weakening of the Chinese hierarchical relationship 
system. The traditional extended family structure seems to 
be on the wane and is being replaced by the smaller conjugal 
family. The status of women appears to be on the rise.
Women are given more say in family decisions, including
their choice of marriage partner. To a large extent, love
marriages have displaced arranged marriages. The lineage 
system is waning, having lost much of its authority and
influence in the Chinese community at large. Similarly, the
spirit of group solidarity is being eroded by demands for 
individual rights and orientation. However, the importance 
of saving face is by no means lessened. It is still very 
much an endearing concern of the Chinese.
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Antiquity
Historical Chinese society was oriented to the past 
and gave preferential status to past events. Ancestor 
worship and strong family and lineage structure were 
expressions of this preference. Perhaps for this reason 
ancient China has been known as a symbol of changelessness.
The Chinese esteem for antiquity is showing signs of 
disruption amidst the rapid socio-economic developments in 
East Asia. People have become more orientated to the 
present and future than the past.1 There has been a strong 
commitment to innovation and new technology. Change itself 
is valued and is not resisted but is actively sought. The 
populace is dedicated to change in many areas of life. The 
essence is on the new look, the new model, and the new 
trend.
Modern and Chinese Medicine
One of the casualties of the trend toward the new 
and improved is Chinese medicine. The profession of Chinese 
medicine was highly regarded in traditional China, but its 
prestige has been declining. M o d e m  medicine, on the other 
hand, enjoys immense popular support and respect. One of 
the studies comparing the efficacy of Chinese and m o d e m  
medicine is Kleinman's empirical findings in Taiwan.
‘Wei, "Taiwan," 487. See also Norman Diamond, Kun 
Shen: A Taiwanese Village (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1969), 108.
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Kleinman observes that part of the Chinese "health care 
ideology" includes the widely shared belief of the Chinese 
that Western medicine is quicker than Chinese medicine in 
treating ailments.1 Another study conducted by Ranee Lee on 
Kwun Tong in Hong Kong in 1981 seems to validate Kleinman's 
findings. Among other things, researchers discovered that, 
in terms of preference, the Chinese appear to be switching 
from Chinese to modern medicine.2 Most people (67 percent) 
perceived Western-trained doctors as more technically 
competent than the Chinese practitioners. A greater number 
of people expressed confidence in modern medicine (65 
percent) than in Chinese medicine (10 percent) for the 
treatment of illnesses.3 A marked difference also was noted 
in the extent to which m o d e m  and Chinese medicine were 
utilized. Among those respondents who sought treatment for 
sickness during the past three years, 83 percent reported 
they visited Western-trained doctors, while only 11 percent 
consulted Chinese physicians. Among those whose children 
used medical services during the past three years, 92
‘Arthur M. Kleinman, "Medical and Psychiatric 
Anthropology and the Study of Traditional Forms of Medicine 
in M o d e m  Chinese Culture, " Bulletin of the Institute of 
Ethnology Academia Sinica 39 (Spring 1975): 116.
2Rance P. L. Lee, "Chinese and Western Health Care 
Systems: Professional Stratification in a Modernizing
Society," in Social Life and Development in Hong Kong, ed. 
Ambrose Y. C. King and Ranee P. L. Lee (Hong Kong: The 
Chinese University Press, 1981), 255-73.
3Ibid., 265.
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percent reported their children were seen by doctors, only 5 
percent by Chinese physicians.1 In addition, Lee observes 
that the younger the generation, the more likely they would 
use m o d e m  medical services.
Why do contemporary Chinese opt for m o d e m  instead 
of traditional medicine? Lee suggests that the common 
Chinese perception that m o d e m  medicine is superior to 
Chinese medicine may be due to the proven efficacy of modern 
science in solving many problems. He further elaborates:
The "good result" of m o d e m  medicine may be an 
important source of its dominance over Chinese medicine 
in Hong Kong. That dominance may also result from 
m o d e m  medicine's association with science. It has been 
widely perceived by the local population that the 
knowledge and skills of m o d e m  medicine were developed 
through the use of scientific procedures, while Chinese 
medicine is unscientific and is, therefore, less 
reliable. Being supported and justified by the dominant 
value of science, the profession of m o d e m  medicine 
enjoys a higher degree of legitimacy than the profession 
of Chinese medicine in Hong Kong.2
It would be a mistake to conclude that Chinese 
medicine has met its doom and that its demise is a matter of 
time. The same study reports that despite the confidence 
the populace has in Western medicine, most people still 
believed in Chinese herbs (70 percent) rather than in m o d e m  
drugs (12 percent), because they thought that herbs were 
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sale of Chinese herbs and medicine has continued as a multi - 
million-dollar business each year. In Lee's study, the new 
orientation of the Chinese is evident. In addition, it also 
shows the famous Chinese pragmatism in action. It is a 
situation where the best from the East and the West are 
carefully examined, selected, and amalgamated. Nobody knows 
how long this blending of Eastern and Western medicine will 
last. But for the moment, modern medicine seems to be more 
favorably evaluated and extensively utilized.
Dilution of Ancestor Worship
Intimately connected with the practice of filial 
piety is the cult of ancestor worship. Undoubtedly ancestor 
worship is dependent on the practice of filial piety and is 
vitally important to the tradition of family solidarity and 
continuity.
In the contemporary Chinese society, context- 
specific studies on the extent to which ancestor worship is 
practiced are difficult to come by. But evidence indicates 
that the traditional function and purpose of the ancient 
cult has been challenged. Fewer Chinese these days consider 
ancestor worship to be obligatory because of changing values 
in marriage and family. A survey of 1,048 Taiwanese in 1977 
reported that 49 percent of respondents considered the 
purpose of marriage to be personal happiness; 28 percent the 
establishment of a family; and 18 percent the continuity of
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the family lineage.1 The high percentage of the 
respondents' aspiration for personal happiness appears to 
have made the tradition of maintaining an ancestor altar 
less desirable.
Although many Chinese in Singapore consider ancestor 
worship a principal part of Chinese culture, very few choose 
to identify themselves as ancestor worshippers. In a 1975 
survey, only 3.1 percent of the respondents perceived 
themselves as such.2 In a separate study in Hong Kong 
conducted in 1989, Smith used a quota sampling technique to 
interview 163 residents to ascertain the vitality of 
ancestor worship. 53.8 percent of the respondents mentioned 
the presence of an ancestral shrine in their homes.3 As to 
their personal involvement in ancestor-related rituals, 2 8.2 
percent claimed never to participate. An additional 34.4 
percent participated in rituals no more than three times a 
year, while 23.9 percent did so four to twelve times a 
year.* Socio-economical change also affected the degree of 
personal involvement in ancestral rites. Only 8.5 percent 
of the interviewees considered themselves more regular in
‘Hsieh, "Attitudes in Flux," 27.
2Joseph 3. Tamney and Riaz Hassan, Religious 
Switching in Singapore (Singapore: Select Books, 1987), 4-5.
3Henry N. Smith, "Ancestor Practices in Contemporary 
Hong Kong: Religious Ritual or Social Custom?" Asia 
Journal of Theology 3 (April 1989): 31-2.
4Ibid. , 33.
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the performance of ancestor practices at the time of 
questioning than they were five years earlier; while 26.3 
percent participated less regularity. A majority, 65 
percent, indicated no change in their level of 
participation.1
Although ancestor worship is still being practiced, 
its vitality appears to be waning, especially among the 
third- and fourth-generation immigrants. Some set it aside 
as anachronistic. Others participate out of deference to 
their elders, and they intend to do so only as long as there 
are older members of the family who insist upon it. Most 
indications point to continuous trends toward a change in 
family and lineage structures, toward a lesser degree of 
group orientation, toward a narrowing of loyalties down to 
the immediate family, and toward more egalitarian attitudes 
and practices. These indications are not likely to be 
conducive to reverential respect and responsibility to 
eiders which are basic to ancestor worship.
Current Perceptions of the Elderly
Historically, the Chinese have encouraged a positive 
attitude toward and responsibility for the care of the 
elderly in the family. Confucius explicitly outlined the 
duties of a son which included honor and veneration for the 
aged and provision for their needs and comfort.
’•Ibid., 35.
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China has long been recognized as a gerontological 
society. Chinese societies in East Asia, however, are 
relatively young. Chinese aged sixty-five and above 
numbered about 7 percent of Hong Kong's population in 19 861 
and 5.3 percent of Taiwan's population in 1987.3 The 
population of elderly in Singapore has increased from 3.8 
percent of the population in 1957 to 7.2 percent in 1380.3 
The projected figure for the year 2030 is about 600,000 or 
about 2 0 percent of the total population. The demographic 
shift toward an older population, however, does not pose as 
much of a problem as does changing attitudes toward the 
elderly. In a recent study comparing the attitudes toward 
aging in the United States and Taiwan, a sample of 200 
Taiwanese nursing students showed a more favorable 
perception of older people than the sample of students in 
the United States.4 But indications are that this favorable
‘Commissioner for Census and Statistics, Hong Kong 
19 86 By-Census. Main Report, vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
Government Printer, 1988) .
3Cecilia Chang, "Serving Those Who Served," Free 
China Review 39 (March 1989), 10.
3P. Arumainathan, Report on the Census of Population 
1970. Singapore. Vol. 1 (Singapore: Department of
Statistics, 1973), 52; and Chian-Kim Khoo, Census of 
Population 1980. Singapore. Release No. 1 (Singapore: 
Department of Statistics, 1981).
4Betty L. Chang, Alice F. Chang, and Yung Shen, 
"Attitudes toward Aging in the United States and Taiwan," 
Journal of Comparative Family Studies 15 (Spring 1984): 119.
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perception is languishing, a trend that some believe to be 
worrisome.
A study of the problem of aging in Hong Kong by Chow 
shows that the support of the elderly remains largely a 
family matter. About 8 0 percent of the older people are 
still living with their families, usually their married 
children.' Research from Taiwan reveals 73 percent of the 
elderly live with their children.2 Although generally well 
taken care of physically, the aged suffer a marked decline 
in status. Chow reckons that the most significant factor in 
this decline is the gradual loss by the elderly of a sense 
of importance in the family. He explains:
The traditional Chinese saying that "an elderly 
person is like unto a treasure at home" is no longer 
taken seriously and, as they are deprived of the role 
they have been playing for thousands of years, the 
elderlys are finding themselves to be unwanted by the 
family.3
Besides rejection from one's own family, Chow 
elaborates other factors leading to the eclipse of the once 
formidable prestige of the elderly:
For the elderly in Hong Kong, the veneration of the 
young is as important as financial security. 
Unfortunately, there is no little evidence to show that
'Nelson Chow, "Aging in Hong Kong," in Social Issues 
in Hong Koncr. ed. Benjamin K. F. Leung (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), 166.
:Mei-Jen Lin, "Shifting Attitudes," Free China 
Review 39 (March 1989), 14.
^Nelson Chow, "The Chinese Family and Support of the 
Elderly in Hong Kong," The Gerontologist 23 (December 1983) : 
586 .
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Che elderly are still held in high esteem. In the study 
mentioned above on the changing life-styles of the 
elderly in low income households in Hong Kong, it was 
found that despite the fact that the elderly usually 
considered themselves to have better personal qualities 
than the younger generations, they often had a very low 
image of themselves in terms of their contribution 
towards the society. They also expressed a strong 
feeling of isolation and loneliness.1
The change in the perception of the elderly leads to 
a change in attitude toward the way they should be treated. 
For example. Law's research in 1982 found fewer older folks 
were consulted on important family matters.2 Some old 
people resort to suicide. The plight of feeling neglected 
and emotionally abandoned by their families may be part of 
the problem.3 Another study reveals that the older folks 
have been found to be victims of abuse.4
The change in family structure and the shift in 
attitude toward the elderly prompts some contemporary 
Chinese to desire a greater governmental role in the care of 
the aged.3 In Hong Kong, Chow found that though 9 0 percent 
of the respondents in a survey agreed that it was the
‘Ibid., 167.
:Chi-Kwong Law, "Attitudes toward the Elderly," 
Resource Paper Series (Hong Kong: Department of Social Work, 
University of Hong Kong, 1982).
3Alex Kwan, A Study of the Suicidal Phenomenon of 
the Aged in Hong Kona (Hong Kong: Association for the Rights 
of the Elderly, 1987).
4Peter Chan, "Report of Elderly Abuse at Home in 
Hong Kong" (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Council of Social Service,
1986).
sLin, "Shifting Attitudes," 14-17.
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responsibility of the family to care for its elderly 
members, the same high percentage thought that the 
government also had an obligation to maintain the elderly at 
a reasonably good living condition.1 Singapore and Hong 
Kong governments have so far expressed reservation regarding 
the involvement of the state with the problem of the aged. 
Both governments express concern as well as caution. As 
early as 19t>5, the Hong Kong government stated unequivocally 
that in tackling the problem of the aged, the traditional 
values must be preserved:
It is of the greatest importance that social welfare 
services should not be organized in such a way as to 
make it easier for socially disruptive influences to 
gain a hold over the community, or to accelerate the 
breakdown of the natural or traditional sense of 
responsibility-- for example by encouraging the natural 
family unit to shed on to social welfare agencies, 
public or private, its moral responsibility to care for 
the aged or infirm.2
Most Chinese profess horror at the way Westerners 
put their aged parents into nursing homes rather than 
tending to them at home personally. To them it seems 
intolerably unfilial at best and downright inhuman at worst. 
In recent years, however, such astonishment has been 
replaced by an attitude of resignation. Many contemporary 
Chinese find themselves inadvertently following the
‘Nelson Chow, "The Chinese Family and Support of the 
Elderly in Hong Kong,” 586.
:Hong Kong Government, Aims and Policy for Social 
Welfare in Hong Kona (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government 
Printer, 1965), 5.
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footsteps of their Western counterparts. Some begin to 
place their parents in nursing homes, out of necessity, so 
they claim, for hectic work schedules prevent them from 
having much time for their children, let alone their 
parents.1 Moreover, when both husband and wife work, caring 
for aged parents is now felt to be too demanding and out of 
the question. Since m o d e m  jobs preclude round-the-clock 
care for parents, many find nursing homes an attractive 
alternative. But it is an alternative many opt for 
reluctantly with mixed feelings of sorrow, guilt, and 
relief.2
Besides the concern pertaining to the abandonment of 
the aged, the importance of funerals is also being scaled 
down. As mentioned in chapter 3, traditional Chinese 
funerals were weighty matters. They involved complex 
rituals and great expense. In contemporary societies like 
Singapore, however, clan organizations have suggested that 
funeral rites be simplified to reduce "unnecessary wastage." 
Clan leaders suggest that "it is more important to show love
'The demand of time on Chinese families has prompted 
the setting up of new but highly profitable "errand-running" 
companies in Taiwan. For a monthly fee of NT$2000 or US$56, 
the firm will run up to forty household errands per month, 
including sending children to school, paying utility bills, 
buying bus tickets, and shopping for groceries. "Marriage 
Tension," 18.
2Jennifer Lee, "Nursing Home Alternatives," Free 
China Review 39 (March 1989): 28.
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and respect for one's parents when they are alive."1
Despite the diminishing authority and prestige of 
the elderly, Gold reckons that there is still a general 
respect for the aged in contemporary Chinese society. Among 
possible explanations for this phenomenon, according to 
Gold, is the gerontocratic political system (as in Taiwan) 
in which elderly politicians are still in charge, even 
though the percentage of the population under twenty five is 
very high in East Asian societies.2
To sum up, it can be said that the modern, 
individual-centered way of life has reduced the traditional 
status and authority of the elderly. Many, in fact, are 
suffering from an eclipse in esteem, honor, and power.
Others have become disillusioned by the lack of familial and 
social support in their old age. Traditional attitudes of 
respect and filial piety appear to have been replaced by 
varying degrees of casualness. The practice of putting the 
aged parents into nursing homes seems to indicate a new and 
ominous trend.
The "Emancipation" of Youth
The power and influence of the aged has been 
replaced in part by the rising status of young people in
‘Chinese Customs and Festivals in Singapore 
(Singapore: Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan 
Associations, 1989), 137.
^old, interview.
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contemporary aociecy. Yesteryear elders were revered for 
their wisdom, today members of the younger generation are 
hailed as the forerunners of society. Assuming a new 
identity, young adults are often regarded as representing 
the intrinsic value of change and newness. They have often 
been singled out as brave souls blazing new worlds, a vital 
force in nation building. No longer playing the role of 
appendages, they are lauded, showered with attention, and 
placed in positions of responsibility and authority. The 
Chinese dictum "Those without mustache are unreliable in 
handling matters" is obviously a thing of the past.
The "emancipation" of the youth seems to have come a 
long way. The loosening of parental control, as discussed 
earlier, not only means greater freedom socially, but also 
connotes milder and less frequent disciplinary action.
Casual observers of contemporary society detect a certain 
degree of leniency in child rearing by Chinese parents who 
have been influenced by the more "modern" and permissive 
approach advocated by foreign media. Parents often comment 
that they treat their children much more laxly than they 
themselves were treated as children.
Liberated young people cherish the new perception 
they have of themselves. In a comparative study in Taiwan 
in 1986, the youth saw themselves as more influential in the
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family chan did respondents a decade ago.1 They also 
demonstrated less eagerness to defer to the elderly or the 
voice of experience. This is probably due in part to their 
educational achievements. Today's young people have gone 
considerably farther in their schooling than did most of 
their parents. Moreover, they are convinced that their new 
knowledge is superior to that of their elders.
The emancipation of young people is reflected in 
their preference of teaching methodology in school. In a 
comparative study of Taiwanese students between 1975 and 
1985, 83 percent (compared to 57 percent in 1975) preferred 
"soft-line" teachers, and 15 percent liked the "hard-liners" 
(compared to 3 9 percent in 1975) who had rigid attitudes 
toward the truth of what they taught. In 1975, 42 percent 
of the students preferred lectures to discussions. The 
preference was reversed ten years later with 7 percent 
favoring lectures.2 The trend seems to point in the 
direction of more freedom of expression both at home and in 
school.
A trend toward a substantive shift of traditional 
values among m o d e m  young people has been reported by a 
number of studies. A survey conducted among students at the 
National Taiwan Normal University indicated, among other
‘Gerald A. McBeath, "Youth Change in Taiwan, 19 75- 
1985," Asian Survey 26 (September 1986): 1028.
2Ibid. , 1029.
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things, that when they become too old to walk, they would 
rather rely on their own savings than on the support of 
their sons; that bringing forth new ideas was more important 
than maintaining the achievement of predecessors; that human 
will surpassed the will of Heaven; and that they were 
certain that what was modern was superior to what was 
traditional.1
Age-old values such as frugality are also changing. 
Chinese tradition taught the high value of thriftiness and 
of putting aside personal savings. But the age of 
consumerism has arrived in the contemporary Chinese society. 
Rapid economic growth has given rise to a greater amount of 
disposable income and a higher standard of living.
Increased affluence means increased consumption, usually 
spearheaded by the younger generation, as is indicated in 
this report from Taiwan:
According to July 1S88 research findings published 
in Management magazine and Breath Through magazine, the 
consumption power of local youth between 13 and 19 years 
of age accounts for over US$7.5 billion in annual sales. 
The marketing survey reported that the most popular 
priorities for pocket money spending include music 
cassettes, fast foods, clothing, stationary and cards, 
and admission to movies.2
Suffice it to say that the elevation of the status 
of young people represents a partial abandonment of a
'Betty Wang, "Sweeping Revisions of Values and 
Goals," Free China Review 39 (August 1989): 35.
:Irene Yeung, "Consumerism Comes of Age," Free China 
Review 39 (August 1989): 38.
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traditional worldview in which the role and power of the 
elderly were highly esteemed. The youth have emerged from 
their formerly passive role in family and society to become 
an active and treasured asset in nation-building. The 
emancipation of the youth has not been without its problems, 
however. Since young people accept and defend a way of life 
which is incompatible with tradition and parental authority, 
conflict between the new and old generations is as common as 
inevitable.1 Such conflict may have precipitated a growing 
trend in youth-related social problems in Chinese 
communities.2
The Resurgence of Tradition
It has been said that once everything changed except 
China. It is now said that there is nothing in China that 
does not change. Whether that statement is true is 
debatable. However, there is little doubt that in the
'For a study on the generation gap between 2,557 
high school students and their parents in Taiwan, see Kuo- 
Hsiung Tsao, "Generation Gap among Taipei High School 
Students," Acta Psychologica Taiwanica 23 (1981): 9-16.
2In Taiwan, the juvenile offender rate in 1978 was 
31.1 per 10,000 population. By 1987, the rate had increased 
to 67.4 per 10,000. In contrast, the adult offender rate 
rose from 41 per 10,000 population in 1978 to 52.6 per 
10,000 in 1987. See Chuen-Jim Sheu, "Minimizing the 
Misfits," Free China Review 39 (August 1989): 54. For 
problems related to the young people in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, see Bong-Ho Mok, Problem Behavior of Adolescents 
in Hong Kong: A Socio-cultural Perspective. Occasional
Papers No. 7 (Hong Kong: Institute of Social Studies, The
Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1985) , and H. B. M. Murphy, 
"Juvenile Delinquency in Singapore," The Journal of Social 
Psychology 61 (December 1963): 201-31.
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Chinese societies in East Asia radical transformation is 
taking place. An examination of social change in these 
communities during the last two or three decades shows that 
the traditional Chinese worldview is undergoing attrition. 
Naturally many are apprehensive about the implications of 
this process. On the one hand, there is general acceptance 
of progress and prosperity; on the other, there is an 
inevitable note of nostalgia regarding the passing of time- 
honored traditions, and anxiety regarding the prospect of a 
chillingly impersonal and ruthlessly calculating modern 
society.
It is perhaps for this reason that there is a 
revival of some of the old traditions in Chinese societies. 
The Taiwanese government has launched the Chung Kuo Wen Hwa 
Fu Hsing Yun Tung (Movement for the Renaissance of Chinese 
Civilization)--the purpose of which is to integrate 
Confucian virtues such as filial piety and harmony with 
science and technology.1 The organization publishes a 
monthly journal and sponsors research promoting 
Confucianism. In 1989, Taiwan's oldest Confucian temple
'Hsu, Americans and Chinese. 379. By and large, 
traditional Chinese customs flourish well in Taiwan. But in 
the past, attempts had been made by Japanese and Nationalist 
officials to limit or eliminate certain folk religious 
customs. See Robert P. Weller, "Beggars, Bandits, and 
Ghosts: The Failure of State Control over Religious 
Interpretation in Taiwan," American Ethnologist 12 (1985) : 
46-61; idem, "The Politics of Ritual Disguise: Repression
and Response in Taiwanese Popular Religion, " Modern China 13 
(1987) : 17-39 .
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built in 1665, was restored to its former grandeur at a cost 
of $5 million. The restored temple is a symbol of the 
movement for the preservation of the Chinese tradition.1 
Admittedly, the Cultural Renaissance movement is organized 
in part as an ideological defense against Communism in 
mainland China, but it is also regarded as a bulwark against 
the erosion of tradition by the process of secularization.2
In a recent study conducted by Roberta Martin, it is 
significant to note the stark contrast between the social 
and political norms propagated by the governments of China 
and Taiwan.3 Martin based her findings upon an analysis of 
two sets of elementary-school textbooks on such topics as 
personal attributes, social relationships, and attitudes 
toward manual labor, agriculture, and the like. The result 
of the study indicates important differences between the two 
political systems. In Taiwan, it is the aim to make the 
individual's focus the family unit. Filial piety, 
patriotism, academic achievement, an aesthetic appreciation 
of nature, and a sense of propriety in interpersonal 
relations are the desired attributes of the citizens in
‘Jeffrey H. Mindich, "Restored Grandeur," Free 
China Review 40 (November 1990) : 4-21.
:For a recent study of traditional beliefs in 
Taiwan, see P. Steven Sangren, History and Magical Power in 
a Chinese Community (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1987) .
3Roberta Martin, "The Socialization of Children in 
China and on Taiwan: An Analysis of Elementary School
Textbooks," The China Quarterly 62 (June 1975): 242.
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Taiwan.1 This conclusion appears to be consistent with the
efforts of the Taiwanese government to revitalize the 
traditional Confucian system of social behavior and personal 
mores.
In the Republic of Singapore, the government has had 
misgivings about the purveyance of Western lifestyles and 
values through the mass media. With rising affluence and an 
English education, the traditional Chinese worldview is 
being replaced by a more individualistic lifestyle for the 
youth. The danger of deculturization was warned against in 
a remark given by the then Singapore Prime Minister, Lee 
Kuan Yew, in his National Day Rally speech in 1978:
A person who gets deculturized--and I nearly was, so 
I know the danger--loses his self-confidence. He 
suffers from a sense of deprivation. For optimum 
performance a man must know himself and the world. He 
must know where he stands. I may speak the English 
language better than the Chinese language because I 
learnt English early in life. But I will never be an 
Englishman in a thousand generations and I have not got 
the Western value system inside; mine is an eastern 
value system. Nevertheless I use Western concepts, 
Western words because I understand them. But I also 
have a different system in my mind.2
More recently, in a dinner organized by 200
‘ibid., 260. In contrast to the Taiwanese 
government, the Chinese government is found to be promoting 
a break with the Confucian system, stressing a new socialist 
system of attitudes and behaviors. The primary focus of the 
individual is to be the larger community in which he works-- 
the team, the commune, the nation. Each citizen is to be 
actively involved in political programs in nation building, 
and party officials are to be model citizens.
2nA Rethink on Education System and Talent 
Deployment." The Mirror 14 (4 September, 1978): 1.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 3 0
Singapore Chinese clans and business associations, the new 
Prime Minister Mr. Goh Chok Tong reiterated that Singapore 
needed a value-system that would ensure its long-term 
survival as a nation.1 A set of five common values to help 
develop a Singapore identity and resist the spread of 
Western mores were later debated in Parliament.2
The measures taken by the Singapore government as 
part of the moral education program to remind its citizens 
of their roots include the teaching of the Chinese language 
as a second language, the "speak Mandarin" campaign, and 
teaching Confucianism in schools in the 1980s.3 The efforts 
seem to be paying of, for there is some evidence of a 
resurgence of interest in things Chinese, from the 
resurrection of Chinatown to visiting China, net only among
‘Singapore Bulletin 19 (January 1991): 3.
^he five values are: nation before community and
society before self; family as the basic unity of society; 
community support and respect for the individual; consensus, 
not conflict; and racial and religious harmony. See 
"Government Proposes Five Shared Values," Singapore Bulletin 
19 (February 1991) : 13-14. For a public reaction of the 
proposed values, see "Most People in General Support of Core 
Values," The Straits Times. 9 January, 1991, 2; "'Consensus' 
Emerges as the Most Controversial Value," The Straits Times. 
9 January, 1991, 19.
3Renowned Confucian scholars from outside Singapore 
were invited to lecture and conduct seminars in an effort to 
further stimulate interest in Confucian ethics. Some of 
their publications include Lian-Chang Tai, Confucian Studies 
and Singapore (Singapore: Institute of East Asian 
Philosophies, 1987); Wei-Ming Tu, The Wav. Learning, and 
Politics in Classical Confucian Human x  s m  \ o  x r i ^ c i ] p o 2 r &  *
Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1985), and Conference 
on Confucian Ethics (Singapore: Institute of East Asian 
Philosophies, 1987) .
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Che older generation but also among young Singaporeans.1
In Taiwan, fashion is no longer mere imitation from 
the West. The new "Chinese fashion" is gaining popularity. 
At first glance, the term "Chinese fashion" is a 
contradiction in terms, for "Chinese" represents 
changelessness, and "fashion" change. This is no longer the 
case, for Chinese folk styles and culture have been actively 
incorporated into contemporary designs from textile2 to 
dolls3 to layout of department stores.4 The aim is to 
achieve a uniquely Chinese favor which at the same time is 
comparable to the contemporary world fashion scene.
Research conducted at the National Taiwan University 
also lends credence to the trend toward a resurgence of 
tradition. In the 1960s, young people listening to Western 
music were regarded by their peers as modern and superior, 
while those who preferred Chinese songs were thought to be 
less intelligent. But in the 1970s, things began to change.
'Thomas T. W. Tan, Your Chinese Roots: The Overseas
Chinese Storv (Singapore: Times Books International, 1986), 
246.
Theresa Sung, "New Ideas for Chinese Fashion," 
Sinorama 15 (April 1990): 6-13.
3Chung-Fang Chang, "Debut of Uniquely Chinese 
Dolls," Sinorama 15 (April 1990): 20-5. Chinese children 
are encouraged to drop their blond, blue-eyed Barbie dolls 
in favor of "Mei-Lan,- complete with five changes of 
costumes: bridal dress, Ching dynasty court dress, two
dresses from the early Republican period, and a contemporary 
cheongsam.
■^Theresa Sung, "China Fever Hits the Departmental 
Stores," Sinorama 15 (April 1990): 14-9.
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Wang describes what, happened on campus:
Students began reading novels or essays about the 
land they grew up in, and professional performing 
groups, such as Taiwan's Cloud Gate Dance Ensemble and 
the Peking opera troupe led by Kuo Hsiao-Chuang, 
attracted floods of young admirers with their 
choreography that emphasized Chinese themes and 
tradition. Moreover, songs written and sung by students 
themselves became increasingly popular, leading to a 
genre called "campus singers" (hsiao yuan ko shou).1
Probably among the most encouraging signs of the 
revitalization of the Chinese culture in East Asia is the 
immense popularity of Chinese annual festivals and holidays. 
These festivals are calculated on the basis of the Chinese 
lunar calendar and are enthusiastically celebrated each 
year. Most, if not all, Chinese participate in these annual 
festivities no matter how sophisticated they think they have 
become. Many reckon that revelling during the Lunar New 
Year or ritualizing during the Hungry Ghost Festival is the 
very Chinese thing to do as Chinese. The continued 
celebration of the Chinese festivities and the preservation 
of folk arts are indicative of the survival power of Chinese 
culture.:
On the basis of the studies reviewed so far, several 
statements about the traditional Chinese proclivity for 
antiquity may be made. One is that deference to the elders
‘Betty Wang, "Sweeping Revisions," 35.
:Kun-Liang Chiu, "Traditions Trying to Survive,"
Free China Review 40 (April 1990): 4-11. See other articles 
in the same issue which is devoted to preservation of 
Chinese folk arts and customs.
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is on the wane. The power and status of the elderly of 
yesteryear appear to have been supplanted by increasing 
independence of young people who are better educated and 
lauded as emerging builders of a new society. Orientation 
to past events and wisdom i3 being replaced by orientation 
to the present and the future. Changelessness is no longer 
regarded as a virtue. Change is not only deemed to be 
desirable but is actively sought after. Yet amidst 
tumultuous changes in the traditional worldview, Chinese 
age-old customs and festivities are still popularly 
practiced and show no sign of falling into abeyance.
Particularity
One of the well-known characteristics of the Chinese 
people is their natural bent for concrete rather than 
abstract thinking. For the traditional Chinese, one need 
not to reason so much as to perceive. Validity depends less 
on the coherence of ideas than on what may be conceived of 
as the coherence of what is perceived.1 Noted Chinese 
scholar Lin Yutang explains it this way:
With the Chinese as with women, concrete imagery 
always takes the place of abstract terminology. The 
highly academic sentence: "There is no difference but
difference of degree between different degrees of 
difference and no difference, " cannot be exactly 
reproduced in Chinese, and a Chinese translator would 
probably substitute for it in the Mencian question:
"What is the difference between running away fifty steps
'Cornelius Osgood, The Chinese: A Study of a Hong
Kong Community (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 
1975), 1151.
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and running away a hundred steps [in battle]?" Such a 
substitute expression loses in definition and exactness, 
but gains in intelligibility. To say, "How could I 
perceive his inner mental processes?" is not so 
intelligible as "How could I know what is going on in 
his mind?" and this in turn is decidedly less effective 
than the Chinese "Am I a tapeworm in his belly?"1
Lin concludes that Chinese thought always remains on 
the periphery of the visible world. He thinks this helps 
one to have a sense of fact which is the foundation of 
experience and wisdom.
As alluded to in chapter 3, research in Chinese 
linguistics suggests that the reality-centered Chinese 
language predisposes the Chinese to reality-centered 
thinking. The hieroglyphic form of Chinese writing 
"concretizes" reality in visibly perceivable written form. 
The various grammatical ambiguities of the Chinese language 
also makes it an awkward medium for the expression of 
abstract thought.
The Chinese penchant for concrete thinking remains 
largely unchanged in contemporary Chinese society. Bloom, 
for instance, has done extensive research in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan on the Chinese response to counterfactual statements. 
In English, a counterfactual statement is in essence a 
hypothetical statement in which the reader is invited to 
temporarily switch from the realm of reality to "a state of 
affairs known to be false, not for the purpose of simply 
pretending, but for the express purpose of drawing
'Yu-tang Lin, 83.
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implications as to what might be or might have been the case 
if that state of affairs were in fact true."1 "If he had 
come, I would have gone with him" is a simple example. In 
an experiment conducted in Hong Kong in 1972-1973, Bloom 
asked the subjects questions of the form, "If the Hong Kong 
government were to pass a law requiring that all citizens 
make a weekly report of their activities to the police, how 
would you react?" The subjects responded, "They won't," 
"They didn't," or "The Government hasn't." Bloom tried to 
explain, "I know the government hasn't and won't, but let us 
imagine that it does or did...." But the explanation only 
frustrated the subjects into explaining statements such as, 
"We don't speak/think that way," "It's unnatural," "It's 
unChinese." Some even suggested statements such as these 
were prime examples of Western thinking.2
To illustrate the Chinese aversion to counterfactual 
thinking, Bloom relates the experience of a friend in court:
A good friend of mine who was teaching Chinese in 
the Albany area was called to a New York State court to 
serve as a translator for a Taiwanese citizen who had 
overstayed his visa, but who had made plans to leave the 
country the next day. The judge asked my friend to 
translate the sentence, "If you weren't leaving 
tomorrow, you would be deportable." After struggling 
for a few minutes to formulate an adequate translation, 
she attempted to make sense out of the sentence in 
Chinese in a form roughly equivalent to "I know you are
'Bloom, 14.
2Ibid., 14. This is only one of the experiments 
conducted by Bloom. For details of these fascinating 
studies, see the rest of the chapter "The Distinctive 
Cognitive Legacies of English and Chinese," 13-60.
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leaving tomorrow, but if you do not leave, you will be 
deported. " The Taiwanese replied in Chinese, "But what 
do you mean? I'm leaving tomorrow. Don't worry, I'm 
leaving." My friend persisted in her attempts to convey 
the counterfactual/theoretical intent of the judge's 
statement, but the Taiwanese continued to interpret the 
statement, no matter what form the translation took, as 
a threat, roughly equivalent to "If you don't go, you 
will be deported" and so, continued to declare 
defensively that he was indeed leaving. Then the judge 
asked, "If you have to be deported, where would you wish 
to be deported to?", making a further cognitive leap 
into the realm of the pure hypothetical. Again several 
attempts at translation, this time with even less 
success. Perceiving that the Taiwanese was totally 
unable to comprehend what was going on and that he was, 
as a consequence, becoming more and more frustrated, my 
friend counseled him to respond "Taiwan." He did. The 
proceedings terminated and were recorded in the court 
record. The Taiwanese left the country the next day 
apparently never understanding that it was not that the 
judge questioned the sincerity of his intent to leave 
and was therefore threatening him, but rather that the 
judge wanted him to understand the implications of what 
would happen if he did not act as he had already planned 
to.1,1
The reluctance among the Chinese to make a cognitive 
shift into the realm of the theoretically possible 
counterfactual seems to indicate the Chinese propensity to 
concrete thinking is very much alive today. In fact a 
content analysis of a leading Chinese newspaper in Taiwan 
over a period of three weeks uncovered only one use of 
counterfactual argument, and that turned out to be in a 
translation of a speech by Henry Kissinger.2
Some Chinese bilinguals are comfortable using 
counterfactual statements, but would prefer to use them in a
‘Ibid., 18.
2Ibid.
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descriptive form in order to express the same idea naturally 
in Chinese. Take, for instance, the statement "If the 
lecture had ended earlier, Bill would have had a chance to 
prepare for the exam" may be more concretely converted into 
factual alternatives such as "The lecture ended too late, so 
Bill did not have a chance to prepare for the exam."1
By and large counterfactual thinking is alien to 
most Chinese, especially the Chinese-educated. But those 
who are English-educated generally have no problem 
understanding counterfactual statements.
Linguistic Deviation
Several recent developments in Chinese 
linguistics suggest that significant attempts have been made 
to transform the Chinese language. Most of the efforts 
originate from the Peoples Republic of China. Since the 
1950s, China has been promoting simplified Chinese 
characters to replace the often cumbersome old characters.2 
The new trend appears to have caught on. Even Singapore has 
been adopting simplified Chinese for the past twenty years, 
mainly because it is easier to learn and use. As to whether
■ibid., 16.
2See Peter J. Seybolt and Gregory K. K. Chiang, eds. 
Language Reform in China: Documents and Commentary (White 
Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1979; and Wen-Djang Chu, "Chinese 
Language," in A Symposium on Chinese Culture, ed. Chi-Pao 
Cheng (New York: China Institute in America and American 
Association of Teachers and Chinese Language and Culture, 
1964), 21-7.
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the simplified Chinese has any bearing on Chinese pattern of 
thinking has not yet been determined.
Another major development is the introduction of the 
pinyin romanization system. The eventual goal is to replace 
written characters with alphabets. Romanization facilitates 
the encoding of computers, of which the Chinese now have 
more than 300,000 words. Despite the alleged benefits of 
espousing the pinyin system, it is difficult to imagine the 
total abandonment of traditional Chinese characters without 
the sacrifice of a significant measure of Chinese culture.
Many believe the written characters will continue to 
provide a strong sense of cultural unity and continuity with 
the past. But even the Chinese language in its spoken and 
written forms has shown signs of change in response to the 
pressure of Western influence. The Chinese did not 
traditionally permit suffixes to be attached to the verbal 
form and turn it into a noun as is done in English (e.g., 
confirm and confirmation). In Chinese, the verb and noun 
forms are separate lexical entities. They do not 
necessarily resemble one another in sound or form. But the 
anglicized Chinese that one sometimes sees today is anything 
but Chinese. Chao points out that in spoken Chinese, more 
and more speakers are using noun forms constructed out of 
verbal forms by the affixation of suffixes.1 Thus "capital"
'Yuen-Ren Chao, A Grammar of Spoken Chinese 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 225-8.
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and "communist" are converted into "capitalism" and 
"communism", and "modem" and "normal" into "modernize" and 
"normalize."
Another transmutation of the Chinese language has to 
do with the "de" construction to express equivalents of 
English possessive and English descriptive subordinate 
clauses.1 For example, the English phrase "John's book" is 
translated as "John 'de' book." In a compound sentence, the 
multiple use of the "de" construction only tends to confound 
the listeners. Bloom lists a few of the strange 
constructions seen in Hong Kong and Taiwan today. "That 
matter 'de1 important" is actually equivalent to "The 
importance of the matter." "That measure 'd e ' 
effectiveness" is equivalent to "The effectiveness of the 
measure." "His 'd e ' sincere" is equivalent to "His 
sincerity," etc. Commenting on this m o d e m  usage of the 
Chinese language, Bloom says:
These constructions, although in use, are still 
considered by many Chinese as corruptive influences that 
should be eliminated from the language altogether; by a 
majority of the subjects interviewed as aesthetically 
less attractive alternatives to the traditional non- 
entified forms; and by just about everyone, whether they 
oppose them, favor them, or remain indifferent to them, 
as prime examples of what is called in Chinese 
"Westernized Chinese speech."2
Bloom warns that Chinese linguistic change may mean 
change in the Chinese worldview. He believes that as the
‘Bloom, 42.
:Ibid. , 43.
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Western counterfactual thought and language continue to 
influence the Chinese world, "there may be observed a 
process of value change in China leading for better or worse 
toward the theoretical system approach so characteristic of 
the West."1 If Bloom's assessment is right, the departure 
of the contemporary Chinese from the traditional reality- 
centered thinking to a more theoretical mode of 
conceptualization would have far-reaching implications. The 
m o d e m  Chinese bent to a theoretical pattern of thinking may 
have something to do with the contemporary interest in 
science and technology in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. 
It may also have some bearing on the large scale on-going 
research and development projects sponsored by the various 
governments and their agencies.2
‘Alfred H. Bloom, "The Role of the Chinese Language 
in Counterfactual/Theoretical Thinking and Evaluation," in 
Value Change in Chinese Society, ed. Richard W. Wilson, Amy 
A. Wilson, and Sidney L. Greenblatt (New York: Praeger,
1979), 63.
2In Taiwan, for instance, technicians accounted only 
2.4 percent of the total working force in 1951. By 1986, 
the percentage reached 6.3 percent, more than double in 
thirty years. San Gee, "Occupations Redefined," Free China 
Review 38 (June 1988): 6. In 1979 the Institute for 
Information Industry was established with a staff of only 
twenty. By 1987, the number had grown to 511, 78 percent of 
whom were computer professionals. Li-Ling Tseng, "The 
Abacus Yields to the Computer," Free China Review 38 (April
1988): 6. Taiwan's technological transformation is also 
evident from the creation of Hsinchu Science-Based 
Industrial Park, its own equivalent of Silicon Valley in San 
Jose. Jhitang Chen, "Lessons for Hsinchu from Silicon 
Valley," Free China Review 38 (April 1988): 18-23.
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Harmony
Traditionally, the Chinese are well known for their 
inclusive approach to life. They view human experience as a 
continum and are not inclined to choose between extremes, 
for taking an extreme position distorts reality. A 
harmonizing and reconciling tendency is part of the 
traditional Chinese worldview that has made the Chinese 
Chinese.
Literature on empirical studies in this area is 
extremely limited. This is probably an indication that the 
Chinese propensity toward harmony has remained rather stable 
over the years and not many mutations have been detected. A 
review of literature shows only slight indication of change.
It is perhaps not surprising that in contemporary 
Chinese society, the resilient aspect of the Chinese esteem 
for harmony is still thriving. The Chinese continue to 
vouch for the validity of equilibrium on three levels: 
natural, personal, and communal.
Harmony with nature includes recognizing the cosmic 
forces in time and space. When one is b o m ,  the eight 
characters of one's horoscope are believed to be related to 
the zodiac. One may be fated to be down and out because one 
is b o m  at the wrong time, but through clever manipulation 
of the cosmic forces such as choosing auspicious dates for 
important events in life, one can reverse one's fortune.
Even the positioning of one's desk, the direction of the
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door, and the location of the ancestor's grave must be 
coordinated with the principles of yin and yang and the five 
elements of metal, wood, water, fire, and earth. An 
architect or interior designer who is not well versed in 
feng-shui (geomancy) will be out of a job even if he or she 
has an advanced degree from Europe and America.
The second level of harmony is believed to be 
harmony with oneself. A person must have few desires. 
Outbursts of anger should be avoided. One must by all means 
practice the Doctrine of the Golden Mean as advocated by 
Confucius. In addition, the two forces of yin and yang 
should be kept in balance through proper diet.
The contemporary Chinese also believes in communal 
harmony. Ancestor worship is a means to achieve harmony 
with the deceased in the family. It is widely believed that 
sickness and misfortune are often results of negligence or 
failure to perform ancestral rites. In addition, communal 
harmony means getting along amicably with one's neighbors. 
When the corner of one's house runs up against the 
neighbor's house, one should hang up a hexagonal mirror to 
ward off the inauspicious effect. In the event of a death 
in the family, one must paste strips of red paper on the 
neighbor's doors to drive away evil spirits and bad luck. 
Extended further, communal harmony also means harmonious 
relations between people and the supernatural. The gods and 
ghosts must be appeased and respected, although many can be
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manipulated and negotiated with a view to keeping them from 
activities inimical to their own best interests.
A New Awakening
Traditionally, most Chinese are known to be 
apathetic to politics, and most choose to stay out of it as 
much as possible. Recent development, however, points to an 
awakening of political consciousness in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan.
The mass rallies in Hong Kong after the Tiananmen 
Square incident in June 1989 surprised political observers. 
Some think the demonstrations were organized against the 
backdrop of concern over the prospect of democracy in Hong 
Kong in the post-199 7 era. Nevertheless, the scale of the 
protest marches was unprecedented in the recent history of 
Hong Kong. In fact, the incident dramatically transformed 
Hong Kong's political landscape, producing a rare sense of 
communal spirit and purpose. It served as a catalyst that 
resulted in Hong Kong finding its "political soul."1 
Commenting on the rallies, one organizer said, "People have 
shown that they are politically conscious and motivated."2
A similar trend in political awakening has also been 
noted in Taiwan. For one thing, the number of public 
protests and demonstrations is on the rise. A study at the
'"Waking up to the Future," Asiaweek 15 (23 June,
1989): 32.
:Ibid.
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National Chungchi University shows a total of 1462 cases of 
public protest between July 1986 and June 1987.1 Tsai 
remarks that one of the most significant social developments 
in Taiwan in recent years, particularly during the past 
three years, has been the emergence of numerous large scale 
collective movements characterized by public protests, 
demonstrations, mass petition, and violent confrontation 
with the authorities.2 Many factors account for this trend. 
An important one has to do with the increasing 
differentiation of Taiwanese society. Rapid economic 
development has transformed Taiwan from a homogeneous to a 
heterogenous society in which various social units compete 
for control and power. The formerly integrated institutions 
such as the family and lineage are no longer able to forge 
unity and exercise social control. The traditional modes of 
conflict resolution through the elders are no longer 
feasible. People prefer to take their grievances to the 
streets.
The Concepts of Food
The ubiquitous presence of food in Chinese society 
attests its importance to the Chinese. The most common form 
of greeting is "Have you eaten?" instead of "Good morning"
‘Wen-Hui Tsai, "Protest Movements in Taiwan in the 
1980s," The American Asian Review 8 (Winter 1990): 117.
:Ibid.
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or "How are you?" Besides food, almost everything else is 
considered inconsequential.
The traditional concept of food is still very much 
alive today. Chinese cosmology based on the theory of yin 
and yang extends to food and medicine as well. Certain 
foods are categorized as yin which are "cold" and others as 
yang which are "hot." Examples of "cold" foods include 
squash, lotus roots, sugar cane, and mung beans, whereas the 
"hot" foods consist of mutton, beef, chicken, and the like.1 
Being cold or hot has nothing to be with the temperature or 
the spiciness of the food. Rather it is a metaphorical 
association with the yin-yang cosmology in relation to human 
organisms. For the body to be healthy, it is believed there 
must be a balance between the intake of "cold" and "hot" 
food. When this harmony is disrupted, sickness is bound to 
occur. According to a study done by David Wu, this common 
perception of food is popularly held in Singapore. It is 
found that almost everyone knows something about the 
classification of Chinese food and its relationship to 
health.2 Even English-educated Chinese university students 
who themselves are the products of rapid social change have 
not completely abandoned their traditional concepts of hot-
'David Y. H. Wu, Traditional Chinese Concepts of 
Food and Medicine in Singapore (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1979), 6.
:Ibid. , 5 .
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cold harmony in foods.1 Informal interviews with students 
from Taiwan and Hong Kong reveal the same prevailing 
knowledge, a fact which goes to show the persisting power of 
traditional beliefs.
In the same study, Wu refers to the "pluralistic 
medical situation" in Singapore which illustrates the famed 
Chinese reconciling ability. He says, "Traditional medical 
practitioners and spirit mediums intermingle with physicians 
trained in modern Western medicine, while traditional stalls 
of Chinese medicine stand side by side with Western-style 
drug stores."-’ One of the oldest hospitals in Singapore, 
Kwang Wai Siu, has both modern physicians and Chinese 
medical practitioners available for consultation under one 
roof.
Religious Tolerance and Eclecticism
The Chinese proclivity to pluralism in medicine may 
also be seen in their approach to religion. The Chinese 
believe a religion should never be rejected because each 
religious system represents partial truth. No religion can 
claim a monopoly over other religions. As such, the Chinese 
see different religions as complementing one another. 
Religion, therefore, must be respected and tolerated. This 
toleration is evident in the way Chinese parents select
'ibid . , 3 .
:Ibid. , 1.
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schools for their children. Chinese of all religions are 
found among parents of students at Christian as well as non- 
Christian schools. Although it is recognized that their 
children may be converted to Christianity, the parents seem 
to have no qualms about sending their children there.
A corollary of religious tolerance is syncretism. 
Being "open-minded," the Chinese adopt beliefs and 
practices from several religions at the same time, most 
commonly Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and folk religion. 
Since Confucius is highly esteemed in Chinese communities, 
his statue can be found not only in Confucius temples, but 
in such syncretistic folk /Buddhist temples as the Cheng 
Hoon Teng Temple in Malacca and the Lung Shan Temple in 
Taipei. There, Confucius is worshipped as Bodhisattva and 
the protector of ancestor worship.' The same phenomenon can 
be witnessed in most places in Chinese society. In cases of 
illness, prayers are offered to the various bodhisattvas as 
well as to deities of the local folk religion. During 
funerals, it is not uncommon to see both Taoist and Buddhist 
monks performing rites for the deceased and, occasionally, a 
Christian pastor may be asked to pray for the dead man's 
soul— just in case!2
Summing up, one can say that the Chinese tendency
'Steninger, 493.
:John Blofeld, Beyond the Gods: Taoist and Buddhist
Mysticism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974), 33.
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toward harmony seems to have withstood social change. This 
does not mean, however, that the contemporary Chinese are as 
reconciling and inclusive as was traditionally the case.
The traditional concepts of foods remain mostly unchanged. 
Despite the high level of technology and education and the 
official secular policy of the governments, the Chinese 
religion still perpetuates traditional forms of tolerance 
and syncretism.
Practicality
If the Chinese esteem for harmony has survived 
socio-economic changes largely intact, the propensity to 
practicality appears to be faring even better yet. In fact, 
it may be the most tenacious of all aspects of the Chinese 
worldview. As ever, contemporary Chinese are supremely 
realists with a vivid sense of the here and now. Their 
humanistic devotion to the present precludes anything 
metaphysical. There is little thought regarding the 
hereafter. In fact, it seems incongruous that one should 
forsake the visible world for the invisible heaven. The 
ultimate concerns of the this-worldly Chinese are success, 
wealth, and longevity. To achieve these, one must first 
know how to elude evil forces, and second, know what one 
might do to secure supernatural succor.1
'Vivienne Wee, "Religion and Ritual among the 
Chinese in Singapore: An Ethnographic Study," M.A. thesis.
University of Singapore, 1977; Howard D. Smith, Chinese 
Religions (New York: Hclt, Binehart & Winston, 1971), 171-
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Eluding Evil Forces
From the dawn of history, China has been a land 
alive with spirits. The contemporary situation in overseas 
Chinese communities is no exception. Even today it is 
customary for the Chinese to offer little sacrifices to the 
gods and wear amulets for protection. They also consult 
shamans, healers, priests, and diviners to placate 
troublesome spirits and win them over. Consequently the 
belief in and fear of demons and the search for methods to 
prevent them from doing harm are significant factors in the 
Chinese worldview. Naturally, this adds to the importance 
of filial piety and ancestor worship, for practicing these 
virtues prevents the deceased ancestors from turning into 
malicious demons. A corollary of this is that any person, 
object, or ceremony that can protect people from demons is 
considered to be very important. Hence, the shamans and 
mediums enjoy high social esteem and are very much sought 
after.1 Most shamans operate from folk temples. The rising 
level of education and the economy has not seriously 
undermined the popularity of folk religion.: In Taiwan,
1 6 .
'Ruth-Inge Heinze, Trance and Healing in Southeast 
Asia Today (Bangkok: White Lotus Co., 1988), 60. See also 
Mitsuo Suzuki, "The Shamanistic Elements," in The Realm of 
the Extra-Human: Agents and Audiences, ed. Agehananda
Bharati (The Hague: Mouton, 1986), 253-60.
:Kuang-Hong Yu, "Development of Taiwanese Folk 
Religion: Analysis of Government Compiled Data," Bulletin
of the Institute of Ethnology Academia Sinica 53 (Spring
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there has been a great revival of folk religion. In 1983, 
there were 12,000 folk temples. According to Yih-Yuan Li's 
report, there is one temple per 1,800 people in Taiwan, 
which means that there are proportionately more temples than 
there are in Thailand where there is one temple per 2,370 
people. It is estimated that about 85 percent of the 
population of Taiwan are adherents of folk religion.1
Like their traditional counterparts in China, the 
modern Chinese will do anything to avoid anything thought to 
be malevolent. Homes are protected with charms inside and 
out. The use of a mirror above the front entrance is a 
freguent practice for it is believed that demons are ugly, 
and when they see themselves in the mirror they are 
frightened at their own image and scurry in retreat. The 
Hungry Ghosts Festival on the fifteen day of the seventh 
month is a principal occasion to appease malevolent spirits. 
On that day the gates of hell are said to open releasing 
famished evil spirits chat have been neglected by their 
living relatives. As these straying spirits are believed to 
be abominably malignant and mischievous, they must be 
painstakingly appeased. Hence, the community feeds them. 
Families offer food and burn ghost money for their use in
1982) : 67-103 .
'Yih-Yuan Li, "Shamanism in Taiwan: An
Anthropological Inquiry,” in Culture-Bound Syndrome. 
Ethnopsvchiatrv. and Alternate Therapies, ed. William P. 
Lebra (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976), 179-88.
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the nether world. Other paraphernalia such as incense 
sticks and incense papers are also set ablaze. The Hungry 
Ghosts Festival underscores the persistence of the 
traditional view of Chinese society as being under constant 
threat from the dead, even the dead from one's own family.
It also highlights the Chinese esteem for practicality. In 
an interview with Bill Moyers, renowned sociologist Peter 
Berger, relates an experience he had in Singapore during a 
Hungry Ghosts Festival.
I was at dinner with some friends. When I went back 
to my hotel, there was a little tent next to the hotel. 
The employees' association of the hotel had a shrine for 
the hungry ghosts— that in itself was not surprising. 
Inside was a Chinese man selling paper money, which you 
burn and which then is transferred to the other world 
for the use of the hungry ghosts. But back of where he 
sat he had a big piece of paper on which were entered 
the exact amounts that each person had given for the 
hungry ghosts. It was a bookkeeping arrangement. That 
is East Asian folk religion— a pragmatic, indeed 
capitalistic, attitude in dealing with the next world. 
The ghosts can actually go and look at the balance 
statement. There's hard-headed practicality in dealing 
even with ghosts.1
Beside appeasing the ghosts, there is the selection 
of propitious days for important events such as weddings, 
the beginning of a journey, the opening of a new store, and 
the signing of business contracts. Even in today's love 
marriages, many weddings have been postponed because the 
dates chosen are considered unlucky. In setting up a home, 
the kitchen stove is to be set in the northwest to act as a 
barrier to evil influences, since west and northwest are
'Bill Moyers, 485.
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considered unlucky.1 Before a building is erected, feng- 
shui experts must be on the scene to determine the most 
auspicious direction it should face so as not to obstruct 
the flow of cosmic power that will bring fame and 
prosperity.
It should not be assumed that feng-shui is confined 
only to rural areas. Urbanization does not seem to pose any 
problem for the contemporary Chinese who believe in the 
phenomenon. City-dwellers may not have choice in the 
location and orientation of their apartments, but many still 
arrange their furniture on feng-shui principles, with a sofa 
facing south along a north wall, or a cabinet set to block 
potentially hostile lines of force from across the street.2 
The two buildings said to have the best feng-shui in Hong 
Kong are the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Headquarters in 
Queens Road Central and the Peninsula Hotel in Kowloon. The 
best known geomancer, Mr. Choi Park-Lai explains, "If you 
look at the bank building, you can see it shaped rather like 
a Chinese laughing Buddha. It is guarded on each shoulder 
by another taller building. Also if you look over to the 
Star Ferry, you can see the movement of the water as if it 
is flowing toward the bank, then away up toward North Point.
'Derek Walters, Feng Shui: Perfect Placing for Your
Happiness and Prosperity (Singapore: Asiapac, 1988), 13.
2Daniel Overmyer, Religions of China (New York:
Harper & Row, 1986), 61.
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This is the flow of money into the bank."1 Mr. Choi recalls 
a job in which he was called to assist. It was at the 
District Office where people were getting sick all the time. 
He went in and moved all the furniture around. No more 
sickness was reported after that.3 Mr. Choi publishes Hong 
Kong's number one best-seller, the Chinese Almanac which 
sells over one million copies each year.3
Securing Supernatural Succor
As was the case in ancient China, fortune-telling 
thrives in contemporary Chinese societies. Irrespective of 
age, gender, or social station, many seek to peer into the 
future through the ancient craft of divination. In a study 
of religious trends in Taiwan, the Academia Sinica's 
Institute of Ethnology found that over half of all Taiwanese 
adults, including the highly educated, have had their 
fortunes cast.4
Conventional Chinese wisdom says that there is a 
natural force which can be utilized for one's ends through 
religious practices. If one does the right thing, a 
felicitous outcome can be expected. It is also believed
'Frena Bloomfield, The Occult World of Hong Kong 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong Publishing Co., 1980), 109.
:Ibid. , 112.
3Ibid., 100.
4Sunny Hsiao, "Contemporary Views on Chinese Fortune 
Telling," Sinorama 15 (December 1990): 122.
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that one's fate is predetermined,1 but one's luck can be 
influenced by the gods. Many hold that only a few could 
achieve success in a competitive world and those who are 
successful make it not only because they are capable and 
diligent, but more importantly, because they are lucky.
Luck, therefore, is a highly prized commodity which temple 
gods and ancestral spirits can appropriate.
The most popular form of securing supernatural 
assistance from the temple gods is by the use of fortune 
sticks. The deities are worshipped mainly to obtain their 
help to make one successful. In general, people usually go 
to the temples whose gods have the reputation of bringing 
luck and fortune. But when their prayers are not answered 
they move on to another god or another temple.:
Apart from the use of fortune sticks in the temples, 
Many choose to have their fortune told by professional 
fortune tellers.3 In contemporary Chinese society, there is 
hardly any city, town, or village without its diviners or 
fortune tellers. Having one's fate told is almost a way of
‘Mr. Ta-Yu Kao, one of Taiwan's most famous 
physiognomists says, "Seventy percent of what happens in 
life comes from fate, but 30 percent is self-imposed."
Kao's thinking appears representative of the contemporary 
Chinese. Mei-Chen Lu, "Hands-On Consultant," Free China 
Review 38 (June 1988): 22.
2Baker, "Hong Kong Man," 478.
3For a description of the Chinese art of divination, 
see Sunny Hsiao and Laura Li, "The ABC of Chinese 
Divination," Sinorama 15 (December 1990): 130-35.
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life. The most common form of fortune telling is a system 
of Eight Character Readings which involve the date of birth, 
principles of yin and yang, and the Five Elements. 
Consultation of the Eight Character Readings are still 
considered advisable before the commencement of any new 
undertaking. It is a must when marriage is considered to 
ensure harmonious liaisons.
There are diverse varieties of fortune tellers.
Some use fortune sticks, others use what are thought to be 
divinely inspired parakeets. Still others prefer tortoise 
shells for divination. Marjorie Buckle, one of the best- 
known fortune tellers in Hong Kong, uses a pack of cards to 
unfold the future.1 Another famous astrologer uses the 
abacus to make predictions and he is so much in demand that 
his waiting list extends for a year.2 Interest in various 
types of astrology has been considerable. Bookstores in 
Singapore regularly stockpile large quantities of paperbacks 
on the occult.3 Newspapers run regular columns on 
horoscopes. Face and palm reading are also prevalent. One 
well-known palmist says, "We Chinese think the face tells 
more than the hand. The face is predetermined but the lines 
of the hand can change so much. However, they do help to 
tell about the motivation and the inner part of a person.
'Bloomfield, Occult World of Hong Kong. 19.
2Ibid. , 126.
'Clammer, 52.
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Of the face, the most important part is the eyes. That is 
where the changes in the heart can be seen. There are 
forty-eight different kinds of expressions in the eyes 
alone. And ten types of face shapes. Each one with its 
particular character delineation."1
In sum, the Chinese living in today's modern 
societies are inclined as ever to retain their long-held 
propensity for practicality. They show little interest in 
the metaphysical and the hereafter. Their this-worldly bent 
has not changed to any significant extent since time 
immemorial, especially in their earthly pursuit of success, 
wealth, and longevity. Living in a relatively affluent 
society, they appear to be just as solicitous to avoid evil 
forces and curry favor from supernatural sources as did 
their ancestors. Every stress is oriented toward 
utilization of the auspicious and avoidance of the 
malevolent. The Chinese emphasis on the functional 
significance of religion may be seen in all of this. The 
practice of religion in contemporary society is as 
utilitarian and instrumental as was traditionally the case-- 
to achieve practical ends. In all of this, the Chinese 
proclivity to practicality seems to have successfully 
weathered the strains of rapid social and economic change 
and has emerged as probably the most resilient of the five 
elements of worldview under consideration.
!Bloomfield, Occult World of Hong Kong. 65.
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Conclusion
The processes of modernization and secularization 
sweeping through East Asia have brought about transformation 
in its socio-cultural landscape. Various aspects of the 
traditional Chinese worldview have undergone diverse degrees 
of change and continuity. Some changes are more easily 
discemable than others. Where possible, the shape and 
delineation of these changes have been studied and 
documented.
A general pattern emerges from this research. On 
one hand, one sees evidences that suggest metamorphic 
changes in the hierarchical and other traditional aspects of 
the Chinese worldview. Though highly esteemed in the past, 
the long-standing hierarchical structure has been 
appreciably weakened, however. The family remains the most 
fundamental unit in society. It continues to perform many 
of it3 traditional functions such as rearing the young and 
caring for the old, although the extent of these functions 
has been curtailed considerably. The family is undergoing 
perhaps irreversible structural change from the extended to 
smaller and more adaptable nuclear-type family. Loyalties 
to one's family and lineage appear to be on the wane. There 
is a loosening of parental control, and filial piety is 
often called into question. Social change also brings about 
the elevation of women's status in family and society. 
Courtship and marriage have been redefined and taken on new
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meaning and significance. Moreover, the traditional 
deference to elders seems to be languishing as society looks 
approvingly on the vigor and pliability of the younger 
generation.
On the other hand one sees little evidence of 
debilitating change in the last three strands of the Chinese 
worldview considered--particularity, harmony, and 
practicality. The Chinese propensity for reality-centered 
consciousness and concrete thinking has largely remained 
intact, although there are indications of change in the 
Chinese language that may adversely affect such pattern of 
thinking. The Chinese feelings for harmony in nature, in 
human and in community are very much in practice. Even more 
so is the legendary Chinese tolerance and syncretistic 
approach to religion. In terms of practicality, the Chinese 
are very much preoccupied with three this-worldly concerns-- 
success, wealth, and longevity.
In the ebb and flow of continuity and change, the 
Chinese of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore appear to have 
taken on many characteristics akin to their Western 
counterparts. Their worldview has been influenced by the 
complex process of secularization, and there is a new 
receptiveness to change, a bent to individualism, 
rationality, expediency, efficiency, flexibility, autonomy, 
relativity, contingency, and, to some extent, impersonality. 
Yet amidst the hustle and bustle of life, and partially
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because of its many pressures, the contemporary Chinese 
express seemingly unsatiable desire for something 
supernatural. They take time to have their fortunes told, 
to worship at the local temple, and to invoke the gods and 
spirits. Such are some of the attributes of the modern 
Chinese who consider themselves to be coming of age.




Thus far the present study has considered the 
process of secularization in its Western and Eastern 
contexts and the ways it has influenced the traditional 
Chinese worldview. As noted in chapter 1, secularization in 
the West manifests itself predominantly in terms of 
religious decline, whereas in East Asia it is revealed more 
specifically in social and cultural change. The validity of 
this hypothesis has been substantiated by the findings in 
chapter 4. While the traditional Chinese worldview as we 
know it has undergone some change, it has also shown some 
degree of tenacity in retaining certain key traditional 
elements. Even then, the differences between the 
traditional and contemporary way of life are as enormous as 
they are radical. This complex situation in which the 
Chinese culture appears to be at its crossroads seems to 
pose significant missiological and theological implications 
for the church. These implications must first be considered 
against the backdrop of the present Chinese ambivalence to 
the process of secularization.
260
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Chinese Ambivalence to Change 
The interplay of Chinese traditional forces and 
Western science and technology is one of the most striking 
features of modern East Asia. The process of secularization 
brings about change, and tradition is generally resistant to 
change. Some Chinese intellectuals both inside and outside 
China believe tradition and change must be held in tension 
so tradition can be preserved. Others in these three 
societies wonder how much longer the Chinese tradition will 
be able to withstand the onslaught of modernization and 
secularization without caving in. The ongoing debate 
between these two groups continues unabated. The three 
prevailing schools of thought regarding the perceived threat 
of foreign elements in secularization include (1) 
modernization without Westernization, (2) Westernization an 
masse, and (3) change within tradition.
Modernization without Westernization
After its humiliating defeat by the foreign powers
in the nineteenth century, particularly the Opium War of
1839-42 and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, China was 
awakened to its glaring weakness and placid complacency. As
the country began to reconstruct its social and economic
infrastructure, Chinese intellectuals had to grapple with 
the thorny problem of how best to meet the challenge and 
aggression of the technologically superior West. Respected 
Chinese scholar and reformer Chang Chih-Tung (1837-1909)
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advocated a policy of synthesizing Confucianism with Western 
technology and methodology. His philosophy is reflected in 
his famous dictum "chung hsueh wei ti, hsi hsueh wei yung" 
(Chinese learning for fundamental principles, Western 
learning for practical applications). His view received 
enthusiastic support from many intellectuals in his day, 
including Sun Yat-Sen (1866-1925), one of m o d e m  China's 
most revered political figures and the first president of 
the republic that succeeded the Manchu. In his major work 
San Min Chu I (The Three Principles of the People) , Sun made 
it clear that the Chinese would borrow from the West only 
what they needed and would not accept anything which went 
against the basic precepts of the Chinese civilization such 
as filial piety, frugality, preservation of "face," etc. 
Chinese identity must remain the same. It is significant 
that Sun was a professing Christian. Apparently he did not 
believe that in coming to faith in Jesus Christ he had 
"borrowed" from the West.
Westernization en Masse
The May Fourth Movement following the student 
demonstrations in Peking on May 4, 1919, represents a 
watershed period in which the traditional culture was called 
into question. The fall of the Manchus signaled the 
beginning of the break-up of Confucian orthodoxy. The 
disgust with warlord politics and the exposure to new ideas 
from the West precipitated an intellectual movement. Both
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Chen Tu-Hsiu (1879-1942), dean of the liberal arts faculty 
of Peking University, and Hu Shih (1891-1962), American- 
trained scholar and pragmatist, contended that the norms and 
values of tradition, especially Confucian values were 
stumbling blocks to progress, and must therefore be 
radically excised from their ancestral roots. Since the 
interests of the nation must supersede tradition, China's 
past must be summarily discarded in order to accommodate the 
acquisition of Western techniques and the pursuit of Western 
standards of prosperity.
Change within Tradition
Contemporary thinkers in Chinese societies outside 
China no longer subscribe to the May Fourth philosophy.
They no longer hold a dichotomous view that sets tradition 
against change. They believe that continuity and change are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive as Chang and Sun had 
thought. Rather, they are dialectically related and can be 
mutually reinforcing.1 Ideas from the East and the West can 
be synthesized to effect a transformation within tradition. 
The result is to be Chinese modernization, not Chinese 
Westernization. This approach seems to enjoy the
'Ambrose Y. C. King, Zhong Guo Xian Dai Hua Yu Zhi 
Shi Fen Zi (From Tradition to Modernity) (Taipei: China 
Times Publishing Co., 1977), and H. G. Yin, Zhong Guo Wen 
Hua De Zhan Wang (The Prospects of Chinese Culture) (Hong 
Kong: Culture Book House, 19 69).
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best of two worlds: modernization without sacrificing
cultural integrity.
This concept of the creative transformation of 
tradition is akin to sinologist Fairbank's perception of 
"change within t r a d i t i o n . F a i r b a n k  contends that 
traditional Chinese forms of thought and action have a 
tendency to continue as they are, and hence that it is more 
accurate to describe change in East Asia as "change within 
tradition" rather than radical transformation.
Evaluation
To evaluate the three Chinese theoretical responses 
to secularization outlined above, it may be said that the 
first, in which modernization without Westernization is 
advocated, may be well intended, but the outcome is 
doubtful. Some assert that Western models of development 
are inextricably enmeshed with Western values and that 
invariably old traditions and old mores will be eroded and 
replaced by foreign values. Thus it is assumed that by 
adopting Western know-how, the infiltration of values 
incompatible with Chinese tradition is inevitable.
The second response in which indiscriminate and 
wholesale Westernization is recommended may have been 
desirable in the early twentieth century in China, but it is 
no longer alluring in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore
‘John K. Fairbank, etal, A History of East Asian 
Civilization. 5.
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inasmuch as these societies have progressed economically. 
Moreover, the Chinese culture as a counterweight makes 
Westernization en masse unlikely.
The third response to the process of 
secularization based on the assumption that modernization is 
possible within tradition seems to be a viable option. 
Research findings cited in chapter 4 on the changes in the 
Chinese worldview confirm Fairbank's assessment that most of 
the changes may be said to have occurred within the 
perimeter of the tradition. Many now embrace the theory of 
"industrialization with honor" and feel confident that the 
Chinese can maintain their traditional culture inviolate by 
rejecting Western values while simultaneously embracing 
Western technology. This implies that they can distinguish 
a process of modernization from the broad system of Western 
values and practices. The line of difference between the 
two, however, is not easy to draw or, once drawn, to hold on 
to. For this reason, some believe that "ethnic 
affinnation"1 must be vigorously maintained in an effort to 
retain one's identity. Even then, some feel that becoming 
"modernized" without becoming Westernized is an unattainable 
compromise. They contend that it is impossible to modernize 
one aspect of society without endangering the entire
'K. S. Yang and Michael H. Bond, "Ethnic Affirmation 
by Chinese Bilinguals," Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 
11 (1980) : 395-410.
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fabric.1 Western technology is inherently infectious if not 
subversive. It cannot be dissociated from other aspects of 
American and European civilization, nor can it be divorced
from the Western worldview. Hence, letting in Western
technology is like admitting the Trojan horse.
Modernization may yet turn out to be the undoing of the 
Chinese culture.
Whether the Chinese will eventually lose their
cultural continuity in time to come remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, suffice it to say that the initial admiration 
of Western science and technology has now given way to 
severe soul-searching and a radical reassessment of 
traditional values. In fact, some argue that the current 
cultural renaissance and revival of traditional religion in 
contemporary Chinese society are actually a response to the 
challenge of rapid social change.2 Chinese scholar Sun 
Longji, on the basis of his research in Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan, argues that a number of fundamental 
characteristics of the old culture, far from being 
threatened by "modernization, " tend on the contrary to be
'Steadman, 28.
2As shown in chapter 4, there is mounting evidence 
of a resurgence of traditional beliefs and practices, 
including a revival of interest in Confucianism, Buddhism 
and Taoism, as well as in fortune telling and geomancy.
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intensified.1 Sun's findings confirm the conclusion in 
chapter 4 that the tenacity of the Chinese cultural heritage 
has made change within tradition possible.
Chinese ambivalence to change is illustrative of the 
current mood in these three societies. But the concern of 
this study goes beyond such ambivalence. Research findings 
in chapter 4 demonstrate that the traditional Chinese 
worldview has not remained untouched in the processes of 
modernization and secularization, but has gone through 
critical change. Thus an understanding of the current 
Chinese worldview cannot be based on the old assumptions 
described in chapter 3, neither should the missionary 
challenge to win the modern Chinese in these societies be 
considered against the traditional background. As the 
Chinese are caught up in a flux of change, the missiological 
implications of the contemporary worldview are to be 
contemplated in the context of this change in order to be 
relevant. These implications are discussed in three broad 
areas in their natural sequence, namely, mission, 
conversion, and ecclesiology.
Implications for Mission 
Familial Tutelage
It is suggested in chapter 1 that one of the
•Longji Sun, Zhong Guo Wen Hua Pi Shen Ceng Jie Oou 
(The Deep Structure of the Chinese Culture) (Hong Kong: 
Yishan, 1985), 7.
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outcomes of the process of secularization is the deliverance 
of people from a vast system of control, including familial 
control. According to chapter 4, this liberation seems to 
have taken place in the three contemporary Chinese 
societies, though deliverance there appears to be more from 
familial than ecclesiastical control as has been the case in 
the West. The traditional Chinese worldview had tended to 
be ethnocentric and autocratic. One's duty was first and 
foremost to the family and fellow kinsmen. Individual 
initiative and aspirations were of secondary consideration. 
Besides, the family system including the lineage was so 
strong that often an individual was considered more as a
filial son than as a good citizen.
The process of modernization has drastically changed 
the status of the individual in the family and the community
at large. Urbanization, modern education, and rising
individual income and status have encouraged the 
transfiguration of the traditional family system from the 
extended to the nuclear. This familial transformation also 
means that the individual is no longer inextricably tied to 
the traditional family system and is more likely to be 
treated as free-standing person. The release of the Chinese 
from their familial tutelage should not be interpreted to 
mean that all family ties are gone and individualism reigns 
supreme. On the contrary, respect for parental authority is 
still conspicuous even though such authority is no longer
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 6 9
considered as binding. Filial piety is still considered a 
virtue and the extreme Western-type of individualism is not 
yet much in evidence.
Historical Tutelage
China is perhaps the only country in the world to 
have been culturally and, to a lesser degree, politically 
united for more than three thousand years. Naturally, the 
Chinese have a great sense of continuity with the past. 
Sinologists generally agree that the Chinese are a proud 
race largely because of this historical continuity. 
Missionaries to China often found the Chinese incredulous as 
to why they should give up their unbroken heritage for an 
"uncultured" foreign faith. Moreover, they regarded their 
country as the Middle Kingdom of the earth and tended to be 
incurably xenophobic. In this closed environment, history 
and culture exerted a formative influence on the populace.1
This influence, however, appears to be on the wane 
as quick-paced social and economic changes take place. The 
cultural cement thac had held China together for millennia 
began to crack under contact with the modern world. As 
indicated in chapter 4, the contemporary Chinese are prone 
to look at their tradition, including the Confucian 
classics, more critically than ever before. Explicit and 
complacent confidence in the past is undermined and the
;Fusan Zhao, Christianity in China (Manila: De La 
Salle University Press, 1986), 1.
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rationality of traditional beliefs is called in question.
The Chinese today are more vocal and less hesitant to 
castigate, even publicly, those aspects of tradition they 
deem deleterious to progress.1
New-Found Freedom
The process of unshackling of the contemporary 
Chinese from the familial and historical tutelage 
contributes to a new personal freedom. First, many among 
the younger generation are free to choose their reference 
group from among peers or colleagues rather than having them 
dictated by kin. Second, this new freedom is associated 
with a weakening of traditional beliefs. More are now free 
to retain or discard their traditional religion. The trend 
in decline of adherence to Chinese traditional beliefs is 
evident from a survey of 1,025 Chinese Singaporean 
households in 1989.: The findings seem to be consistent
with the results of a survey done twenty years earlier. In 
1969, Tamney conducted a random sample survey of 287 
University of Singapore students to ascertain their 
religious beliefs. About 39.4 percent professed to be 
Christians while 46.5 percent were either indifferent to, or 
had no religion. Only 7.4 percent said they believed in the
‘One of the best books in this area is Longji Sun's 
Zhong Guo Wen Hua Pi Shen Ceng Jie Gou which is quoted 
above.
:"Religious Trends in Singapore," Singapore Bulletin 
17 (October 1989): 15.
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Chinese religions, meaning religions associated with the 
Chinese culture such as Buddhism, Taoism, and the 
traditional beliefs.1
The new freedom created by the processes of 
modernization and secularization undoubtedly provide new and 
perhaps unprecedented opportunities for the proclamation of 
the gospel. These new opportunities for gospel proclamation 
look more promising when one considers the new receptivity 
to the gospel among the contemporary Chinese described 
below.
New Receptivity
Besides new freedom, the liberating effect of 
secularization has created keen receptivity to the gospel 
among the Chinese in two specific groups: the youth and the
English- educated.
Among the age groups, the youth appear to be most 
receptive to the gospel. A survey found that two-thirds of 
the Christians in Singapore were converted when they were 
between fourteen and nineteen years old, and those who 
considered themselves most committed were from the same age
'Joseph B. Tamney, "An Analysis of the Decline of 
Allegiance to Chinese Religions: A Comparison of University
Students and Their Parents," in Analysis of an Asian 
Society, comp. Riaz Hassan and Joseph B. Tamney (Singapore: 
n.p., 1969) .
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groups as well.1 The high rate of baptism of young people 
presents the church with a long-coveted opportunity for 
evangelism. It was only about fifteen to twenty years ago 
that young people desiring to be baptized suffered severe 
parental opposition. Some were beaten and others were 
disowned by their families. The same antagonism still 
exists today but it is discemably less severe; there is 
thus a situation which is much more conducive to evangelism. 
This new receptivity is certainly one of the contributing 
factors to the large increase in the Christian population in 
Singapore in recent years.2
The English-educated appear to be more receptive to 
the gospel than the Chinese-educated. As discussed in 
chapter 4, education plays an important role in the 
development of East Asian countries and the effects of the 
introduction of the English language has had profound 
consequences. One of these is a seeming correlation between 
the English language and the receptivity of an individual to 
the Christian message. The report cited above notes that 
only one in ten of the Chinese-educated are followers of 
Christianity, whereas among the English-educated the ratio
‘Religious Conversion and Revivalism: A Study of
Christianity in Singapore (Singapore: Ministry of Community 
Development, 1989), quoted in "Religious Trends in 
Singapore," 15-16.
2nReligious Trends in Singapore," 16.
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is one in four.1 The 1980 population census in Singapore 
reveals a similar situation. Of those who were literate 
only in English, 28.5 percent were Christians, whereas only
3.6 percent of those who were literate only in Chinese were
Christians.2 Sng and You give the following explanation for 
this new trend:
The replacement of the Asian languages by English as 
the main language of instruction in schools cannot but 
undermine the traditional values and outlook of a 
people. On the one hand, Western-type education 
encourages students to be more independent in their
thinking. Such students are less prepared to accept
traditional beliefs and practices uncritically. On the 
other hand, as students become more versatile in another 
language, they are exposed to the values and beliefs of 
another culture. This helps to remove some of the 
prejudices their forefathers might have had against 
embracing another religion. It is likely that the 
higher the educational level students attain, the more 
probable are these trends.3
The new generation of Chinese appears to differ from 
their forebears in their attitude toward Christianity. The 
former bristling antagonism seems to be subdued and replaced 
by a more hospitable openness. The fact that English is 
becoming more and more the lingua franca of contemporary 
Chinese urban societies highlights exciting new openings for 
the gospel.
■ibid., 15.
2Bobby E. K. Sng and Yon Poh Seng, Religious Trends 
in Singapore: With Special Reference to Christianity
(Singapore: Graduates' Christian Fellowship and Fellowship 
of Evangelical Students, 1982), 27.
3Ibid., 46-7.
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Summary
The process of modernization in the three Chinese 
communities has produced a climate more favorable to the 
receptivity of the gospel. The changes include liberation 
from one's familial and historical tutelage. The Chinese 
are more free to think and act on their own without the 
control and scrutiny formerly exercised. New receptivity to 
the gospel is also found among the young and the English 
educated. The trend toward greater openness to the gospel 
implies that the church can look forward to a more fruitful 
response as it seeks to fulfil its mission to the 
contemporary Chinese.
Implications for Conversion
An outcome of the opening of mission opportunities 
among the Chinese should be conversion to Christianity. A 
serious consideration of the process and meaning of 
conversion raises several important missiological concerns. 
In this section, attention is given to two of these issues. 
One has to do with the relationship between conversion and 
culture, the other relates to conversion in its wider 
context. Before delving into these two implications, 
however, it is necessary to examine the word "conversion" in 
its biblical context.
From the outset, as Peters clearly points out, it is 
well to recognize that the concept of conversion is deeply 
rooted in revelation:
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The doctrine of conversion is written in bold 
letters across the pages of the Bible. It is set forth 
with great emphasis in the Old Testament, is strongly- 
reiterated in the gospels, and boldly preached by the 
apostles. It is a concept deeply rooted in divine 
revelation. As such it has been recognized by Biblical
theology and as such it was emphatically preached by our
fathers in the faith.1
The word "conversion" and its related terms are a 
translation of the Hebrew verb :TV (shuv) which is found 
approximately 1056 times in the Old Testament. It is used
in a variety of ways and in general carries the meaning of
returning, turning back, turning away.2
The word aT/J is used approximately 118 times in a 
moral and religious sense and carries the idea of religious 
conversion in the sense of turning away from sin, turning to 
the Lord, changing one's course of direction, action, 
attitude, and relationship.3 In this meaning, 3 TU has two
'George W. Peters, "The Meaning of Conversion," 
Bibliotheca Sacra 120 (July-September 1963): 235.
2 A more comprehensive definition is stated by Barth 
this way: "The Hebrew verb shuv refers to the occurrence of
"turning" in the opposite direction. The direction in which 
a man went or looked and which determined his plans and 
actions is changed into a new, the opposite direction. It 
means the "re-orientation" towards a goal from which one has 
moved away previously. Equally in relation both to concrete 
and abstract things, shuv indicates a "return"; 
geographically it means returning to a former position; 
circumstantially, it means restoring a former state." 
Christoph Barth, "Notes on 'Return' in the Old Testament," 
The Ecumenical Review 19 (July 1967): 310.
3The following passages are listed for comparison: 
"Unto the Lord"--Deut 4:30; 30:2, 10; 1 Sam 7:3; 1 Kings 
8:33; 2 Chron 6:38; 30:9; Neh 9:26; Job 22:23; Ps 22:23; 
51:15; Isa 19:22; 55:7; 60:5; Jer 3:7; 4:1; 24:7; Lam 3:40; 
Hosea 12:7; 14:2-3; Joel 2:12-13; Mai 3:7. "From sins"--l 
Kings 8:35; 2 Chron 6:26; Neh 9:35; Isa 59:20; Jer 25:5; Eze
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implications. It means reversal from something and a 
returning to something else. The person who is converted 
leaves one context and way of life and turns to God.1
3 TU in its covenantal usage expresses a change of 
loyalty.2 It is also a dynamic experience. To return to 
the covenant means to become open to God's righteous purpose 
in the future. It is not only a call back but also a call 
forward. 3 TO therefore does not refer primarily to a past 
experience. Instead, it is a constant call to re­
commitment, to the renewal of the covenant.
It is significant to note that conversion in the Old 
Testament has primarily a collective connotation. 3 TV is 
frequently addressed to the whole people of God (Haggai 2:17 
with Zechariah 1:3,4). It is used of the conversion of the
18:28; 33:11, 14; Jonah 3:10.
‘Gillespie further elaborates: "For the Hebrew,
conversion was never just the experience of changing but 
included a goal of action on the part of the believer where 
the conception of God's will was being fulfilled in turning 
around. It was a movement back to knowing God." V. 
Gillespie, "Religious Conversion and Identity: A Study of
Relationship" (Ph.D. diss., Clairmont Graduate School,
1973), 27.
2Jeremiah uses 3 1YJ in the covenantal sense 48 times. 
W. L. Holladay, The Root Subh in the Old Testament (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1958), 128. Similarly, the word is used by 
Amos. When he calls on the people of Israel to prepare 
themselves to meet their God (4:12), Amos is, in fact, 
saying that it is also turning to them in order to bring 
about renewal of the covenant relationship. About 164 
instances of covenantal 3 "IV; are unevenly distributed 
throughout the Old Testament. Six are found in the 
Pentateuch, 18 in the former prophets, 113 in the later 
prophets. Out of the 164 cases, 48 are in the book of 
Jeremiah, and only 20 in Isaiah.
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nation Israel, of a national act of returning to Gcd after a 
national act of disobedience. It is not essentially a 
private experience or an individualistic decision, but a 
matter for Israel in toto. In the Old Testament context, 
conversion may be individualistic or collective, but it was 
always personal. This personal return to God is to be 
understood "as an indication and representation of the 
'return' of the whole people' of Israel."1 This observation 
has significant missiological implications on the principle 
of multi-individual conversion which is discussed below.
In the Septuagint, the Hebrew verb 3 VC is translated 
by errl arp e<£e i v {epistrephein) , brwoaTpe<t>e l v (apostrephein) , 
and otvoKSTpe<t>e i v (anastrephein) , words which express the same 
general idea as 3 T{J.: The New Testament follows the
Septuagint and uses the same words to convey the Christian 
idea of conversion. Although these words describe only 
external motion, they all carry the idea of turning around 
in either a physical, mental, moral, or spiritual sense,
‘Barth, 310, 311.
^The meaning of the root word GTp'e<t>£ii> {strephein) 
is "to twist," or "to turn," or "to bend," or "to steer."
See G. Bertram, " arpktps i v, " in Kittel's Theological 
Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. G. Friedrich (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), 7:714. Stephen used the verb in
Acts 7:39 for an inward turning of the heart of the Jewish 
fathers back to Egypt. In Acts 13:46, Paul and Barnabas are 
said to turn away from the Jews to the Gentiles because the 
former rejected the gospel.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 7 8
notably a turning away from sin.'
Besides the words that indicate a turning away from 
sin toward God, the New Testament uses the word peTcxpoe i v 
(metanoein) which means to repent. Literally it means "to 
have a change of mind." Repentance involves a change of the 
total person--mind, heart, and will. It is a change of mind 
respecting God, respecting ourselves, respecting sin, and 
respecting righteousness. The change involves a person in 
his totality.
We have noted the root meaning of conversion as 
closely connected with a drastic change from the past, a 
turning away from sin while turning to God. Spiritual 
conversion means complete transformation. In addition, 
conversion in the Old Testament sense means a communal act,
'William Barclay, Turning to God (Grand Rapids:
Baker, 1972), 20. Stephen used the verb in Acts 7:39 for an 
inward turning of the heart of the Jewish fathers back to 
Egypt. In Acts 13:46, Paul and Barnabas are said to be 
turning away from the Jews to the Gentiles because the 
former rejected the gospel. One of three compound verbs 
kirLaTpe<t>€ i v represents an example of the idea of turning 
around. The word occurs about 40 times in the New 
Testament, with about half that number in the Gospel of Luke 
alone. When Gabriel appeared before Zechariah, the angel 
said that John the Baptist would be instrumental in turning 
or converting "many of the sons of Israel to the Lord their 
God" (Luke 1:16) . Christ said to Simon Peter, "When you 
have turned again [or have been converted] , strengthen your 
brethren" (Luke 22:32). When Peter had indeed experienced 
that turning again, he challenged others to do likewise: 
"Repent ipeTaporjacxTe) therefore, and turn again 
(eriarpk^aTE), that your sins may be blotted out" (Acts 
3:19). The outpouring of the Holy Spirit and the ministry 
of Peter finally led to multi-conversions on the day of 
Pentecost. If he had not repented as he did, he would not 
have been a channel of the Holy Spirit to effect changes in 
the minds and hearts of his listeners.
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representing Israel's collective decision of obedience to or 
rejection of God's words.
Conversion as a collective act has significant 
implication for mission. Luzbetak describes conversion this 
way: "Conversion means turning away from old ways to new
ways, a basic reorientation in premises and goals, a whole­
hearted acceptance of a new set of values affecting the 
'convert' as well as his social groups, day in and day out, 
twenty-four hours of the day and in practically every sphere 
of activity--economic, social, and religious."1 The 
process of conversion should involve not only complete 
transformation, but also a reevaluation on the part of the 
convert of his/her relationship to the cultural and social 
matrix of his/her life. Details of this context are 
discussed below.
Conversion and Culture
The relation between conversion and culture has long 
been debated. When new converts come into the church, how 
should they relate to their cultural past--food, dress, 
medicines, songs, dances, myths, rituals, etc.? Should the 
church insist on imposing its own "culture," or should the 
gospel be customized? Some maintain that conversion entails 
a clean break with one's former cultural ties. To them 
conversion means a change of culture at best, and alienation
luzbetak, 6.
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and rejection from one's culture and community at worst. 
Others interpret conversion in terms of a turning to Christ 
but without necessarily rejecting one's culture. Conversion 
to them means a new loyalty to Christ but not an abandonment 
of one's cultural roots.
The Willowbank Report provides sound principles on 
the relationship of culture and conversion. First, the 
radical nature of conversion should be recognized.
Conversion involves a clean and complete break with the 
past. It is so radical that it is spoken of in terms of 
death. Severance from the past may be painful, but it is a 
necessary part of the Christian birth experience. Having 
parted company with the old, we put on the new. We become a 
new creation. Having died with Christ, we are alive 
evermore, with renewed strength and grace. This should be 
what conversion is all about.1
Second, conversion should not "deculturize" a 
convert.2 One practice in the past has been that if one 
wanted to become a Christian, one almost had to abandon the
'The Willowbank Report: Report of a Consultation on 
Gosoel and Culture. 19-22. The Willowbank Report came from 
the Lausanne Theology and Education Group which met from 
January 6-13, 1978 at Willowbank, Somerset Bridge, Bermuda. 
The Theology and Education Group was one of the four working 
groups appointed by the International Lausanne Committee for 
World Evangelization (LCWE) to study the implications of the 
Lausanne Covenant, an important document outlining the basis 
and nature of evangelization. The Covenant was adopted 
during the LCWE's congress in 1974.
2Ibid., 20.
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culture of one's own family and society. There is much 
within most cultures that is not contradictory to the gospel 
and may be retained and even strengthened in the new 
Christian community. There is no need to deculturize a 
convert and require the forsaking of practices that are not 
forbidden by the Scripture.
Cultures, however, are never perfect. The gospel 
stands in judgment of all cultures1 Cultures are inherited 
by fallen beings. There is a sharp division between the 
kingdom of God and the kingdom of man. Niebuhr reiterates a 
fundamental theological conviction when he asserts that the 
good nature of humans has been corrupted by sin and that 
corrupt nature produces perverse culture and perverse 
culture corrupts nature.2 There is thus an element of 
distortion in every culture. Because human culture has been 
divorced from the Christian faith and has been uprooted, we 
must make it subservient to the will of God, and to the 
truth of Christ.3
Perhaps the most controversial cultural issue for 
Chinese converts is ancestor worship. Some believe it to be 
a communication between the living and the dead, it
^iebert, Anthropological Insights. 55.
:H . R. Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1975), 211.
3Lit-Sen Chang, Strategy of Missions in the Orient: 
Christian Impact on the Pagan World (Presbyterian and 
Reformed Publishing Co., 1970), 67.
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acknowledges supernatural powers of the spirits of the 
deceased over the living descendants, and should thus be 
abandoned as a spiritualistic cult. Others take the 
position that ancestor worship serves only as a memorial to 
the dead. As such, no element of worship is present. It is 
neither the purpose nor intent of this study to evaluate 
this extremely complicated and paradoxical issue. Suffice 
it to say that in the evaluation of the ancestor cult in the 
light of the scriptures, cultural facts must also be taken 
into consideration. We must see how one can reinterpret 
some of the rites in order to create new meanings without 
compromising biblical criteria. The cultural mandate of the 
church is two-fold: First, to determine how far the Chinese
may remain Chinese after conversion, and second, to 
formulate Christian alternatives to practices that are 
deemed unscriptural.
Conversion in Context 
In chapter 3, we noted the emergence of the conjugal 
family and how this trend has tended to foster individualism 
in the present Chinese society. Although the 
individualistic tendency is on the rise, the sense of 
familial and communal solidarity has by no means been 
squelched. This group-orientation constitutes a key element 
in the consideration of Christian conversion in context.
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The Individualistic Approach
Mission practice in the past has been inclined to 
the individualistic approach to conversion. The early 
Pietists in the seventeenth century were especially 
concerned with the salvation of individual souls. Pioneers 
such as Philip Spener (1635-1705) and August Herman Francke 
(1663-1727) concentrated their efforts on the individual. 
Their original aim was to promote personal piety, but their 
methodology was extended to their mission practices as well. 
Count Zinzendorf described his work as Einzelbekehrung, 
meaning "conversion of individuals."1
Missionary to India Henry Martyn (1781-1812) worked 
untiringly for the salvation of Muslims. In the midst of
translation and debates, he never forgot his paramount
M  A M  ̂  -V-M C  »- W  -i —. -3 -I - - J TT _ .ej T 1 . . J.' J  - - - - W  • --wa. wx. xuuxvxuuai. . ac i_ .liicX-l-i. y  uxu wia wxic i*iusixiu
in Iran, and one of his final missionary acts was baptizing 
this individual.2
William Carey (1761-1834) believed as early as 1806 
that the primary goal of mission was to win individuals, but 
he also maintained that the establishment of churches and
schools go hand in hand with conversions.
McGavran styled the individualistic approach to
'Ibid.
2Ibid. , 178.
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conversion "drip by drip evangelism."‘ As alluded to in 
chapter I, this practice was largely influenced by the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The individual is 
regarded as an independent entity in society, and as such 
one has the right to make certain claims on the community in 
which one lives. Brunner described the philosophy of 
individualism a "Robinson Crusoe" affair. He regarded 
individualism as "an attempt to interpret the individual 
human being solely in the light of his own personality, and 
the society as the coalescence of such individuals."2
Unfortunately, the philosophy of individualism has 
invaded mission theology and practice. Many Christians 
consider it a precious spiritual heritage brought from 
Europe to America by the Puritans and Pietists. Instead of 
participating in growth, fellowship, service, and witness, 
Christians tend to live to themselves as individuals. The 
crucial ingredient of koinonia is absent, and there is 
hardly any communal relational responsibility. Francis Hsu 
has reasons to characterize the Western form of Christianity 
as essentially an individualistic religion that emphasizes a 
direct link between God and the human soul.3 Hsu is right 
to a certain extent. To say that Christianity is an
‘Donald McGavran, Understanding Church Growth (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), 337.
:Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative, trans. 0. Wyon 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947), 294.
JHsu, Americans and Chinese. 254.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 8 5
individualistic religion is saying only half truth. The 
other half is God's constant reference to his people as a 
group.
Kasdorf does not shrink from using the term 
"anathema" in describing individualism in conversion because 
Christian conversion is as much relational as it is 
personal.1 He characterizes conversion this way:
These observations lead us to conclude that 
conversion is personal, but not individualistic; it is 
experienced by individuals, but it affects the 
community; it is expressed in a vertical relationship, 
but not without horizontal dimensions.2
Suffice it to say that an individualistic approach 
to conversion is not the only approach. While we must agree 
that individual conversion is the basis of mission, we 
should take exception to its exclusivity. We need to 
bioaden the one-sided individualistic approach to include 
the individual's social context, that is, the group of which 
he or she is a part.
A Biblical Approach
Tippett3 maintains that the basis of church growth 
is indeed the conversion of individuals. But sometimes the 
stress put on individual conversion obscures the fact that
•Hans Kasdorf, Christian Conversion in Context 
(Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1980), 108.
2Ibid. , 105.
3Alan R. Tippett, Church Growth and the Word of God 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970), 31.
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the Holy Spirit sometimes brings people to repentance in 
groups, families, and tribes. The Bible uses terminology 
such as "congregation," the "community of God," the "people 
of God," and "fellowship." In fact "the idea of 
congregation goes back, to the collective worshipping body of 
the Psalms and beyond (Psalms 26:12; 68:26), even from the 
beginning of Israel's history as a nation." Israel is 
described as "the assembly of the congregation of Israel" 
(Exod 12:6) . The assembly was a public decision-making 
group in which the leader made his announcements, and the 
people accepted or rejected them. We are told that Moses 
and Aaron "gathered together all the elders..., did signs in 
the sight of the people," and "the people believed...and 
bowed their heads and worshipped" (Exod 4:29-31) .
Tippett points out that the Old Testament concept of
the "people of God" is one of a cohesive unit. Such
cohesiveness begins with the nuclear family and then expands 
to the extended family. This unit is expected to act 
inseparably under elected leaders chosen by God (Deut 1:13- 
18) .'
Kin unit decision making can be seen in the New
Testament. After healing the demoniac, Christ sent him back
to his own home unit to testify to them what great things 
the Lord had done for him (Mark 5:19,20) . The woman of 
Samaria came as an individual, but Jesus sent her back to
'Ibid., 32.
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her kin. As a result, "many of the Samaritans believed in 
him because of the word of the woman who testified" (John 
4:39). The Samaritans were so keen to learn more from Jesus 
that they invited him to stay with them. Apparently Jesus 
saw the potential of the group context in winning 
individuals. The result was "many more believed" (John 
4:4) .
The apostles likewise did not confine their efforts 
to individuals. Stories abound of whole families, and in 
some instances, entire villages coming to accept Christ 
abound. Acts 9:35 speaks of whole villages: "All the
residents of Lydda and Sharon . . . turned to the Lord."
Acts 14:1 notes, "Now at Iconium . . .  a great company 
believed, both Jews and Greeks," among whom it seems were 
whole families. We also note in Acts 16:5 that "Lydia . . . 
was baptized, with her household." Acts 16:33, "The jailer 
. . . was baptized . . . with all his family."
The group approach to conversion is biblical and 
appears to be consistent with the group orientedness of the 
contemporary Chinese. It should therefore constitute a 
valid methodology in this context.
Multi-Individual Conversion
Pickett highlights the fact that an individual must 
be considered in his/her social context. Hence, group- 
consciousness must be part of mission strategy:
To group-conscious people the action of a group is
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incomparably more important than the action of many 
isolated individuals, the corporate witness to Christ 
transcends in significance the personal witness, and the 
most effective demonstration of the power of Christ is 
the transformation of a group of believers.1
While it is true that one has to make one's own 
personal decision, one is seldom an isolated individual. A 
person is often an individual within a group.2 This 
principle is especially significant for the Chinese society 
where by and large people are very much group-oriented. 
Living in large cities, many still adhere closely to the 
practice of the traditional extended family and group 
customs, although the structure of the extended family as 
such is being replaced by the conjugal family. The 
sociocultural context of an individual is still viewed with 
high regard. Group cohesiveness is still operative as a 
communal principle. Each individual represents a unique yet 
precise ethnic entity, however Westernized he/she may have 
become.
Though the Chinese are being liberated from the 
tutelage of the family, the fact remains that from time to 
time some youth still suffer persecution or even ostracism 
when becoming Christian. Their parent's opposition is 
largely based on the belief that when they die, their 
"unfilial" Christian children will not provide them with
‘j. Waskom Pickett, Christian Mass Movements in 
India (New York: Abingdon Press, 1933), 333.
:Alan R. Tippett, People Movements in Southern 
Polynesia (Chicago: Moody Press, 1971) , 207.
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sustenance in the nether world. The worst scenario the 
parents fear is that they will eventually become vagabond 
spirits roaming from place to place, spirits that are looked 
upon with abject contempt and pity. The worst imaginable 
plight to a Chinese after death is to be without living 
descendants. Seen in this background, it is not difficult 
to recognize why baptizing converts against the wishes of 
the parents or family constitutes a most unfilial act and 
represents a gross and blatant insult to the Chinese family 
and ancestry. The one-against-all mission practice of 
winning converts tends to create acrimonious resentment and 
sometimes irreconcilable alienation. It is no wonder that 
Christianity has been accused of being a divisive religion 
for disjointing family members, and a hypocritical religion 
for not practicing what it preaches, an obvious reference to 
the fifth commandment.
Biblically and socially speaking, multi-personal 
conversion1 is a legitimate means of mission. It is akin to 
the Chinese worldview in group consciousness, mutual 
dependence, and social harmony. The traditional one-by-one- 
against-a-social- tide conversion is a slow and painful way 
to grow. But where families and whole social groups hear 
the Word and come to Christ together, there is far less
‘Some call it multi-individual conversion.
Apparently the new term is used to differentiate it from the 
term "group conversion" which unfortunately has the 
connotation of baptism en masse without much prior 
preparation and study.
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social dislocation and less searing wounds between members 
of the same family. Normal, healthy, and cohesive 
relationships can remain intact. The converts are less 
likely to renounce their Christian faith under the power of 
an unconverted group spirit.
Summary
Christian conversion has both cultural and social 
implications. It is more than a spiritual experience, for 
it involves not only a person's soul, but his culture as 
well. A change of behavior involves a change in 
relationship to culture. A distinction needs to be made, 
however, between the gospel and what might be called a 
Christian culture, for no society is a perfect expression of 
the gospel. On the other hand, although the gospel belongs 
to no culture, God's revelation is always expressed within 
cultural forms.
This recognition should not hide the radical nature 
of conversion. The transformation brought about should be 
revolutionary. It means a basic re-orientation of premises 
and goals, a whole hearted acceptance of a new set of 
values. Coming to faith in Christ establishes a new center, 
a new frame of reference in one's life. Conversion does not 
necessarily imply that one forsakes one's culture, but it 
does mean that there will be a radical and critical new way 
of looking at one's culture. Inevitably this will mean a 
rejection by the new Christian of what now appears from the
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Christian standpoint to be negative in his or her culture 
and a strengthening of that which is of value.
Besides its cultural context, conversion has a 
social dimension. Conversion always takes place within a 
relational framework akin to one's social environment. As 
such one should concentrate on the communal setting to which 
the convert belongs. In so doing, the church cannot only 
avoid painful dislocation, extraction, and regression but is 
likely to bring about fruitful growth.
Implications for Ecclesiolocry 
Mission leads to conversion, and conversion to 
incorporation within the local church through baptism.
Three aspects of the church are considered here: the church
as the Body of Chri3t, the church as a worshiping community, 
and the church as a herald.
The Church as the Body of Christ
The traditional Chinese found security and support
in their primary relationships to family and kinship, and as 
indicated in chapter 3, this is the main reason why they had 
little need to venture out of this network of human ties. 
With the modification of the family system in the 
contemporary societies as described in chapter 4, these 
primary ties have been weakened considerably. The former
centripetal relationships are now confined largely to the
nuclear family.
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To reach the contemporary Chinese, one must consider 
the nature of the church. How should the present situation 
in the Chinese societies inform our ecclesiology? What does 
it mean to be a church in the contemporary scene? What kind 
of a church can best speak to the modern Chinese? Three 
avenues are proposed here: the church as surrogate family,
as a plausibility structure, and as networking.
Surrogate Family
In the near absence of strong and close-knit 
consanguine relationships, the church should assume the role 
of a surrogate family to the Chinese. The void created by 
the erosion of primary ties should now be filled by the Body 
of Christ in which the contemporary Chinese can find a 
network of human ties akin to that found in the traditional 
society.
The new surrogative role of the church is rooted in 
the concept of the church as the body of Christ. The word 
"church" in English comes from the Greek ekklesia which had 
a double meaning. It referred to the act of calling and the 
result of that act, the assembly or congregation. The New 
Testament does not use ekklesia to designate a building, an 
organization, or a denomination. Ekklesia always carried 
the meaning of the people of God through Christ.
There are a number of images related to the nature 
of the church. Three of the metaphors from the New
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Testament are highlighted here.1 First, there is the 
"people of God" metaphor. In the Old Testament God 
repeatedly calls the children of Israel His people. "I will 
live in them and move among them, and I will be their God, 
and they shall be my people" (Ezek 37:27). The prophet 
Hosea also makes the same point, "I will have compassion on 
her who had not obtained compassion, and I will say to those 
who are not my people, 'you are my people' and they will say 
'Thou Art my God'" (NASB) .2 Perhaps 1 Peter 2:9,10 stand 
out more than other passages in the New Testament accenting 
the significance of the people of God as "a chosen race, a 
royal priesthood, a holy nation."
Second, there is the "body of Christ" image. This 
is the most prominent image in Paul's epistles and is the 
only one with no Old Testament equivalent.3 Christ is 
spoken of as the Head of the body which is the church, with 
members having different functions such as apostles, 
prophets, teachers, workers of miracles, healers, helpers, 
administrators, and speakers in tongues, etc. (1 Cor 12:28). 
Despite its diversity, there is to be unity, for "you are
‘John R. W. Stott, One People: Helping Your Church
Become a Carina Community (Old Tappan, N J : Power Books,
1982), 26-9. See also Paul S. Minear, Images of the Church 
in the New Testament (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960).
:Paul quotes these two OT passages in 2 Cor 6:16 and 
Rom 9:25-26. In both references he makes direct application 
to the Christians. (See also Gal 6:16, 2 Cor 6:18, Titus 
2:14).
3Stott, 29.
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the body of Christ" (1 Cor 12:27).
Third, there is the "household of God" metaphor. 
Israel had been called God's son (Hos 11:1) in the Old 
Testament. In the New Testament, Christians may call God 
"Abba Father" (Rom 8:15)‘ after having been adopted into His 
royal family. Christ Himself declares that "whoever does 
the will of my Father in heaven is my brother, and sister, 
and mother" (Matt 12:49-50) .2 In Acts, Christians are 
sometimes known simply as the "brethren" (Acts 15:22). It 
is because "you are no longer strangers and sojourners, but 
you are fellow citizens with the saints and members of the 
household of God" (Eph 2:19). In this household, barriers 
are abolished. "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is 
neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; 
for you are all one in Christ Jesus" (Gal 3:28) . 
Consequently, the days of discrimination are over. In Col 
3:11 Paul uses four striking phrases: "fellow citizens," 
"fellow heirs," "fellow members," and "fellow partakers" to 
underscore the undifferentiated participation of all God's 
people in His blessings in a communal setting.
All three of these images portray the concept of the 
people of God as a community. By virtue of Christ's 
redemptive act, the people of God make up one body. Members 
of the church are linked not only to Christ but also to each
‘See also 1 John 2:29-3:3; 3:9, 10; Gal 4:4-7.
:See also Mark 3:34-35; Luke 8:19-21.
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other in mutual functional dependence, in corporate worship 
and fellowship, and in ministry.
The communal aspect of the church is most crucial to 
the nurturing of new Chinese converts. When converted, the 
Chinese go from one social context to another. If the 
church as their new social framework provides the same 
warmth and mutual functional support as their former one 
did, the transition to Christianity will have been 
successful, and the chances of long-term survival as 
Christians enhanced. In cases where members are rejected by 
their former social group, the church as a community can 
step in to provide care and support. In any case, the 
surrogative role of the church provides the converts with a 
substitutionary kinship system that should parallel or even 
surpass their former primary relationships. The warmth and 
mutuality found in the Body of Christ should form a viable 
basis of new relationships for the contemporary Chinese.
Plausibility Structure
The church as the body of Christ should not only 
serve as a surrogative kin group to the Chinese, it should 
provide the setting in which the meaning system of its 
members is realized. According to Berger a social group of 
this kind functions as a plausibility structure:
Worlds are socially constructed and socially 
maintained. Their continuing reality, both objective 
(as common, taken-for-granted facticity) and subjective 
(as facticity imposing itself on individual 
consciousness), depends upon specific social processes,
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namely those processes that ongoingly reconstruct and 
maintain the particular worlds in question. Conversely, 
the interruption of these social processes threatens the 
(objective and subject) reality of the worlds in 
question. Thus each world requires a social "base" for 
its continuing existence as a world that is real to 
actual human beings. This "base" may be called its 
plausibility structure.1
Berger goes on to describe why all religious 
traditions require specific communities of believers such as 
the Christian koinonla for their continuing plausibility. 
B-rger maintains '-'ha:; religious experience is greatly 
enhanced by the function of these social structures which 
define and maintain belief systems and associated behavioral 
expectations. To a great extent, what is real and true for 
a person is what the group affirms as being real and true. 
When these social structures falter, the nomos of reality 
may turn into anomy. When they thrive, they give the 
believers social support and reinforce their worldview.2
Plausibility structure may be especially helpful in 
providing and maintaining meaning system of groups in high- 
tech societies where people experience a host of complex 
personal and social predicaments. Not the least of these 
problems is the sense of isolation. Living in highrise 
buildings, many feel alienated and segregated. Urbanization 
has narrowed the physical distance between people but
‘Berger, The Sacred Canopy. 45.
2Ibid. See also Peter L. Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in
the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1966), 119-68.
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widened their social distance.1
Besides increasing isolation, people tend to 
experience a loss of the meaning of existence as well. 
Jacques Ellul calls the forces at work in a technological 
world "The Technique"--a pervasive method of problem-solving 
that asks, "How can we best solve this problem now?" rather 
than, "What is the ultimate objective?"2 People feel they 
are treated as a means to an end without regard to 
personhood or the meaning of existence. As attested in 
chapter 4, Chinese in East Asia to a large measure have also 
experienced meaninglessness and loneliness.
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck state succinctly, "The 
individual is not a human being except as he is part of a 
social order."3 Since time immemorial, human beings have 
learned that they cannot live without friends. As Herbert
‘This social phenomenon has been demonstrated by 
findings from research conducted in public housing areas. 
Some findings from Singapore include Riaz Hassan, "Social 
and Psychological Implications of High Density," Skistics 
39 (June 1975): 382-6; Mui-Teng Yap, "Privacy and 
Neighborliness," B.Sc. academic exercise, University of 
Singapore, 1975; and Soo-Hong Lim, "Relocation, Social 
Network and Neighboring Interaction in a Block of Flats: A
Case Study," B.Sc. academic exercise, University of 
Singapore, 1973.
:Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. by 
John Wilkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 3-22.
Ellul1s latest book The Technological Bluff is another 
penetrating critique of m o d e m  society. He shows how we 
have mistakenly allowed technology to deceive us into seeing 
global and individual problems in terms of technical 
progress. See The Technological Bluff, trans. by Geoffrey 
W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990).
3Kluckhonn and Strodtbeck, 18.
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Martin says, "The greatest generic bond that makes the world 
consciously kin is the will to friendship. It is the 
heart's desire, the world's need."1
What kind of a church is likely to appeal to the 
contemporary Chinese? A church that provides social and 
psychological security and support in place of primary 
relationships; a church which functions as a plausibility 
structure through which a meaning system may be communicated 
and made meaningful.
Social Networking
Not only can the church assume a surrogative role 
and function as a plausibility structure, it can also use 
social networking as a basis for reaching the contemporary 
Chinese.
The church as a plausibility structure underlines 
the potentiality of doing evangelism in a "natural way." 
Traditionally, missionary evangelistic methodology has been 
dominated by two main approaches. First, the content- 
oriented approach emphasizes on the imparting of certain 
correct information in a teacher-student situation, and 
second, the confrontationally oriented approach that 
accentuates the use of the right technique in a salesman-
■Herbert Martin, A Philosophy of Friendship (New 
York: Dial Press, 1935), 194.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
299
customer situation.1 These conventional approaches often 
have limited member participation and the meager result has 
been disappointing. But working through a pre-existing 
social group represents an alternate strategy. Research 
from the various churches has amply validated the notion 
that the best potential means of recruiting converts is 
along the lines of pre-existing social relationships.2 
Natural ties of friendship are there. McGavran calls these 
"the bridges of God."3 Others name it friendship evangelism 
or the relationally oriented approach in which conversion is 
a process of genuine relationship of caring, listening, 
sharing, and growing in a friend to friend situation.
Parish consultant Lyle Schaller after twenty-five years of 
research indicates that two-thirds to three-quarters of 
converts come from their own kinship and friendship network. 
In fast growing churches, the range is between 65 to 85 
percent, and in the fastest growing churches, converts won
’W. Charles A m ,  "Evangelism or Disciple Making?" in 
Church Growth: State of the Art. ed. C. Peter Wagner
(Wheaton, IL: Tyndale, 1986), 63.
:See, for example, Oscar Lewis, "Seventh-day 
Adventists in a Mexican Village," in Process and Pattern in 
Culture: Essavs in Honor of Julian H. Steward, ed. Robert
A. Manners (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1964); John 
Lofland, Doomsday Cult (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1966); 
Luther P. Gerlach and Virginia H. Hine, "Five Factors 
Crucial to the Growth and Spread of a M o d e m  Religious 
Movement," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 7 
(Spring 1968): 23-40.
3Donald A. McGavran, The Bridges of God (New York: 
Friendship Press, 1981).
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through the kinship and friendship network account for about 
90 percent of all baptisms.1
It has been found that converts won through the 
relational approach are not likely to leave the church after 
joining. Again, the key is in the plausibility structures. 
In a social group situation, converts are able to sustain 
their commitment because their beliefs are constantly 
affirmed and revitalized by the group. Schaller's research 
reveals that "the ones least likely to become inactive 
members are those who become part of a group, where 
membership in that face-to-face small group is meaningful 
before formally uniting with that congregation. They are 
assimilated before they join."2 In a study comparing active 
and inactive members, it was found that those who continued 
as active church members had been exposed to an average of 
5.79 different Christian influences prior to their 
commitment, whereas dropouts had only 2.16 exposures by 
comparison.3 Though Shaller's research was conducted in the 
West, it is expected that the same principle applies in the 
East, for the functions of plausibility structures are 
likely to transcend cultural and national boundaries.
‘Lyle E. Schaller, "Six Targets for Growth," The 
Lutheran 13 (September 3, 1975): 11-13.
2Lyle E. Schaller, Assimilating New Members 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1978), 76.
3Flavil Yeakley, Why Churches Grow (Arvada, CO: 
Christian Communications, 1979), 65.
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The importance of social contacts through networking 
net only highlights perhaps the most successful means of 
evangelism, it also underlines the crucial role the laity 
play in creating and maintaining these social contacts. 
Witnessing is the responsibility of all believers, not 
exclusively the pastor's. Moreover, a Christian's daily 
work is to be considered an avenue for service. The laity 
are said to be the "dispersion of the church. They can 
penetrate more deeply into diverse social networks than the 
average pastor has access to. Elton Trueblood calls this 
witnessing approach the "strategy of penetration."2 
Trueblood notes that Christ's figures of speech such as 
salt, light, keys, bread, water, and leaven all have a 
commonality, that is, they represent some kind of 
penetration. He explains:
The purpose of the salt is to penetrate meat and 
thus preserve it; the function of the light is to 
penetrate the darkness; the only use of the keys is to 
penetrate the lock; bread is worthless until it 
penetrates the body; water penetrates the hard crust of 
the earth; leaven penetrates the dough, to make it 
rise.3
Just as these figures show unequivocally the 
function of the laity in their daily spheres of work and 
influence, the Chinese members should be taught how they can
'Hendrik Kraemer, A Theolocrv of the Laity 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1958), 181.
2D . Elton Trueblood, The Company of the Committed 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 68.
3Ibid.
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effectively work through their social network to utilize the
bridges of God. Indeed, the success of the lay people's
ministry must be measured not by how many attend church each
week but by what they do during the week.
Social contacts among the kin and friends underscore 
yet another significance of social networking, that of the 
cell groups. In recent years, there has been skepticism 
about large organizations, and in the midst of increasing 
impersonality and anonymity many religious organizations 
have turned to operating in small groups, base communities, 
house-groups, and the like.1 The phenomenal success of the 
world's largest church, the Full Gospel Central Church in 
Seoul, is based upon the establishment of cell groups.2 Its 
formula of achievement in phenomenal church growth has been 
adopted worldwide. Even Billy Graham who is renowned for 
his large scale crusades is now incorporating principles of 
cell groups in his public meetings. For instance, the Hong 
Kong Billy Graham Crusade in 13 39 has been extended by video 
in 1991 to 70,000 locations in thirty countries in Asia. In 
Singapore, the plan calls for the saturation of the entire 
island with hundreds of "television house parties." In each
■Leslie Newbigin, "Mission in the 199 0s: Two
Views," International Bulletin of Missionary Research 13 
(July 1989) : 102 .
2Paul Yonggi Cho, Successful Home Cell Groups 
(Plainfield, NJ: Logos International, 1981). See also John 
N . Vaughan, The World's 20 Largest Churches: Church Growth 
Principles in Action (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1986), 
35-49 .
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host family where the party is to be held, nonbelievers are 
invited to view the video cassettes of the Hong Kong 
Crusade.1 The principle of networking appears to be a 
workable approach in these Chinese communities.
Francis Hsu says it right, "For the Chinese, his 
family and its direct and widest extension, the clan, are 
the beginning and end of his human universe."2 The church 
as the body of Christ and the surrogate family of the 
Chinese provides a natural network of relationships. Such 
networking among friend3 and acquaintances is not only 
culturally congruous to the Chinese, but also conducive to 
greater chances of success in evangelism among the Chinese.
Summary
The church as the Body of Christ must respond to the 
new generation of Chinese according to their present needs: 
the weakening or loss of meaning and of primary 
relationships. These needs may be fulfilled by the church 
playing the role of a surrogate family in which Christian 
friendships take the place of primary relationships. The 
church also functions as a plausibility maintenance 
structure in which the Chinese find meaning in a group 
context. Finally, the church may capitalize upon the method
'Richard S. Greene, "Thirty Countries, 70,000 
Crusades Bring Gospel to Millions, " Decision 32 (April 
1991): 28-9.
:Hsu, Clan. Caste, and Club. 234.
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of networking through which the Chinese may be won to Christ 
by personal social contacts.
The Church as Worshiping Community 
The church as the Body of Christ is also a 
worshipping community in the "breaking of bread and in 
prayers" (Acts 2:42) . Worship as a communal act is a 
regular and integral part of the church.
How does our understanding of the Chinese worldview 
enlighten us on the type of worship service with which the 
Chinese are comfortable and find profitable? To elucidate 
this question, we return to the conclusions in chapters 3 
and 4 pertaining to the Chinese esteem for particularity and 
practicality.
Worship as Concrete Experience
The Chinese bent to concreteness should inform the 
way worship is conducted. Worship should be so designed to 
stress its tangible nature. Nowhere is this nature 
demonstrated more clearly than in holy communion. The bread 
and wine as concrete symbols of Christ's body and blood are 
commemorations of His atoning sacrifice and anticipation of 
His soon return. Whether in sacrament or sermon, worship 
that appeals to the Chinese mind appears to possess this 
tangibility of reality. In such worship, the reality is 
affirmed-- the reality of divine action delivering humans 
from their sin and death and bringing them to participate in
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eternal life. Thus the soteriological nature of God's 
saving act in human history must be emphasized alongside the 
concrete reality of this act.
Perhaps because of this affinity to concreteness, 
the communion service should be held more frequently. More 
emphasis should also be given to the ordinance of humility 
as an explicit memorial of Christ's condescension. Baptism 
as a tangible expression of Christ's death and resurrection 
and as a symbol of being dead to sin and alive to God should 
also be carefully planned and elaborately enacted.
The visual-oriented Chinese are also likely to be 
captivated by a generous use of visual aids in worship 
service. Sight and sound engage the senses and heighten 
one's perception of symbols such as the bread and wine.
When worship is perceived as a concrete event or experience, 
it becomes an encounter between worshiper and God. Music 
and drama are effective facilitators of such encounter.
Music
Music is a powerful aid to worship because it is a 
more expressive medium than ordinary speech.1 It helps to 
verbalize praise and supplication and serves to concretize 
expressions and give them a sense of realness.
Most Chinese worship services today use Western 
music with Chinese words. Often this Anglo-Chinese blend
'James F. White, Introduction to Christian Worship 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1980), 99.
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appears to be a mismatch that bears little resemblance to 
indigenous Chinese music. Nida tells of the experience of a 
taxi driver in India who was asked by a man just when the 
services in a certain Christian church would be over. The 
taxi man replied, "I don't know, but there are always four 
noises, and there have already been two!"1 We have no 
reason to believe the Chinese carry their tune in 
"Christian" music any better than their Indian counterparts, 
for Francis Hsu spells out clearly that Chinese music by 
Western standards is considered primitive:
Two characteristics distinguish Chinese music from 
its well-developed Western counterpart: the absence of
harmony and an emphasis on the programmatic. No matter 
how many instruments perform at the same time, Chinese 
music is always in unison. Musical theory is 
unelaborated, musical instruments are never 
standardized, music scales are not variegated, and the 
total musical repertoire is extremely small in view of 
both China's size and its long history.2
Hsu's comment may be the reason why when some 
Chinese try to sing hymns set to Western music, they simply 
"murder" the tune. But in the past five years in Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore, Chinese Christian artists have 
produced new series of Christian songs and music that have a 
distinctive Chinese flavor. The new trend may be the 
beginning of an new era in the indigenization of Christian 
worship, particularly of songs and music which should be
'Eugene A. Nida, Message and Mission (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1960), 175.
:Hsu, American and Chinese. 390.
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invaluable tools to communicate the gospel on a familiar 
wavelength to the present-day Chinese.
Drama
Weber observes that illiterates have the tendency to 
think in concrete terms and that their communication is 
often pictorial, symbolic, and dramatic. He recommends 
dramatic method of communication as the most effective means 
of reaching them.1 Though most Chinese in Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Singapore are literate, communication through 
drama also should be a powerful means of getting across the 
gospel message. A review of Chinese Christian literature 
reveals very little regarding experimentation with drama.
Traditionally, the Chinese drama or operas enjoyed 
immense popularity. They had become an important part of 
the Chinese national life. Lin explains it this way:
Apart from teaching the people an intense love of 
music, it has taught the Chinese people, over ninety 
percent of whom are illiterate, a knowledge of history 
truly amazing, crystallizing, as it were, the folklore 
and entire historical and literary tradition in plays of 
characters that have captured the heart and imagination 
of the common men and women.2
Lin goes on to describe how Chinese operas, besides 
popularizing history and music, helped to shape the morality 
of the Chinese people. Through stories with human
‘H. R. Weber, The Communication of the Gospel to 
Illiterates: Based on a Missionary Experience in Indonesia
(Madras: Christian Literature Society, 1960), 70.
:Yu-tang Lin, 265.
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characters, operas provided concrete conceptions of good and 
evil conduct.1
The use of drama in gospel presentation has been 
found to be successful in many places. While Hindu 
villagers soon become tired of the Western style of 
preaching and leave, they will stay half the night to see a 
drama to its end. In South India, for example, the 
performance of Christian dramas or "burrakathas" usually 
lasts long into the night.2
Bong-Rin Ro relates his experience in a evangelistic 
crusade in Rangoon, Burma. No foreign missionaries have 
been in Burma since 1966. But his heart thrilled as he 
witnessed a dramatic presentation at the crusade by nine 
theology students of the life experiences of Ko Tha Byn, the 
first Burmese convert who had been a gang leader and killed 
more than 3 0 people before his conversion through the 
ministry of Adoniram Judson. At the end of the drama, about 
20 people responded to an invitation to accept Christ.3 The 
success of the crusade underscores the functionality of 
using a non-traditional mode of presenting the gospel in 
ways understandable to the local people.
‘Ibid., 266.
:Luke and Carmen, p. 186.
3Bong-Rin Ro, "Contextualization: Asian Theology,"
in The Bible and Theology in Asian Contexts, ed. Bong-Rin Ro 
and Ruth Eshenaur (Taiwan: Asia Theological Association, 
1984) , 68 .
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The employment of drama has been found politically 
effective in the People's Republic of China. Drama was used 
to indoctrinate people and "convert" them to the Maoist 
cause. This utilization of drama to inform illiterates was 
a continuation of the earlier imperial pattern of 
contracting playwrights and actors' guilds to promote ideas 
that would be "evangelistically" supportive of government 
policies.1
Drama is a powerful means of communication because 
it is more than a mere enactment of a story--it is the 
reliving of an experience and the reaffirmation of a 
conviction. Nida maintains that drama involves complete 
identification, not merely with words, but with actions. He 
reckons it is the "closest approximation to the living 
reality that symbolism can ever have."2
The Chinese, with their bent toward reality-oriented 
thinking and living, should find a dramatic presentation of 
the gospel more in line with their linguistic composition 
and thought pattern than abstract preaching. Both music and 
drama heighten worship as a concrete experience.
Reorientation of Preaching
The Chinese affinity for concrete thinking also 
should inform preaching. Since the Chinese attach great
‘Edward Hunter, Brain-Washing in Red China (New 
York: Vanguard Press, 1953), 114-46.
:Nida, Message and Mission. 176-7.
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significance to historical particularities, a reality- 
centered orientation will be the prime consideration in our 
discussion of the form and content of preaching.
In East Asia, one sometimes witnesses a legacy of 
the missionary era, that is, a Western style of preaching 
even though the Chinese language is used. The most common 
phenomenon is a three-point didactic sermon, usually 
philosophical and abstract in substance and form. Most 
pragmatic Chinese find such preaching difficult to grasp, 
let alone to respond to. A cognitive approach to preaching 
is alien to the Chinese mind, as are transplanted Western 
models of church music, worship service, architecture, 
hymns, and evangelistic crusades. Even courses offered at 
theological seminaries in East Asia are inherited from the 
West with little or no modification.1 This is not to say 
the West has nothing to offer. The point is that the 
missionary approach should not be a direct foreign 
transplantation that gives little consideration to the 
cultural context of the target audience. In short, 
methodologies must first be "climatized" or sinicized so 
that they may grow and prosper under indigenous conditions. 
The fact that Buddhism found it necessary to change its 
language from the universal to the particular in order to 
"fit-in" with the Chinese should be a lesson to the church.
'See, for example, Harvie M. Conn and Samuel F. 
Rowen, eds., Mission and Theological Education in World 
Perspective (Farmington, MI: Associates of Urbanus, 19 84).




The Chinese bent toward situation-centered thinking 
lends itself to narrative preaching. A story, whether 
actual or analogical, depicts situations that the mind 
perceives as involving events and characters. The drama in 
a story may have taken place years ago, but when it is 
narrated, it assumes an existential attribute so that the 
listeners can almost "see," "hear," and "feel" what is going 
o n .
Narrative preaching is sometimes called story- 
preaching. Whatever it may be termed, it is the approach to 
preaching in which narrative is used as a vehicle of 
communication. Narrative preaching generally finds 
receptive acceptance among the Chinese because they often 
communicate with one another in story form. Whether it is 
settling disputes or negotiating a business contract, a 
direct confrontational mode of communication is foreign to 
the Chinese. They prefer an indirect manner which 
introduces the form before revealing the content. The form 
is invariably a story or an analogy of some kind. One needs 
to listen attentively and patiently to catch "the point" 
which usually comes at the end of the story, and the end may 
not be in sight until after some time.
Ideology aside, Mao Tse-Tung was a master story­
teller. His story language commanded enormous respect among 
the populace. The following is one of the analogies he
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cited in the conflict between the Kuomintang and the 
Communist Party:
To whom should the fruits of victory in the War of 
Resistance belong? It is very obvious. Take a peach 
tree for example. When the tree yields peaches they are 
the fruits of victory. Who is entitled to pick the 
peaches? Ask who planted and watered the tree. Chiang 
Kai-Shek squatting on the mountain did not carry a 
single bucket of water, and yet he is now stretching out 
his arm from afar to pick the peaches. "I, Chiang Kai- 
shek, own these peaches," he says, "I am the landlord, 
you are my serfs and I won't allow you to pick any." We
have refuted him in the press. We say, "You never
carried any water, so you have no right to pick the 
peaches. We the people of the Liberated Areas watered 
the tree day in day out and have the most right to 
gather the fruit."
Hsu maintains that storytelling has always been part 
of Chinese life and culture. Since most Chinese in 
traditional China were illiterate, storytelling was a major 
form of disseminating information to the masses:
Storytelling is one of the most ubiquitous forms of 
entertainment in China. Storytellers are found in every
market place and temple fair, and in all cities and
towns. They are in great demand during the ancestral 
festival of the Seventh Moon and the Spring Festival at 
the end of the Chinese year. They are frequently hired 
to entertain guests at a wedding, funeral, or birthday 
celebration. They may recite a single episode or they 
may be commissioned to tell an entire novel from 
beginning to end. They tell their tales in different 
ways: some by talking; others by interspersing their
talk with singing, since most of the popular novels are 
also available in lyric form. As a matter of fact, 
storytelling most decidedly antedated written fiction in 
the vernacular in China.2
In contemporary Chinese societies, novels and
'Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tuna. Vol. 
IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), 16.
:Hsu, Americans and Chinese. 11.
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stories are as ubiquitous as storytellers of old. Everyday 
newspapers run half a dozen ancient as well as m o d e m  story 
serials, and these are the first things many readers read in 
the mornings. Stories made into movies or television mini­
series also attract large numbers of viewers.
In the West, communication of the gospel through 
narratives is emerging as one of the major forms of 
preaching in the eighties.1 A number of preachers and 
authors who used this approach appear to have been 
successful. Among them are C. S. Lewis whose writings have 
been known to reach the hearts of common people. John 
Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress, for a number of years, was the 
second most widely read English book. Some call it the most 
influential religious book in English literature. Both 
Lewis and Bunyan used story as the vehicle for communicating 
the gospel.
Stories are widely known as a universal mode of 
communication. Wilder believes that in actuality the 
Gospels are oral forms of communication that generally
‘A number of books tout this approach. A 
representative sampling would include George M. Bass, The 
Story and the Song (Lima, OH: CSS Publishing Co.); Edmund 
Steimle, Morris Niedenthal, and Charles L. Rice, Preaching 
the Story (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980); Richard A. 
Jensen, Telling the Story: Variety and Imagination in 
Preaching (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1980); 
Eugene L. Lowry, The Homiletical Plot (Atlanta: John Knox 
Press, 1980), and idem, Doing Time in the Pulpit: The 
Relationship between Narrative and Preaching (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1985) .
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appear in three literary forms: drama, narrative, and
poetry.
The Word of God found its appropriate vehicles both 
in the sense of images and of forms. Within limits one 
can say that to this very day and always Christianity 
will most characteristically communicate itself at least 
in these three modes: the drama, the narrative, the
poem--just as it will always be bound in some degree to 
its primordial symbols, no matter how much the world may 
change. In a double sense Father Thornton's statement 
holds true: "The contents of the revelation are
mysteriously inseparable from the forms in which they 
are conveyed."1
Wilder's point is well taken. If the gospel is to 
be effectively communicated, it should be done in the forms 
of the culture in which it finds itself. The content and 
the form should be inseparable. They are the configuration 
of the biblical text in its totality. The content should 
not be wrangled out of the form of the text in the process 
of sermon construction. Jensen concurs with Wilder when he 
says:
The biblical writers very often communicate with us 
through stories. Why should we de-story these stories 
in our sermons and simply pass on the point of the story 
to our listeners? Why should we rip the content out of 
the form as our normal homiletical process? If the 
story (or whatever literary form the text may take) is 
of no matter why didn't the biblical writer just tell us 
the point in the first place? Why didn't the author of 
Genesis 2-3 just tell us what sin is? Why did he or she 
tell a story? And if that biblical author carefully 
constructed a "sin story" why do we always feel 
compelled to improve on the story by preaching on the 
point?
A holistic exegesis must be directed at both form 
and content. It is not enough to get the meaning out of
'Amos Wilder, Earlv Christian Rhetoric: The
Language of the Gospel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1971), 43.
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the text and into the sermon. We must pay attention to 
the total configuration of textual form/content.1
From the evidence gathered above, situation-centered 
preaching in the form of narrative appears to be congruent 
to Chinese thought patterns. Most Chinese worshippers 
should appreciate this type of preaching more readily than 
they do the abstract kind. Though the form of preaching is 
important, the content should also be considered. This is 
the subject of the following section.
The Content: Meaning-Oriented
Preaching
Secularization has contributed to a host of problems 
among the contemporary Chinese, not the least of which is a 
sense of meaninglessness or loss of purpose in life. If the 
communication of the gospel is to be effective, the content 
of preaching should address this problem.
The social and health problems produced by the 
technological age and rapid economic advancement have been 
referred to as the "human cost of development." In Taiwan, 
for instance, severe alcoholism among the Han Chinese 
population has increased over the past forty years by 100 to 
200 fold, compared to the ten-fold increase in real per 
capita Gross National Product (GNP) over the same period.1 
Hong Kong has earned the reputation of being the "stress
'Jensen, 129.
:"The Human Cost of Development," Free China Review 
40 (May 1990): 1.
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city" of Asia. Its competitive lifestyle accounts for 700 
suicides and 1,700 suicide attempts each year.1 In 
Singapore, reports indicate a three-and-a-half - fold increase 
of young psychiatric patients at a government child 
psychiatric clinic from 245 in 1975 to 983 in 1985. A 
corresponding rise of patient count for psychiatrists in 
private practice is also evident. Among the factors cited 
are stress and pressure from high parental expectations, 
inability to cope with studies and examinations, and 
relationship problems.2
A corollary of meaninglessness is fear. It has been 
found among the contemporary Chinese that the worst fear is 
probably the fear of the dead.3 Most Chinese fear contact 
with the spirit of a deceased person. Others are fearful 
over the uncertainty of the future. As pointed in chapter 
4, this probably explains why astrology is a growing 
business in these three societies.
Undoubtedly, rapid economic development has brought 
material wealth and a higher standard of living. But not 
everything is as rosy as one would hope. Contemporary urban 
Chinese are in a period of transition from a traditional
‘Henry Holley, "Good News in Hong Kong," Decision 
31 (May 1990): 18.
2Ai-Phang Ho, "Getting on with Life," Mirror 26 (15 
March, 1990): 10.
3Griffiths, 65; and Ray Nyce, "The Gospel and 
Chinese Religions Today," Southeast Asia Journal of Theology 
14 (1973): 48.
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order of life to a more Western mode of living. Changes in 
Europe took place over several centuries, whereas the 
changes in East Asia occur in decades. Obviously, not all 
can cope with the pace and magnitude of change. The gradual 
evolution of traditional culture into a hybrid culture 
between the East and the West produces a loss of the meaning 
of life for many.
Berger's thesis is that the process of 
secularization will not go on endlessly from which there is 
no return. It is his opinion that the human need for 
meaning eventually establishes the internal limits of 
secularization. Individuals yearn to grasp the reality in 
which they live in order to be able to feel that their lives 
are meaningful.1 The irony is that secularization tends to 
undermine the traditional theodicies that have provided 
meaning during meaning-threatening experiences.2 Most 
religions offer theodicies of suffering and death. Berger 
states, "The sacred cosmos, which transcends and includes 
man in its ordering of reality, thus provides man's ultimate 
shield against the terror of anomy. 1,3 But modern society is 
less capable of providing this "sacred canopy" because the 
meaning-providing efficacy of culture and religion have
'Berger, The Homeless Mind. 15.
2McGuire, 29. See also Berger, The Sacred Canopy.
24.
■Berger, The Sacred Canopy. 27.
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become somewhat impotent. Where there is no meaning, there 
is chaos and disorientation.
Since meaning is fundamental to a sense of order, 
preaching must provide this meaning system to satisfy the 
Chinese gnawing hunger for peace and assurance. Effective 
preaching to the Chinese must spell out fundamental answers 
to allay fears. Besides, it must confront the problems 
related to the bondage of meaninglessness. It must also 
address questions of loneliness and discontentment. It must 
speak to the need for a sense of wholeness of person which 
can be found only in God.
Summary
In view of the Chinese esteem for particularity, we 
need to rethink the entire spectrum of worship and evaluate 
how well it is in-tune with the Chinese mind. Meaningful 
worship to the contemporary Chinese means worship as a 
concrete experience. It must engage the senses and it must 
afford opportunities for expressions of faith, principally 
through music and dramas. As for preaching, the traditional 
three-point sermon does little to synchronize with Chinese 
patterns of thought. But situation-oriented and need- 
oriented preaching seems to appeal more directly to the 
Chinese mind than the logical-abstract type.
The Church as Herald
The church in the contemporary Chinese society is
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more Chan the Body of Christ and a worshiping community. It 
is a herald as well. It is to proclaim the good news of 
Jesus Christ and Him crucified.1
To reach the Chinese with the gospel, the message 
must be presented in a manner that appeals to 1) their 
worldview and 2) their existential needs. Two major 
obstacles that impede thi3 kind of communication include the 
Chinese perception of an uncomfortable dualism in 
Christianity and the void of what Hiebert calls "the 
excluded middle." These concerns are described and 
addressed in the two following sections: wholism and
functionality.
Wholism
One of the most conspicuous themes of the Chinese 
worldview as alluded to in chapters 3 and 4 is its vision of 
unity. The Chinese believe all things and events belong to 
one undifferentiated reality. The totality of reality in 
all its dimensions are interdependent. The Chinese regard
'The church as herald is one of the models taken 
from Avery Dulles' Models of the Church (Garden City, NY: 
Image Books, 1978), 76-38. Obviously the church as herald 
does not adequately represent the totality of the church.
One may look at the church as a servant, a prophetic voice, 
a sign of God's kingdom, or an interim worshiping community 
for the nurture and support of God's people during the 
period between the two Advents of Jesus Christ, to be 
replaced at the Second Advent by the Kingdom--visibly and 
powerfully displayed--"that God may be all in all" (1 Cor. 
15:24-28). However, only the herald model is used here to 
accentuate the importance of the gospel message commissioned 
by God and carried by the church as God's mouthpiece.
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the internal reality of humans and the external reality of 
the cosmos as interconnected and therefore as comprising one 
whole. The two have an intrinsic relationship that is 
characterized by harmony. This wholistic worldview 
permeates and regulates every aspect of the Chinese way of 
life and thinking. Accordingly Chinese thought tends to be 
intuitive, concrete, wholistic, and paradoxical. This 
Chinese traditional proclivity to harmony has not changed 
much through the years. In fact chapter 4 suggests that 
most contemporary Chinese are still very much predisposed to 
this worldview assumption.
How does Christianity with its perceived dualism1 
find a hearing among the Chinese? Most Chinese have never 
quite understood the brand of Christianity interpreted and 
practiced in the West. To them Western thinking is alien to 
their thought pattern. Westerners tend to express ideas in 
bi-polar terms: good or evil, right or wrong, black or
white, true or false, matter or spirit, science or religion. 
This dualism is rooted in the Graeco-Roman view of the world 
and enshrined in Platonic philosophy. On this view, what is 
not good must be evil and what is not evil must be good. No 
room is given to the gray area which recognizes the
‘This aspect of Christianity should by no means be 
equated with Manichaeism, a Gnostic religion that maintained 
the theme of dualism as a means of explaining the existence 
and relationships of good and evil in the universe. Though 
expressions of dualism in Christianity are limited, 
Christianity is often perceived by the Chinese as a 
dualistic religion.
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possibility of something as neither good nor evil, or, good 
and evil at the same time. Undoubtedly this Western dualism 
made rational enquiry and scientific discoveries possible, 
but it remains a stumbling block to the Chinese.
Christianity appears to them to be a religion of conflict 
because most Christian thoughts are expressed in bipolar 
terms such as secular and sacred. But to the Chinese, 
proposals framed in the form of antitheses simply do not 
exist. The Chinese think it wrong to speak in terms of a 
tension between two seemingly opposite entities. To them, 
each entity must be defined in terms of the other for each 
is fulfilled in a totality constituted by both. On this 
view both are therefore necessary and neither is complete 
without the other.
Presentation of the gospel to the contemporary 
Chinese must avoid the either/or dichotomy and maximize a 
both/and approach. To facilitate this approach, a theology 
of wholism is needed. Basic elements of this theology 
should include inclusivity, the great controversy theme, and 
the doctrine of man.
Inclusivity
Most Chinese regard Christianity as an exclusive 
religion. Its exclusivity is due in part to what the 
Chinese perceive as its dualism. One may argue that 
Christianity is indeed an exclusive religion for good 
reasons. The uniqueness and finality of Jesus Christ is
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nonnegotiable. The scandal of the cross is an exclusive 
reality. All forms of religious faith are not of equal 
validity and worthwhileness to the God who is over all. In 
fact the first word of the gospel is "Repent!" All humanly 
contrived religion is to some degree human-centered and 
hence what Karl Barth called "Onglaube!"
While one is unapologetic in admitting that 
Christianity is an exclusive religion, one may also point 
out that the way the gospel is presented does not have to be 
needlessly exclusive. A more inclusive manner of 
communication will certainly make the gospel more "at home" 
to the Chinese worldview. The Chinese who are used to 
accepting and living with contradictions should have no 
trouble understanding God as the God of transcendence as 
well as the God of immanence, Christ as at once man and God, 
and the Koly Spirit as residing in the heart and in the 
world. The gospel expressed in inclusive terms may find a 
more ready acceptance among the contemporary Chinese.
Great Controversy Theme
The subject of great controversy1 preached by the 
Seventh-day Adventists appears apropos to reinforce the 
wholistic approach to the gospel. The great controversy is 
a comprehensive theme of God's salvific action in the 
history of the universe. It accents (1) the reality of
'See Seventh-dav Adventists Believe. 99-105.
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evil, and (2) the great cosmic struggle between God and 
Satan that involves the entire universe. The conflict that 
started in heaven (Rev 12) continues today involving all 
God's children on planet earth (Eph 6:12). The struggle 
will end with God's final triumph at the Second Advent of 
Christ when Satan is destroyed. Thus the great conflict 
that began with Eden lost will end with Eden restored.
The great controversy theme may be significant to 
the contemporary Chinese in three ways. First, it gives a 
wholistic view of human and cosmic reality that is analogous 
to Chinese assumptions of wholism. Second, it reveals the 
origin of evil and answers questions on the whys and 
wherefores of human suffering. Though the co-existence of 
good and evil appears to be dualistic, this time-conditioned 
dualism is set in the context of the cosmic reality of 
wholeness. Third, it provides assurance pertaining to the 
eventual elimination of evil and the restoration of all 
things. The world that has been fragmented by evil will 
once again be made whole.
The Doctrine of Human Nature
The Seventh-day Adventist wholistic view of human 
nature may provide yet another answer to the problems caused 
by dualistic theological thinking. Adventists recognize the 
created unity of human beings. God breathed the breath of 
life into the lifeless matter formed by the dust of the 
ground, and "man became a living being" (Gen 2:7). The
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3 2 4
union of dust with the breath of life resulted in a living 
being, or soul. Each person is created in the image of God 
as a whole being, physically, mentally, and spiritually 
integrated (3 John 2). In fact, Paul's call for 
sanctification is based on the wholistic three-fold union, 
"Now may the God of peace Himself sanctify you completely; 
and may your whole spirit, soul, and body be preserved 
blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Thess 
5:23). The three are indivisible. The soundness of mind 
depends on the wholeness of body, and vice versa. The state 
of the mind is inseparable from the condition of the body or 
spirit. Thus Adventists consider that the maintenance of a 
level of health which engenders a sound mind is as much a 
religious duty as going to church.
Like the Chinese, Adventists also believe each 
person is part of the physical universe. As such each is 
subject to natural laws as much as is the physical world. 
Compliance with these laws promotes physical health, whereas 
disobedience to them produces broken body and spirit.
The Adventist doctrine of human nature has important 
missiological implications. Adventists reject Platonic 
concepts of dualism and think in terms of harmony of soul 
and body; so do the Chinese. Both agree that harmony 
fosters happiness and health. Chinese believe that harmony 
among the cosmic forces brings health, happiness and 
prosperity, and Adventists regard the harmonious
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relationship between body, mind, and spirit as fundamental 
for the total well-being of the individual. Moreover, 
Adventists hold that while the maintenance of health and 
happiness is possible on this earth, final and perfect 
restoration is yet to come. Harmony is possible both now 
and in the future.
Implications of a Wholistic Theology
A theology of wholism applies not only to the 
presentation of the gospel to the Chinese, it is also 
pertinent to the ongoing Chinese Christian life. To some 
Chinese who are used to going to the temple every day, 
attending church only once a week seems incongruous. If 
religion is significant to one's life, then it should be 
significant every day. Thus church life to the Chinese 
should be a seven-day-a-week affair. To call Chinese 
Adventists "Seven-days Adventists" may be closer to the 
truth than may be realized, for religion is a full-time 
undertaking for the Chinese. The implication of this is 
that the church may find it beneficial to open its doors 
more than once or twice a week to those who wish to pray or 
meditate.
To the wholistic-oriented Chinese, Christianity 
appears to be a religion of the mind, not of the body or of 
the spirit. The compartmentalization of sacred and secular 
is as puzzling as is incongruent. Christian church services 
are often regarded by the Chinese as a little rituals
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believers go through each week. After the service is over 
the believers lead their own "worldly" lives the rest of the 
week. Religion as the Chinese understand it is an 
overarching and all-encompassing experience. It is deeply 
embedded in life. It is more than a system of beliefs. To 
be a Chinese Christian means full participation in church 
and its functions. The Chinese want to know what 
Christianity has to say about other dimensions of one's 
personal life--vocations, money, economic struggles, 
education, family, health, and the like. It would appear to 
be necessary for the church to expand its church life so as 
to include activities and programs beyond the spiritual 
realm in order to satisfy the needs and provide fulfillment 
for Chinese Christians.
Functionality
Another obstacle to be overcome in making the gospel 
meaningful to the Chinese is the void of the so-called 
Excluded Middle.
The Excluded Middle
The this-worldly propensity of the Chinese and their 
almost obsessive concern for success, wealth, and longevity 
has been addressed at length in chapters 3 and 4. We have 
also considered how this tendency prompts them to seek to 
elude evil forces and secure supernatural assistance. This 
common practice of getting in touch with the supernatural
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was prevalent in ancient China and, as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, remains popular in contemporary Chinese 
societies. Increased wealth notwithstanding, the Chinese 
still flock to diviners and palm-readers, even in highly 
urbanized areas.
Hiebert uses what he calls an analytical framework 
to explicate religious systems.1 The framework has 
three levels that explain questions that arise out of 
everyday life. In the West these three levels are reduced 
to two, namely science and religion (Figure 1). Science is 
a system of explanation that answers questions about the 
nature of the world. It includes the social sciences that 
deal with social problems and conflict and the natural 
sciences that seek to understand nature. At the other pole, 
religion provides a system of explanation that gives meaning 
to ultimate concerns such as origins, destiny, and the 
purpose of life. The Western worldview provides answers at 
only these two explanatory levels. A middle zone is missing 
which Hiebert calls the "excluded middle."2
The excluded middle zone has to do with power within
lPaul G. Hiebert, "The Flaw of the Excluded Middle," 
Missiology: An International Review 10 (January 19 82): 35-
47.
:Ibid., 43. Hiebert believes the bifurcation 
between science and religion is an outcome of Platonic 
dualism which has been discussed earlier in this chapter.
See also Rodger K. aufford, The Human Reflex: Behavioral
Psychology in Biblical Perspective (New York: Harper & Row, 
1981), 30.
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folk religion, animism, magic, and astrology. It answers to 
questions pertaining to the sorrows of this present life and 
the uncertainty of the future. It also deals with concerns 
such as getting well from sickness, formulae for success in 




other worldly problems 
sacred
(EXCLUDED MIDDLE)
sight and experience 
natural order 
this worldly problems 
secular
Fig. 1. A Western two-tiered view of reality
i
SCIENCE
examinations, and the like. According to Hiebert, the 
Western worldview does not provide adequate explanations to 
these matters. It is impotent to give direct answers as do 
diviners to the everyday problems people encounter.
The problem of the excluded middle is a thorny 
issue. Some Christians have suggested the use of signs and 
healings as answers to the problem. Others feel that the 
charismatic movement provides an experiential fulfillment 
not found in the conventional Christian church. Whatever 
the merits of these solutions, the functional approach 
proposed below deserves attention, for it is more compatible
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with the Chinese worldview than those listed above.
The Functional Approach
The Chinese passion for pragmatism and functionalism 
and the way this influences all aspects of Chinese life and 
thought has been noted in chapters 3 and 4. The 
contemporary Chinese as we understand them appear to be as 
this-worldly as ever. Concern for the here and now 
continues to preoccupy their minds to the exclusion of 
anything metaphysical.
The Chinese pragmatic concern for this present life 
represents one of the most vital entry points for the 
gospel. Long time Adventist missionary to China and Taiwan 
Milton Lee speaks from experience as he summarizes his 
philosophy of his work among the Chinese. He says the 
Chinese "are more impressed by a practical religion that 
will help them meet today's real problems, rather than one 
which promises only future bliss."1 Lee's comment reflects 
his insider wisdom about the Chinese mind. Indeed, if ever 
the Chinese are to be won, the gospel must be presented in a 
less content-oriented, dogma-oriented, and cognition- 
oriented fashion and in more functional, pragmatic, and 
experiential terms. Important though the doctrinal systems 
are, they mean very little to the Chinese. The traditional
'Milton Lee, "Presenting the Christian Gospel to the 
Chinese," unpublished mimeographed paper, p. 1, Far Eastern 
Division of Seventh-day Adventists.
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content-oriented approach has not worked well during the 
past two centuries and is unlikely to work now or in the 
future. The Chinese must see that the gospel answers their 
needs. They must be convinced what the gospel does before 
they are convinced of what it is. If the gospel does not 
speak to their instinctive passion for the here and now, it 
has not spoken. The bottom line of religion to the Chinese 
is its functionality. If it is functional, it is likely to 
gain acceptance. If it is not, it may be rejected no matter 
how grand and majestic the truth is.
In practical terms, the Chinese esteem for 
functionality indicates the desirability of a major shift in 
mission strategy. Perhaps we should preach and teach fewer 
moral discourses that are lists of dos and don'ts with 
little to say about "what do I get out of this?" We could 
incorporate into our evangelistic strategy more life- 
oriented, meaning-oriented, health-oriented, and wholistic- 
oriented programs. A functional approach of this kind 
should take precedence over eschatology, important though 
that may be. This approach should make the gospel more 
conducive to the Chinese mode of thinking and serve as a 
powerful entering wedge.
After the gospel has gained entry, the process of 
discipleship begins. This is where church doctrines come 
in. An analysis of the Great Commission in Matthew 28:16-20 
reveals four key words: iropeuflevre? "going," nad^re vacere
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"teach," ("disciple") /ScnrTi {ovrec; "baptizing," and 
5t6a'.axoyreq "teaching." Of those four words, only 
"disciple" or "make disciple" is an imperative or a direct 
command. The other three are participles. The imperative 
of the mandate, then, according to Matthew is "to make 
disciples" of all nations. The going, teaching, and 
baptizing are the means of accomplishing the mandate. They 
are not ends in themselves.1
The other four accounts of the Great Commission do 
not expand on this focus. They do, however, add to the list 
of the means available to reach it. Mark 16:15,16 includes 
baptizing, and adds preaching. Luke 24:47,48 restates 
preaching, and adds witnessing. John 20:21 mentions 
sending. Acts 1:8 repeats witnessing and adds the 
geographical aspect of Jerusalem, Judea, Samaria, and the 
uttermost parts of the earth. So, together with going, 
baptizing, and teaching, preaching and witnessing are added 
as part of the process of disciple making. Peter Wagner 
suggests that preaching is a presoteric (before salvation) 
activity, baptizing is a consoteric (with salvation) 
activity, and teaching is a postsoteric (after salvation) 
activity.2 It is important to note that the functional
'George W. Peters, A Biblical Theology of Missions 
(Chicago: Moody Press, 1972), 182; and C. Peter Wagner, 
Frontiers in Missionary Strategy (Chicago: Moody Press,
1971) , 22 .
2Wagner, 22.
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approach to evangelism for the Chinese is never complete 
without the postsoteric teaching ministry. The former is 
life-oriented. The purpose is to gain a beachhead on the 
soul. The latter is characterized by a more doctrinal 
approach through which the convert is taught how to begin a 
new life in Christ.
Summary
The wholistic and harmonious worldview of the 
Chinese must be allowed to inform the way the gospel message 
is presented. An effectual gospel presentation may include 
both wholistic and functional approaches. The wholistic 
method may focus on the great controversy theme and the 
doctrine of the human nature. A wholistic message implies 
an all-embracing approach which includes the social and 
physical, as well as the spiritual dimensions of life. The 
functional approach is equally important. The gospel should 
be presented in terms of function rather than content, since 
the Chinese are more interested in what religion does than 
in what it is. Both the wholistic and functional approaches 
should serve as tenable bridges to reach the Chinese in the 
cultural context in which they live and think.
Summary and Conclusion 
The twin processes of modernization and 
secularization have brought about great social change in 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Increasingly the Chinese
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have come to view modernity with nervous ambivalence and 
restless misgivings, for decades of rapid industrial and 
economic development have taken a heavy human toll in terms 
of social, physical, and psychological problems. The 
struggle has been to emulate the West while at the same time 
preserving the Chinese cultural heritage.
It is observed that this complex situation has 
several significant implications for the church. First, the 
transitional period from the traditional to the modern has 
precipitated a degree of freedom from familial and 
historical tutelage. Former ties to the family and 
tradition have been eroded. The loosening of rigid and 
authoritarian controls signals the dawning of fresh and 
unprecedented opportunities for mission among the 
contemporary Chinese.
Second, the Chinese group consciousness calls for a 
collective missiological approach. Although the traditional 
hierarchical structures have been weakened considerably, the 
modern Chinese remain gregarious and, therefore, a group 
orientedness should inform our evangelistic strategy. More 
emphasis should be placed on the group and less on the 
traditional individualistic mode of conversion.
Third, consideration should be given to the shape 
and social functions of the Chinese Christian church. The 
church is the Body of Christ whose function it is to provide 
fellowship and to create a meaning-reifying community for
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believers. The church is also a community in which worship 
is a corporate as well as a concrete experience, and 
preaching is both situation-oriented and meaning-oriented. 
Further, the church is God's mouthpiece through which the 
gospel is to be presented wholistically. The Chinese regard 
for practicality implies that the traditional doctrinal 
style of preaching be de-emphasized and a more pragmatic and 
functional approach be adopted.
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CHAPTER V I
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The purpose of this study is essentially 
missiological. The ultimate concern throughout has been the 
communication of the gospel to contemporary Chinese in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Hence, a sequence of thought 
has been pursued, beginning with a study of the process of 
secularization in Western society, moving to a description 
of the traditional Chinese worldview, and utilizing these as 
a base which seeks to investigate the effects of the twin 
processes of modernization and secularization on that 
worldview. It does not seem possible to grapple with the 
theoretical issues involved in the evangelization of the 
Chinese in these communities without a basic understanding 
of the process of change that have taken place in their 
societies during the past half century. The study moves to 
a conclusion with an analysis of the missiological 
implications which most closely compared to the worldview 
themes examined in chapter 4, and as such reflect the 
findings of the entire study.
Secularization is a process closely associated with 
the rise of m o d e m  Western civilization. Most sociologists
335
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locate its origins in the Renaissance, and agree that it was 
strengthened by the Protestant Reformation, the 
Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. The rise of 
rational sciences, the development of m o d e m  education and 
the modern state all contributed to the process. In this 
study secularization is defined as a process of fundamental 
social change in which traditional meaning systems and the 
worldview assumptions that underlie them undergo loss, 
replacement, or modification.
Secularization being a multi-dimensional process is 
a worldwide phenomenon, affecting Eastern as well as Western 
societies. The scope of its influence is universal, but the 
outcomes are different in different societies.
Secularization in the West has been characterized by a 
decline in institutional religion, with the result that 
organized religion has lost much of its former status and 
influence in society. The weakening of the social influence 
of religion has been partly attributed to the process of 
institutional differentiation in which the various spheres 
in society were separated from one another with the result 
that each developed its own specialized form in restricted 
spheres of influence. A corollary of the process of 
differentiation has been the privatization of the spiritual 
sphere into which religion has been confined and practiced. 
These developments have fostered the rise of individualism. 
Besides differentiation, privatization, and individualism.
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the process of secularization also has led to the 
displacement of religious interpretations of reality by 
rational scientific explanation based on empirical evidence. 
As a consequence the world is less likely to be perceived as 
a sacred phenomenon and life is not generally regarded as an 
unfathomable mystery.
The processes of modernization and secularization 
have followed a different pattern in the Eastern societies 
where religion is not institutionalized and religion and 
culture are enmeshed as one. In that context, 
secularization is generally characterized by social and 
cultural changes that have weakened but not obliterated the 
traditional meaning systems that have guided society. The 
result has been a reorientation of some values and 
modification of social structures.
This study of secularization is intended to serve as 
a framework upon whicn the influence of modernization and 
secularization upon the worldview of the Chinese in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore may be examined. A worldview is 
a set of philosophical assumptions or presuppositions that a 
social group espouses in common. Worldview lies at the very 
core of culture; it is the way a group understands reality 
and itself. Most core assumptions constituting a worldview 
are learnt early in life and are deeply embedded in a 
person's consciousness. People in traditional societies do 
not usually think about their philosophical assumptions,
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much less examine them. For this reason they generally 
believe their assumptions to be true and valid. Though 
hidden and ofcen unobtrusive, a worldview has a profound 
influence upon a people's way of thinking and living.
For the purposes of evaluation, this study has 
utilized a theoretical paradigm comprised of five basic 
facets of the Chinese worldview. This paradigm includes 
hierarchy, antiquity, particularity, harmony, and 
practicality. Taken as a whole, this theoretical framework 
typifies the way traditional Chinese in general perceived 
reality and themselves.
The traditional Chinese esteem for hierarchy is 
expressed in a concern for the maintenance of proper rank in 
the social order, i.e., scholar-administrator, farmer, 
artisan, and merchant; and for proper relationships, i.e., 
men over women, parents over children, masters over 
peasants, etc.
The family, the most basic Chinese institution, was 
largely extended and patrilineal in structure. It was 
hierarchical as well as authoritarian. Parental authority 
over children was almost absolute, and filial piety was 
rigorously taught and often inordinately imposed. In the 
male-dominated society, women were subordinate and 
subservient to men. Marriage was arranged by parents and 
often without the consent of the betrothed.
The lineage was also an important component in the
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kinship system in traditional China. It commanded awesome 
power and reverential respect and was one of the prime 
reasons for the Chinese propensity to group orientation.
Most Chinese felt secure in the primary family and lineage 
relationships that provided emotional, moral, and economic 
support. Thus individual success did not so much hinge on 
individual performance as on the group performance. The 
group also arbitrated disputes and sought to preserve the 
"face" of the parties involved.
The Chinese reverence for antiquity was revealed in 
an obsessive concern with history. Past events and 
experiences evoked a sense of relevance and often served as 
blueprints for the future as well as the present. The aged 
were regarded as the repository of years of accumulated 
wisdom and were eulogized and highly exalted. They were 
often consulted and their advice taken seriously. The 
Chinese preoccupation with the past can also be seen in the 
importance attached to their ancestors and to the religious 
activities developed to worship them and gain their favor. 
The ancestors, they believed, could bestow protection, 
blessings, and good fortune on their living descendants only 
if they were properly cared for and regularly worshipped 
through elaborate rituals. The Chinese orientation to the 
past has been described by Western sociologists as 
synonymous with changelessness and deemed detrimental to 
progress.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
3 4 0
The Chinese affinity for particularity constituted 
another dimension of their worldview assumptions. The 
Chinese tended to think in concrete terms. Both the 
Classics and the Chinese language contributed to this 
disposition. The Five Classics taught the importance of 
historical particularities. Attention was given to specific 
instances instead of general principles. The Chinese 
language being hieroglyphic presented characters in visually 
vivid forms which naturally reinforced the reality-centered 
pattern of thinking and writing. An important outcome of 
this inclination has been the non-development of science.
The Chinese affinity for harmony brought humans and 
nature together inasmuch as heaven and earth were regarded 
as parts of a comprehensive whole. Death belonged to the 
same realm of reality as life. Departed ancestors and 
living descendants were closely connected. This tendency to 
harmony was partly influenced by Confucius' Doctrine of the 
Golden Mean in which moderation was prized as a virtue in 
life. This proclivity contributed to the Chinese inclusive 
approach to religion, stressing respect and appreciation for 
polarities rather than contempt and antagonism, 
complementariness rather than contrariness. The affinity 
for harmony also predisposed the Chinese to syncretism, the 
espousal of one or more Chinese religions simultaneously.
The Chinese esteem for practicality indicated a 
functional approach to life. In matters relating to
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principles, there was much greater interest in the 
utilitarian rather than the metaphysical. The this-worldly 
aspects of life were concentrated upon and relatively little 
attention was given to the hereafter. This affinity for 
practicality contributed to the anthropocentric tendency 
among the Chinese who for centuries prided themselves as 
being the center of world civilization. Chinese 
functionality has also made the Chinese known for their 
pragmatism in politics, religion, and other spheres of life.
The traditional Chinese worldview as portrayed above 
has not remained immutable in contemporary Chinese societies 
in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Forces of 
modernization and secularization have resulted in social and 
cultural changes that are altering dimensions of life and 
thought, often imperceptibly and sometimes significantly.
The collision between external pressures and indigenous 
traditions has probably produced more profound mutations for 
East Asian Chinese than the Chinese in mainland China had
experienced in the previous two thousand years. The
traditional way of life and thinking, which had so long
served as an insulating and protecting husk, giving a sense
of security and complacency, have begun to crack.
In many ways the change experienced in contemporary 
Chinese societies is fundamental reorientation of thinking, 
reorientation of the worldview, so to speak. Individuals 
are being asked to accept new thinking, new social
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relationships, and more particularly, to reconstruct their 
views on life and reality. Almost simultaneously, they are 
encouraged to modify or abandon many time-honored 
attachments to traditional values and ways of coping with 
reality.
The type and scope of Chinese worldview change is 
neither complete nor definite. However, given the findings 
of this study, we have been able to identify a pattern of 
change and continuity that characterizes the contemporary 
Chinese. The two major areas of Chinese worldview 
undergoing attrition are those relating to hierarchy and 
antiquity. There has been little sign of change in the 
other three areas: particularity, harmony, and
practicality.
As regards hierarchical relationships the extended 
family system is on the wane. By and large it has been 
replaced by a trend toward a smaller conjugal family system. 
Filial piety, though still affirmed as a cardinal Chinese 
virtue, has been rid of its former authoritarian elements 
and replaced by respect and mutuality between parent and 
child. The growing sense of mutuality reflects the rising 
status and independence of the individual. The Chinese are 
less likely to be tied to the family and lineage and are 
more likely to form associations outside the family circle 
inasmuch as the family system has lost some of its former 
almost inextricably closely woven relationship. With the
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availability of education and the rise of personal income, 
the former low status of women is also on the ascendance. 
Marriage is now less likely to be a parental choice, and 
divorce is more commonplace. The power of lineage 
organization is also on the wane. Changing situations have 
made it necessary for lineages to play a smaller social 
role. The Chinese group consciousness, though enervated and 
somewhat modified into a semi - individualistic orientation, 
remains an important part of the cultural milieu.
The present study has also discovered a languishing 
of the traditional Chinese esteem for antiquity.
Contemporary urban Chinese are more committed to innovation 
and more oriented to the present and future than to the 
past. The formerly undisputed past has been called into 
question and many have come to view the backward-looking 
stance as a stumbling block to progress. Although ancestor 
worship is still practiced by the older generation, the 
frequency and intensity of its observance appears to be 
declining. Deference to the elders is also on the wane.
The elders in society, though still reasonably well taken 
care of physically by family members, have suffered marked 
depreciation in power and prestige. In fact, the latest 
trend has been toward sending aged parents into nursing 
homes, an idea which most Chinese viewed with unspeakable 
abhorrence until recently, for sending the aged away from 
home was tantamount to abandonment--the anathema of filial
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piety. While the influence of the aged is on the wane, 
educated and progressive young people are emerging from 
their formerly passive role in the family and society to 
enjoy a marked elevation of status and importance.
While the first two dimensions of the traditional 
Chinese worldview show signs of change, the last three seem 
to have withstood the socio-economic pressures of the 
processes of modernization and secularization. Little 
evidence of debilitating change has been detected. The 
Chinese propensity for concrete thinking is still very much 
apparent today largely because the hieroglyphic Chinese 
linguistics remains mostly unaltered. The Chinese persist 
in their aversion to counterfactual expressions and are 
hesitant to make the cognitive shift from reality-centered 
patterns of thought to the abstract realm. Despite the 
apparent reluctance, the contemporary trend suggests a 
switch in favor of a theoretical thought pattern akin to the 
West, a trend that is partly due to the strong emphasis on 
science and technology education in these societies.
The Chinese affinity for harmony continues to be a 
meaningful part of the prevailing worldview. Like their 
forebears, modern Chinese solicit natural, personal and 
communal equilibrium. Many still vouch for the veracity of 
yin-yang cosmology. The legendary religious tolerance and 
inclusivity continue to characterize the contemporary 
Chinese.
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The esteem for practicality has not been changed by 
the new social and economic conditions--if anything it has 
been intensified. The modern Chinese are as functional and 
pragmatic as ever. Despite the increase in the level of 
education attained and their preoccupation with success, 
wealth, and longevity, they continue to seek to elude evil 
forces and secure favors from ancestors and other gods 
through various means of fortune telling. And more often 
than not, it is the traditional rather than the m o d e m  
practitioners of these arts that are patronized.
The patterns of change and continuity found in this 
study have tended to challenge the thesis that the process 
of secularization is irreversible. Secularization may have 
weakened the influence of religion and precipitated a degree 
of cultural change in the Chinese societies studied, but it 
is unlikely to bring about more than limited change in the 
foreseeable future. It is too simplistic to assume that 
millennia of culture can be obliterated within a few 
decades. The inertia of the Chinese tradition is a potent 
force which has exhibited a remarkable degree of persistence 
and tenacity. The Chinese Confucian ideology and ethical 
orientation appear to have exerted a stabilizing influence 
during changing m o d e m  conditions. While elements of the 
tradition have been debilitated, the essentials of Chinese 
culture are maintained and a viable intergroup ethos is 
perpetuated.
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The conclusion of the present study also rejects the 
idea that traditional and modern forms are always in 
conflict. Most contemporary Chinese adopt a hybrid 
worldview in which new modes of thinking and living which 
approximate Western concepts of social and economic 
development are grafted on to their traditional systems of 
values. Norms regarding the family constitute a case in 
point. Traditional family norms and some norms typical of 
the conjugal family coexist. Such coexistence is deemed 
functionally possible and desirable in the contemporary 
milieu.
This curious mosaic of the traditional and modern 
serves as the backdrop against which the missiological 
implications of secularization should be considered. In 
anticipation of this, we have sought to review three broad 
areas of missiological significance: mission, conversion
and the church.
1. Secularization has increased the potential 
receptivity of the contemporary Chinese to the gospel, 
because secularization is increasingly delivering them from 
the traditional tight control of family obligations and the 
kinship system. This emancipation is creating both personal 
freedom and an openness to the gospel.
2. The Chinese proclivity for gregariousness 
suggests that a group approach to Christian conversion 
should be taken into consideration in mission strategy.
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This has proved very effective in other societies and it 
needs to be explored in the contemporary Chinese setting.
The possibilities of conversion may increase when 
preparation for conversion is conducted in the context of 
the group to which the prospective converts belong. The 
traditional individualistic, one-against-all approach to 
conversion appears to be at odds with the instinctive 
Chinese communal spirit. Multi-individual conversions, on 
the other hand, appear more analogous to the Chinese craving 
for mutual dependence and group incorporation and should 
therefore be explored in depth.
3. The biblical witness regarding the nature of the 
church as a corporate body which provides mutual comfort, 
support, and fellowship to its members should also be 
considered. Most contemporary Chinese are at the crossroads 
of transition. Even while embracing Western technology, 
they are deeply concerned with the continued stability of 
their own culture. They are ambivalent about change, 
wondering how in the midst of change and constancy the 
Chinese cultural heritage is going to end up. The church 
should be able to provide intellectual and social support 
during this period of uncertainty.
As the Body of Christ the church should function as 
a surrogate family to the Chinese. In so doing, the church 
provides not only a plausibility structure where a meaning 
system is reified, but also fellowship through social
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networking and cell groups. The church as worshiping 
community furnishes a tangible and experiential environment 
conducive to the Chinese affinity to concreteness. The 
concept of the church as a herald calls for the community of 
faith to preach, teach, and demonstrate the gospel 
wholistically and functionally.
McGavran's words "winning the winnable while they 
are winnable"1 seems a fitting conclusion to this 
dissertation. The contemporary Chinese of Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Singapore appear to be winnable in the present 
period of political transition and personal uncertainty. 
Secularization has created a counter movement to traditional 
cultural identity. Most Chinese are torn between 
Westernization and traditional orthodoxy. They are 
unsettled about change and feel somewhat sandwiched between 
Western influence and Chinese culture. Meanwhile the 
challenges of everyday life and the search for meaning 
continue to drive them to seek solace and solutions to their 
questions beyond themselves. Thus the partial emancipation 
from the past, the uncertainty of the present, and 
ambivalence about the future produce favorable opportunities 
for the communication of the gospel. Suffice it to say that 
the present condition appears to be a winnable situation 
that should be exploited with the gospel.
In the final analysis, mission remains God's
‘McGavran, Understanding Church Growth. 291.
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prerogative. Though a missionary mandate is given to the 
church, God initiated mission in the first place. Certainly 
this gospel mandate must be carried out with great 
intelligence, ingenuity and devotion. But human effort must 
never overshadow God's sovereignty, for mission is first and 
foremost the work of God Himself. Missionary strategy must 
therefore be subservient to God's providential leading. And 
after all is said and done, glory is to be given to God for 
the building up of His kingdom and the ultimate restoration 
of mankind, including the Chinese.
This dissertation is a pilot, exploratory study 
designed to probe the Chinese mind in its former and present 
milieu. Comparisons of the different research cited are 
difficult to undertake, since different definitions and 
methodologies were used. Thus our findings have proved to 
be more suggestive than definitive. Although the various 
results obtained from this study fall into a pattern, and 
although the interpretations seem plausible, the findings 
and interpretations expressed here should be regarded as 
tentative until they have been applied existentially and the 
results critically evaluated.
The result of this study reveals several areas of 
concern that should probably be addressed in the future. 
These pertain largely to the practical methodology of doing 
mission. This dissertation highlights some implications and 
possibilities for mission in terms of the contemporary
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Chinese worldview. Because the suggestions are mostly 
theoretical, research is needed to field-test the 
conclusions and recommendations made. Only then will it be 
possible to construct a practical strategy for evangelistic 
work among the Chinese.
Another area of possible further research would be 
on "doing" theology the Chinese way. Since theology is not 
done in a vacuum, the description of the contemporary 
Chinese mind in this dissertation should provide a valuable 
source for a theological construction of basic yet seemingly 
unfathomable Christian concepts of God, sin, incarnation, 
atonement, and salvation.
The sinicization of patterns of public worship 
represents another area of concern that calls for more 
study. Research is needed to ascertain how a reality- 
centered approach in terms of drama, music, and other means 
can actually be carried out as an aid to the presentation of 
the gospel to the Chinese.
All in all, a second dissertation is needed that 
will cope with the vast task of applying the insights 
suggested in the theoretical development of this 
dissertation to an equally comprehensive study of the 
evangelistic task in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore.
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